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ABSTRACT 
This thesis provides a political economy analysis of governance, growth and development 
using the case study of Colombia’s second city Medellín. Most conventional explanations 
consider ‘good governance’ reforms to be the institutional underpinnings for Medellín’s recent 
developments, arguing that a standard set of institutions and governance capabilities were 
necessary to achieve an “urban miracle”. In contrast, this thesis uses a historical political 
economy framework to argue that, for a detailed understanding of institutional changes and 
their respective implications, we need to analyse the interdependency between power and 
institutions. When interactions of powerful actors and institutions achieve a sustainable level 
of growth and stability a ‘political settlement’ emerges. This political settlements approach 
argues that there are no ‘good’ or ‘bad’ institutions per se, but only favourable and less 
favourable interdependent combinations of power and institutions that affect the capabilities 
of governance agencies to reduce growth-constraining transaction costs and to maintain 
political stability. The theoretical originality of this thesis is the analysis of how decentralized 
governance and globalized economic networks have changed the dynamics of traditional 
power structures and challenged standard strategies of institutional rent management. In 
particular, it explores ways in which these processes may expand the political settlements 
approach. 
Challenging conventional analyses of the role of institutions for growth, this thesis applies a 
mixed methods case study approach using qualitative and quantitative data to illuminate three 
original contributions to the understanding of Medellín’s development. First, it provides an 
alternative analysis of Medellín’s industrialization process, arguing that favourable 
combinations of power and institutions enhanced growth in light manufacturing industries. 
Secondly, the thesis explores political economy explanations of how the distribution of power 
in Medellín’s political settlement became largely incompatible with institutional mechanisms 
needed for the promotion of advanced industrial development. Insufficient governance 
capacities to create and distribute growth-enhancing rents in the 1970s led to economic 
slowdown, political instability, and violence. Thirdly, the thesis argues that recent 
developments in Medellín can be understood in the context of Colombia’s radical shift to 
neoliberalism, which included decentralization reforms and a transnationalization of capitalist 
elite’s interests. These changes have enduring implications. The new combination of power 
structures and institutions creates limited governance capabilities to incentivize productivity 
growth. The powerful position of the transnational capitalist elite in the ruling coalition 
furthermore hinders the enforcement of disciplining mechanisms. While these structures 
might stabilize the political settlement by gathering different elite factions around the axis of 
transnational accumulation patterns, they also facilitate Medellín’s return to static 
comparative advantages in labour-intensive industries and low technological services, 
perpetuating the city’s confinement in the low productivity end of global value chains.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
"Development should be reconceived not as a national phenomenon, in which what 
develops is a nation, but in terms of developed, underdeveloped, and intermediate 
population groups occupying contradictory or unstable locations in a transnational 
environment" (Robinson, 2010, p. 46). 
“The cities in Latin America have something that makes them a kind of summary, a 
microcosm of the world. The elite… lives in orderly, perfect neighbourhoods, similar to 
the population of the First World: these places could be Norway or Switzerland. This 
elite dominates the economy, makes decisions, organizes armies, plans the future. 
Quite a large mass of people… has to survive in terrible neighbourhoods, in conditions 
of poverty, overcrowding, despair. They have no water or sewer systems, live with 
hunger: these places could be in Africa. In the city where I live, Medellín, in only a half 
hour on the metro, you can move from Sweden to Sudan” (Abad Faciolince, 2014, pp. 
389–390). 
 
These accounts of the relationship between space, interests, and inequality fittingly capture 
some of the core contributions of this thesis. As Robinson (2010) argues, development today 
must be conceived as much more than efforts at growth stimulation on the national level. As 
such, the approach used in this study goes beyond the focus of many institutional theories on 
the role of institutions for development and includes a political economy analysis of 
decentralization processes and transnational factors. Further, this thesis provides a detailed 
political economy discussion of historical and social processes in Colombia that have shaped 
the institutional environment in which policies can be implemented to achieve political and 
economic development. The thesis specifically analyses how different institutional processes 
and governance reforms following the implementation of decentralization and liberalization 
policies in Colombia and the transnationalization of local elite factions affected developmental 
outcomes of the country’s second city Medellín.  
In this context, the thesis addresses the following research questions, from the vantage point 
of its case study Medellín:  
1. How can we frame theories of institutions, governance and development in ways that 
contextualise institutional change in the historic and social processes that have shaped 
political and economic environments of transitional societies?  
This first theoretical research question departs from conventional institutional approaches that 
use the ‘good governance’ framework. By proposing a standard set of institutions and by 
depoliticizing economic decision-making processes, the ‘good governance’ agenda discounts 
the importance of context-specific analyses of the societies in which these institutions are 
13 
 
implemented. The research question points towards the need of studying historically evolved 
power structures in order to understand the impacts of institutional change on actual 
developmental outcomes. The research question thus provides the entry point for a discussion 
of a broader theoretical framework that includes the study of political and social processes 
that shape power structures and impact efficiency and distributive institutional functions.  
The second research question highlights that the parallel processes of decentralization and 
transnationalization change the contexts in which institutions are implemented and enforced. 
Recognizing that development policies are not exclusively defined nationally, the research 
question thus stresses the need for institutional approaches to extend beyond the narrow 
focus on the analysis of national-level institutions, policies and power structures.  
2. In which ways do decentralized structures and globalized processes impact the 
political economy analysis of institutional change in less developed countries? In 
particular, how does the transnationalization of local factions of the capitalist elite in 
Latin America affect power structures and institutional mechanisms in ways that have 
implications for the implementation and enforcement of policies that can achieve 
sustainable levels of political and economic viability?  
Research questions 3-6 relate to the empirical contribution of this thesis. Chapter two 
contextualises these questions in closer detail, identifying the specific gaps in existing empirical 
analyses of Medellín’s development that this study intends to fill.  
3. How did historical and social processes shape the development of the 
interdependency between power and institutions in Medellín in ways that led to the 
creation of favourable conditions for industrialization? 
4. How can changes in the constellation of power, elite interests, governance capacities 
of the state, and entrepreneurial capabilities of the city’s private sector explain why 
the regional economy deindustrialized? How did the changing nature of these factors 
shape developmental outcomes?  
5. What are the impacts of elite transnationalization and political decentralization on the 
distribution of power and the institutional environment in Medellín? What effects did 
these changes have on the city’s development trajectory in recent years? 
6. Has Medellín’s development resulted in sustainable outcomes that could generate 
political stability and economic growth in high productivity sectors? Why does 
Medellín remain the most unequal urban area in Colombia – one of the most unequal 
countries worldwide? 
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Before engaging in a detailed analysis of these research questions, the remainder of this 
introduction provides an overview of the theoretical debate and research area in which this 
study is embedded (section 1.1). Section 1.2 discusses the relevance of this study and points 
out the main contributions this thesis provides. Section 1.3, which outlines the structure of the 
thesis, presents the main arguments of this thesis and previews the findings made in each 
chapter.  
1.1 THEORETICAL DEBATE AND RESEARCH AREA 
Discussions of the factors and processes influencing the creation of the “wealth of nations” 
have been at the core of most debates in the discipline of economics. However, most analyses 
in the discipline have focused exclusively on economic determinants that generate conditions 
of general equilibrium and market efficiency. Following the rising influence of institutional 
economics, scholarly contributions have increasingly emphasized the importance of 
institutions that minimize the costs arising from economic and political transactions. This 
literature analyses the underlying institutions or “rules of the game” that underpin social 
interaction and influence economic choices and growth outcomes (North, 1990). The large 
majority of this literature is focused on the analysis of the implications of different institutions 
for achieving competitive markets in the development of national economies, regardless of the 
context in which these institutions are implemented. From this theoretical understanding 
derives the policy agenda of ‘good governance’, arguably the most prominent agenda for 
institutional reform, that sees a standard set of governance capabilities as necessary and 
sufficient conditions for achieving growth and development in less developed countries and 
regions.  
While this thesis is broadly located in the area of institutional economics, it challenges some of 
the underlying assumptions of the conventional understanding of the role of institutions for 
development on several levels. Firstly, the thesis argues that institutions have efficiency as well 
as distributive functions. It studies how these functions shape the context-specific distribution 
of power that affects the likelihood of implementation and enforcement of a particular 
institutional change and the ways in which policies affect the economic and political viability of 
a society. Specifically, this thesis is concerned with the analysis of the relative distribution of 
power in a particular context and how this affects the conditions that determine successful 
implementation and enforcement of economic policies (Khan, 2010a). Secondly, and 
acknowledging that upward and downward transfers of institutions in less developed countries 
have led to a “hollowing out” of the nation state, this contribution analyses how globalized 
processes and the movement towards decentralization affect the contexts in which policies 
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can be introduced and enforced (Jessop, 2004; Robinson, 2010). The thesis uses the case study 
of Medellín to examine the impacts of transnational and local factors on elite interests and 
power constellation.  
This thesis studies the political economy of governance and growth in the politically 
decentralized and economically liberalized context of Latin America. In the past two decades, 
most Latin American countries have undergone several transformations in their political 
economies. Since the late 1980s and following the crisis of the state-interventionist 
development model that focused on economic growth through import substitution 
industrialization (ISI), Latin America moved away from its state-centred approach and shifted 
to implement neoliberal policies. Besides far-reaching liberalization reforms of trade and 
finance, an extensive privatization of public assets and services, fiscal austerity, as well as a 
very substantial deregulation of state control over industry, these radical changes also involved 
the implementation of a wide range of state restructuring reforms that included the 
decentralization of government (see Faguet and Pöschl, 2015; Falleti, 2010). The main aim of 
the interconnected policies of economic liberalization and political decentralization was to 
make government more democratic, transparent, and accountable by reducing the 
discretionary control of central authority to create rents and by bringing decision making 
closer to civil society (Cavarozzi, 1992).  
This rather radical shift towards neoliberalism in Latin American countries following the 
region’s debt crisis and “lost decade” of the 1980s has substantially changed the contexts in 
which political and economic policies are introduced and enforced (Khan and Blankenburg, 
2009). There is an abundance of academic studies analysing the impacts of these shifts on 
governance, growth and development. However, most scholarly debates that examine 
institutional challenges in politically decentralized and economically liberalized Latin America 
focus on conventional institutional approaches and policies that are linked to the ‘good 
governance’ agenda. Hence, in order to achieve the ‘right’ underpinnings for policies for 
successful growth and development academic observers, international organizations and 
policymakers have promoted institutional reforms that focus on achieving better transparency, 
higher accountability, and less corruption (World Bank, 1992, 2000). The ‘good governance’ 
agenda together with the promotion of decentralization has served as a blueprint approach for 
less developed countries to achieve development. The reforms thus focused on downsizing 
states to minimize market-distorting interventions that are seen as a source of transaction 
costs (see Hall and Pfeiffer, 2000; UN-HABITAT, 2015).  
However, the decentralization and ‘good governance’ literature falls short in discussing a 
variety of different aspects that are important for a comprehensive understanding of 
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governance challenges for less developed countries in general and for urban areas in Latin 
America in particular. Hence, conventional approaches do not engage with closer institutional 
analyses of how policies can be implemented in contexts where spatio-economic changes have 
affected power relations, state capabilities, and political factors in general. There is no 
reference to capitalist development, local elites, or other powerful agents. There is no political 
economy analysis of the interests, ideologies, or the roles played by transnational 
organizations, particularly of financial institutions. The emerging influence of the transnational 
capitalist elite on institutional mechanisms and governance capabilities is also completely 
missing from this strand of literature. Regardless of these shortcomings of contemporary 
institutional explanations of restructuring local governance, there have been only very limited 
attempts to explore alternative institutional strategies for productive economic development 
for urban areas in less developed countries. Literature that proposes a “local alternative for 
decentralization and economic development (in Latin America)” (de la Cruz et al., 2011) or a 
“productive transformation of cities in Latin America” (UN-HABITAT, 2015b) do not challenge 
‘good governance’ ideas and ideals.  
Attempts to explore and develop viable alternative theories on urban governance and policy 
approaches to achieve high productivity growth and economic development through “urban 
entrepreneurialism”, “Schumpeterian local institutions”, or “local developmental institutions” 
have largely focussed urban governance in advanced capitalist countries or in successful 
developmental states that have already achieved a considerable level of economic catching up. 
However, several political and institutional characteristics and the difficulty of mimicking 
particular institutional strategies minimize the analytical value of a comparison with urban 
areas in less developed countries today. Thus, and important for the analysis of urban 
governance in Latin America, less developed countries today face very different obstacles in 
attempts to create and enforce urban “entrepreneurial” or “Schumpeterian” institutions.  
The theoretical contribution of this thesis contrasts with conventional approaches to 
institutional analysis. Using the analytical framework of ‘political settlements’ this thesis 
argues that there are no ‘good’ or ‘bad’ institutions, but only favourable and less favourable 
interdependent combinations of power and institutions (Khan, 2010a; Di John and Putzel, 
2009). A political settlement describes a relatively stable set of institutions, which derive from 
the balances of power in a society. These institutions, in turn, shape a context so that the net 
distribution of benefits sustains the specific distribution of power of that society. This means 
that the distribution of power in a polity or across organizations is an important factor for the 
understanding of institutional changes and their effects on the implementation and 
enforcement of particular policies that influence political and economic developmental 
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outcomes. The framework proposed here argues that in order to understand institutional 
changes and their indeterminate outcomes we need to analyse the compatibility of these 
changes with the particular power structure in the political settlement. In particular, we are 
interested in how a political settlement creates conditions for achieving sustainable and 
inclusive levels of political stability and economic growth. Since the distribution of power 
changes over time, the political economy analysis of institutional change used here is path-
dependent, dynamic and non-linear. 
In order to understand how the interdependency between power and institutions affect 
developmental outcomes, our theoretical approach differentiates between different types of 
costs that are important in the political economy analysis of institutional change. Unlike the 
New Institutional Economics (NIE), we find that a general reduction of transaction costs does 
not automatically lead to positive developmental outcomes. The political settlements 
approach proposed here does not include all kinds of transaction costs, but only focuses on the 
costs that hinder changes that are “growth-enhancing” (Khan, 2009). In turn, an institutional 
change that reduces an irrelevant, non-growth-constraining transaction cost may well lead to 
negative developmental outcomes, for example by inadvertently strengthening powerful 
organizations that block growth. Furthermore, we argue that the particular net effect of 
institutional changes can only be understood if we consider costs that occur through resistance 
to or obstruction of these changes. These “transition costs” are costs that arise depending on 
the intensity of the resistance against distributive implications of the institutional change in 
question and they are a function of organizational powers of potential winners and losers of 
institutional change (Khan, 2009). 
This makes the analysis of the distribution of power crucial. However, and again contrasting 
with the NIE, we understand power not purely as an economic measure to hold out and 
engage in a conflict, but also as the ability to organize support in a society as a whole as well as 
among and between organizations. The understanding of the distribution of power in a 
political settlement is important for the analysis of how changes reduce or induce certain costs 
that can affect growth outcomes. If for example a group of powerful political organizations (i.e. 
a ‘ruling coalition’) wants to push through a policy that reduces growth-constraining 
transaction costs, but faces contestation from organizationally powerful groups that are 
temporarily or permanently excluded from that coalition, the growth-enhancing institutional 
change might not be implemented.  
The political economy framework adopted here further differs from the NIE in regard to the 
evaluation of rents. The NIE sees rents as sources of market distortions that lead to market 
failures. In our approach rents in general, and learning rents in particular can also have positive 
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effects on economic growth and development as they can create incentives and compulsions 
for investments into efforts of acquiring capacities in medium or high technology sectors1. 
Political settlements in less developed countries largely differ from those in advanced capitalist 
countries. Political settlements in less developed countries are more strongly characterized by 
the existence of informal institutions. Hence, the institutional analysis of different costs and 
sources of power also needs to include informal institutions, such as patron-clientelist 
networks, mafias, and the like. Consequently, the analysis of the distribution of power needs 
to include institutions that create informal rents and distribute them to formal or informal 
organizations. The discussion of informality is of particular relevance as it lets us identify and 
analyse specific enforceability problems of particular institutions. 
The successful implementation and enforcement of a growth-enhancing institutional change 
depends not only on the ability of the ruling coalition to reduce growth-constraining 
transaction costs as well as transition costs, but also on several additional factors, such as 
governance capacities of state agencies to effectively manage rents in ways that create 
incentives and compulsions for investments in medium to high technology sectors. We 
particularly focus on learning rents that can incentivize entrepreneurs to invest in efforts to 
increase productivity or acquire advanced technological capabilities. Hence, the success of a 
growth-enhancing institutional change also depends on the technological and entrepreneurial 
capabilities of actors, firms, and sectors.  
In sum, a growth-enhancing institutional change depends on the compatibility of this change 
with the distribution of power, governance capacities of the state and technological 
capabilities of entrepreneurs in a political settlement. A ruling coalition can achieve growth-
enhancing changes if the distribution of power drives the creation and enforcement of a 
particular institution that facilitates rent management in ways that reduce growth-constraining 
                                                          
1 In this thesis, high technology growth is understood as value creation in production of goods at vest 
scales (typically capital goods). The share of value added of the production of such goods tends to be 
high at all stages of the production process. We recognize that global supply and production chains have 
altered the ways in which value is added along the value chain. The unbundling of the production 
process following global capitalist integration has made it possible to offshore some of the stages of 
production. Baldwin (2013) argues that this has led to a shift in value added away from these offshored 
stages. By showing that particularly the production process itself has been offshored and thus involves 
less value creation today than before globalization, the author finds that pre- and post-fabrication 
services are increasingly important sources of high value added growth. Baldwin’s (2013) so-called 
“smile curve” depicts how global value chains have changed the understanding of high value added 
activities in showing that earlier and late stages (in pre- and post production services) more value is 
added than during the production process (depicted on a smile-like graph in which the y-axis shows 
share of value added and the x-axis shows the stage of production).    
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transaction costs and minimize transition costs in order to incentivize minimally capable 
entrepreneurs to invest in the learning and acquisition of higher technological capabilities.  
1.2 RELEVANCE AND MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS 
While the political settlements framework has been widely used in analyses of the effects of 
institutional changes, this thesis further explores this heterodox political economy approach 
and tries to fill gaps in the academic literature on several levels. Firstly, there exists very little 
academic literature that applies the theory of political settlements to the empirical realities of 
Latin America, with the exceptions of some very insightful and important contributions (see Di 
John, 2009; Khan and Blankenburg, 2009). This thesis provides a comprehensive addition to 
the theoretical and empirical understanding of Latin America in general and Colombia in 
particular. Secondly, and as Hickey (2013, p. 19) rightly describes, there is a general gap in the 
political settlements literature when it comes to analysing the role and influence of 
transnational factors shaping the different aspects of the political settlements theory. This 
thesis will thus explore and revise the political settlements framework by including an analysis 
of globalized networks and processes. We particularly use Robinson’s (2010) findings on Latin 
America’s emerging transnational capitalist class to analyse the impacts of these political 
economy transformations on the different variables of the political settlements approach, 
particularly the distribution of power, governance capacities and technological capabilities of 
the local entrepreneurs. Thirdly, this thesis explores how the revised political settlements 
framework helps in the analysis of local and urban governance challenges following Latin 
America’s radical shift to neoliberalism that included not only a return of its economies to 
static comparative advantages in low productivity sectors, but also the far-reaching 
decentralization of political, administrative and fiscal authorities. Hence, and following 
Robinson (2010, p. 27) who finds that “(t)he movement toward the decentralization of the 
national state… in Latin America should be seen in light of changes in the state under 
globalization”, for our political economy analysis of political settlements in Colombia we go 
beyond the narrow focus on national-level actors and factors.  
For a further exploration of the revised theoretical framework and in order for us to test its 
empirical validity, we chose the case study of the city of Medellín. The case study of Medellín 
was chosen strategically because of the several political, economic and institutional 
transformations the city has experienced since the early 1900s. After an impressive 
industrialization phase that spanned much of the first half of the twentieth century the local 
political settlement became increasingly unstable after several crises resulted in economic 
slowdown and political violence. In the 1980s and early 1990s Medellín became famous for 
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being the ‘most violent city in the world’, as the Medellín Cartel, led by Pablo Escobar brought 
terror to the streets of the city and questioned the political and economic legitimacy of local 
institutions and the predominant elite structures. Following Escobar’s death in 1993 Medellín’s 
political economy only recovered very slowly. And with a severe economic and financial crisis 
hitting Colombia in 1998/99 the economic and political viability of the city’s developmental 
trajectory was yet again fragile: Medellín’s violence rates increased once again, the local 
economy experienced a recession with negative growth rates of around 5%, and the urban 
unemployment rate rose over 20%.  
However, by the turn of the millennium economic growth and political stability returned. 
Between 2004 and 2014 violence rates decreased dramatically and GDP growth per capita 
surpassed the average growth rate of Colombia’s economy by large margins. In 2014 
Medellín’s GDP per capita grew by over 4.2%, making the city’s economy the fastest growing 
urban market in Latin America (Brookings, 2015). This truly remarkable success story and 
turnaround of Medellín’s political economy has recently been subject to many scholarly and 
non-academic analyses. Most contributions come to the conclusion that the city’s 
transformations are nothing short of a “miracle” and find that ‘good governance’ policies, 
combined with urban renewal projects are responsible for these developments.  
Motivated by dissatisfaction with and doubts about these rather static institutional approaches 
that are often context-detached, ahistorical and devoid of politics, this study explores the 
explanatory value of the theoretical assumptions outlined above for achieving a 
comprehensive understanding of the case of Medellín. By identifying several gaps in the 
academic literature on Medellín’s development, the theoretical framework adopted in this 
thesis helps to achieve an improved empirical understanding of Medellín’s development. This 
thesis argues that an in-depth understanding of recent developments and transformations 
requires a political economy analysis of historical and social processes. Besides setting the 
stage for a context-specific analysis of recent developments in Medellín, this historical 
investigation allows us to add explanatory value to the understanding of the industrialization 
of the regional economy. While regional ISI experiences in Colombia have been analysed 
extensively in the academic literature, this thesis provides an alternative analysis of Medellín’s 
industrialization process arguing that favourable combinations of power and institutions 
enhanced growth in light manufacturing industries at specific junctures.  
Furthermore, the thesis provides original insights into Medellín’s deindustrialization processes. 
Using the political settlements framework, the thesis provides an original analysis of several 
crises that affected Medellín in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Most conventional explanations 
regard general macroeconomic imbalances, the Latin American debt crises, and falling external 
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demand as the main causes of economic and political turbulences in Colombia and Medellín. 
While this study also analyses these factors, it presents additional political economy 
explanations of these processes and discusses how the power distribution in the local and 
national political settlements became largely incompatible with the institutional mechanisms 
needed for the promotion of advanced industrial development. We find that besides 
macroeconomic causes, it was insufficient technological capabilities of entrepreneurs and 
inadequate governance capacities of the state to create and distribute growth-enhancing rents 
that led to economic slowdown, political instability, and violence. 
The main empirical contribution of this thesis lies in the alternative explanation and in-depth 
discussion of recent economic and political transformations of Medellín. By identifying several 
formal and informal institutional mechanisms and organizations relevant for the 
implementation of policies as well as other aspects specific to Medellín’s political settlement, 
this study sheds light on the particular characteristics of Medellín’s development since the 
early 2000s. Thus, the analytical explanations of Medellín’s recent development depart from 
conventional accounts that generally find political decentralization, far-reaching economic 
liberalization, and “good urban governance” to be the institutional underpinnings of the 
economic and political transformations that led to an alleged “urban miracle” (see Gilbert, 
2006; Gutiérrez et al., 2012). A historical discussion of economic, political and social processes 
that have influenced Medellín’s political settlement provides an entry point to an original 
analysis of the city’s recent development, which deconstructs these “miracle” claims.  
1.3 THESIS STRUCTURE AND MAIN ARGUMENTS 
The thesis begins with a review of the literature about Medellín’s development in chapter 2. 
The chapter is dedicated to a critical discussion of conventional explanations of several 
transformations of Medellín, particularly the institutional changes and growth performances 
since the early 2000s. The chapter introduces the topic and case study in more detail and 
reveals further gaps in the empirical literature, which helps us contextualise the empirical 
research questions this thesis tries to answer. Chapter 2 argues that most studies analysing 
Medellín’s recent development do not sufficiently consider the historical processes of 
economic and social transformation that have shaped the local polity and informed recent 
developmental changes. This is particularly noticeable in the fact that most contributions use 
theoretical approaches rooted in the idea that the ‘correct’ institutional framework helps less 
developed regions to grow and develop. Furthermore, we argue that most scholarly debates 
on Medellín fail to look beyond very basic analyses of quantitative data, such as GDP growth 
rates, unemployment rates, and homicidal violence.  
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Chapter 3 and 4 provide a discussion of the theoretical literature in general and of the political 
settlements literature more specifically. Chapter 3 argues that for a comprehensive and 
contextualized analysis of institutions, governance, and growth we need to include a 
discussion of certain issues the conventional NIE literature fails to address. A political economy 
discussion of the interdependency between power and institutions can provide insightful 
conclusions on how different balances of power in a polity and in organizations can affect 
governance capacities of state agencies, actual implementation of policies, and developmental 
outcomes. Chapter 4 argues that current analyses of the political settlements literature need 
to be explored beyond the influence of national-level actors and factors on the 
interdependency between power and institutions. The ways in which globalized processes and 
decentralized structures have shaped political settlements need to be taken into consideration 
for a more comprehensive understanding of governance and development in urban areas of 
less developed countries more generally and of Latin American cities in particular. We explore 
the influence of a powerful transnational capitalist elite on power balances, institutional 
mechanisms and state capacities in local political settlements in Colombia. Furthermore, 
chapter 4 discusses how decentralization and subsequent horizontal and vertical 
fragmentation in Colombia’s polity and in political organizations might decrease the likelihood 
of successful implementation and enforcement of growth-enhancing institutions. 
Chapter 5 engages in a historical discussion of political and economic processes that shaped 
Medellín’s society and Colombia’s political settlements for much of the twentieth century. The 
chapter argues that a combination of power balances and institutional mechanisms had 
implications for governance capacities of the state and technological capabilities of 
entrepreneurs in ways that affected the successful implementation and enforcement of 
policies to achieve political stability and growth of light manufacturing industries in Medellín. 
In an analysis of Medellín’s deindustrialization following several political and economic crises 
in the 1970s and 1980s, chapter 5 furthermore argues that the constellation of power in 
Medellín’s polity became largely incompatible with institutional mechanisms necessary for 
technologically advanced industrialization. The failure of Medellín’s economy to “grow up” had 
severe implications for economic growth and political stability. The rise of the political elite 
clase emergente (emerging class) and actors such as Pablo Escobar in the 1980s destabilized 
the elite bargain, bringing Medellín’s political settlement close to a collapse. The chapter also 
analyses several formal and informal institutional responses to these crises, including the 
decentralization of political, administrative and fiscal authorities, the formation of informal 
organizations and capitalist networks, as well as the paramiliarization of control. While these 
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mechanisms could temporarily stabilize the political settlement during much of the 1990s, it 
descended into crisis yet again.  
Chapter 6 is dedicated to the analysis of the political and economic development of Medellín 
since the turn of the millennium. For this analysis we use qualitative data from over 60 
interviews the author conducted with actors of different regional elite factions, bureaucrats, 
members of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), media representatives and former and 
current members of paramilitary and guerrilla organizations during fieldwork for this study.2 
The chapter argues that recent changes in Medellín are by no means a “miracle” but rather 
result from changing combinations of institutions and balances of power in the society. The 
particular transformations of Medellín’s institutional structure and the implementation of 
‘good governance’ reforms are consequences of the increasing organizational power of a local 
faction of the transnational capitalist elite that has used the market-enhancing agenda to 
implement policies that promote Medellín’s insertion into globalized processes. The chapter 
argues that Medellín’s powerful transnational capitalist elite is interested in the advancement 
of global capitalism rather than in the development of medium and high technology sectors in 
the domestic market. These developments have shaped the local political settlement. This can 
explain the elite’s acceptance of Medellín’s return to static comparative advantages in low 
productivity sectors, such as services and low-wage and labour intensive industries.  
Theoretical and qualitative findings are tested in a quantitative empirical analysis provided in 
chapter 7. For this analysis we use macroeconomic indicators, findings from household 
surveys, as well as sector-level and firm-level data. The chapter argues that the combination of 
the particular power constellation and institutions in Medellín’s political settlement has 
resulted in economic growth that is marked by the thriving and very dynamic construction, 
finance and tourism sectors. While these sectors have been the engines of Medellín’s 
economic turnaround, they are certainly not sources of high productivity growth. With 
stagnating wages and a capitalist elite that has no incentive to invest in the acquisition of 
capacities in medium or high technology sectors, Medellín’s political settlement has yet to 
reach sustainable and inclusive levels of economic viability. The low productivity of Medellín’s 
economic growth, combined with a labour market that shows a high degree of gross 
employment elasticities, are indicators for these developments. However, despite failed 
attempts to climb up the technology ladder, Medellín’s political settlement has become 
                                                          
2 Informed consent was obtained from all interviewees and participants of focus groups. The author 
provided the respondents with relevant information about the research project and the use of personal 
data. Informed consent was captured in conjunction with SOAS' code of practice on using personal data 
in research as outlined in the School’s research ethics policies. 
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politically resilient. Chapter 7 argues that the high levels of political stability can be explained 
by the combined interests of most powerful elite factions, including the paramilitary. Central 
to this discussion is the role of Medellín’s native son, Álvaro Uribe Vélez.  
Finally, chapter 8 presents the conclusions of this study by summing up the findings and 
contributions of the thesis. The chapter concludes by providing implications for policy as well 
as for future research in this field of study.  
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CHAPTER TWO: GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN MEDELLÍN: TALE OF AN 
“URBAN MIRACLE” 
Medellín is the second largest city of Colombia and the capital of the department Antioquia 
(figure 2.1). Medellín is geographically located in the Valle de Aburrá (Aburrá Valley) at a 
height of 1,479 metres above the sea level in the central cordillera of the Andes mountain 
range. The city is divided into 16 comunas, in which a total of 249 neighbourhoods (barrios) are 
located (figure 2.2). Furthermore, Medellín has five so-called Corregimientos (Palmitas, San 
Cristóbal, Altavista, San Antonio de Prado and Santa Elena), which are small towns that 
administratively belong to the municipality of Medellín. In this chapter and in the remainder of 
this thesis Medellín is used as a synonym for the entire metropolitan area surrounding the city, 
which includes nine other municipalities3.  
 
FIGURE 2.1: COLOMBIA, ANTIOQUIA AND MEDELLÍN  FIGURE 2.2: COMUNAS AND CORREGIMIENTOS 
SOURCES: OBSERVATORIO DE POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS (2011); WIKIMEDIA (2016)  
 
Known for its warm climate as “the city of eternal spring”, the paisa4 capital has only recently 
developed to become a globally important metropolis (DAP Medellín, 2012). As figure 2.3 
indicates, Medellín has experienced a considerable increase in its population over the past 
                                                          
3 Namely, these municipalities are Bello, Copacabana, Girardota and Barbosa in the north of Medellín, 
and Itagüí, Envigado, Sabaneta, La Estrella and Caldas in the southern parts of the Aburrá Valley.  
4 While paisa generally refers to (the people of) the north western region of Colombia, which includes 
the departments Antioquia, Risaralda, Quindío, and Caldas, paisa in this thesis exclusively refers to 
Antioquia and its population. 
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century. While in the 1940s the city only had 170,000 inhabitants, it grew exponentially fast 
and reached a population of 2.48 million in 20165. There are several pull and push factors for 
Medellín’s rapid urbanization that are central to the debate: firstly, and as further discussed in 
chapter five, Medellín’s impressive industrialization and engine of economic and employment 
growth created incentives for the rural population to migrate to Medellín, which was a 
blessing for the city’s industrial factories that were in need of cheap surplus labour 
(Farnsworth-Alvear, 2000). Secondly, the rapid increase of the city’s population was also a 
consequence of the violent Colombian political conflict, generally referred to as La Violencia. 
La Violencia began in the 1940s as a largely rural dispute over partisanship and political 
convictions; it has since forcedly displaced 6 million people, who largely moved to urban areas 
(Albuja and Ceballos, 2010; UNHCR, 2015).  
 
FIGURE 2.3: POPULATION INCREASE MEDELLÍN  
 
SOURCE: DATA FROM SECRETARÍA DE GOBIERNO DE MEDELLÍN, OWN CALCULATIONS 
 
Alongside an impressive population growth, Medellín underwent 100 years of multifaceted 
political and economic developments. Once known for its industrial growth and development, 
particularly due to a flourishing textile industry, Medellín achieved dubious fame for the high 
rise in drug-related violence during the 1980s and 90s. The Medellín Cartel with its leader 
Pablo Escobar terrorised the city, homicide rates increased, and (legal) economic activity 
declined (Thoumi, 1995a, 1995b). After the death of Escobar and the dismantling of the Cartel 
in 1993, Medellín’s economy could not regenerate fully, as the Colombian economy was 
severely hit by an economic crisis in 1998/99 (Torres, 2011). Subsequently, Medellín suffered 
from negative growth rates – in 2000 it had fallen back to the GDP per capita levels of 1992 
(DAP Medellín, 2005). Furthermore, rates of unemployment and informal employment had 
                                                          
5 In the 2005 census the population of Medellín’s metropolitan area was 3.8 million. 
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risen sharply. At the turn of the millennium Medellín was thus suffering from a severe 
economic and socio-political crisis.  
However, in recent years Medellín has yet experienced drastic changes in its urban political, 
economic, and institutional environment. Since the early 2000s the city’s institutional basis and 
governance structure have transformed, making Medellín an exemplary case for successful 
urban development in general, and of local governance in particular (Drummond et al., 2012). 
These institutional changes and subsequent developmental outcomes have caused academic 
scholars as well as journalists to claim that Medellín has gone “from murder capital to model 
city” (Brodzinsky, 2014). The New York Times attributed these developments to “Medellín’s 
Nonconformist Mayor (who) Turn[ed] Blight to Beauty” (Romero, 2007). The Economist even 
declared a “Medellín Miracle” (The Economist, 2014), echoing academic observers who have 
argued that institutional shifts and the “Medellín Model of Good Governance” are responsible 
for a “metropolitan miracle” (Gutiérrez et al., 2012, 2009; IDB, 2011). The award as “Innovative 
City of the Year” in 2012 by the Urban Land Institute, the Wall Street Journal, and Citi Group 
further increased the buzz about Medellín’s development model and reinforced claims of an 
“urban miracle”. As such, the “miracle” discourse continues to be the subject of 
interdisciplinary academic discussions (Urban Land Institute, 2013). 
This chapter reviews the main debates in the literature around Medellín’s development. It 
particularly engages with the “miracle” literature, which argues that ‘good governance’ 
reforms and the rise of Mayor Sergio Fajardo were the main factors contributing to successful 
transformations. We also present empirical evidence of reduced homicide rates and increased 
GDP growth used in this literature. In addition, the chapter discusses the critical literature that 
explains Medellín’s development not as a miracle, but rather as the consequence of several 
national and local-level processes that have shaped developmental outcomes in terms of 
violence reduction as well as economic growth. We conclude by pointing to several 
weaknesses in all existing strands of literature on Medellín’s recent transformation. A common 
weakness is the failure to contextualise recent developments in a wider historical political 
economy analysis of changes in Medellín’s institutional landscape and constellation of power, 
including the city’s industrialization attempts, the following deindustrialization, and elite 
developments. Pointing at these gaps in the literature sets the stage for a theoretical 
unpacking and an empirical re-evaluation of the city’s developments through a political 
economy lens in the remainder of this thesis.  
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2.1 BACKGROUND ON THE “MIRACLE” CLAIMS: SOME ‘STYLIZED FACTS’ 
Before engaging with a discussion of the literature addressing the institutional, political, 
historical and socio-economic underpinnings of the “miracle”, this section presents some 
generalized empirical findings about Medellín’s development. These ‘stylized facts’ are 
presented across the entire spectrum of academic and non-academic literature and focus 
mainly on trends in Medellín’s homicide rate, changes in poverty and employment, and overall 
economic growth. While the different interpretations and explanations of these developments 
will be discussed in sections 2.2 and 2.3, this section presents these empirical data to 
contextualise the subsequent discussion of the literature and the originality of the theoretical 
and empirical analysis provided in this thesis.  
Before the “metropolitan miracle” struck, Medellín and the region of Antioquia had already 
experienced other impressive development trajectories. Founded as a gold mining and 
commercial city in 1675, Medellín became Colombia’s leading producer of the country’s export 
engine: coffee. Medellín’s elite understood the need to diversify the local economy and thus 
recycled coffee capital to incentivize light industrial manufacturing. In the twentieth century 
Medellín became the industrial capital of Colombia. Led by the families Restrepo and 
Echeverría and their textile factories, Medellín embarked on an impressive path of 
industrialization that catapulted economic growth and employment rates to record heights 
between the 1940s and 1960s.  
Even during the civil war, La Violencia, which erupted following the assassination of the 
populist Liberal leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948, Medellín’s economy remained untouched 
and industrial capitalists continued to make record profits. However, due to several political 
and economic factors and inherent shortcomings of Antioquia’s industrial-driven growth, 
Medellín’s economy stagnated in the 1970s. Manufacturing growth never developed from light 
manufacturing goods into heavy and capital-intensive industrialization. Further, with coffee 
prices falling in the late 1970s and increased competition from East Asia, industrial growth 
(heavily reliant on private capital transfers from the coffee sector) plummeted. In the wake of 
Medellín’s deindustrialization the city’s economy witnessed a massive increase in urban 
unemployment, accelerated by the mass exodus of many of Antioquia’s population to Medellín 
due to the on-going violence in rural parts of the country. Besides economic problems such as 
growth stagnation, growing unemployment, and low investment rates, this period also 
witnessed a massive increase in urban violence. Chapter five analyses the political economy 
explanations of these historical phenomena in more detail, however it is important to discuss 
these dynamics, as Medellín’s recovery from them is seen as the basis of the “miracle” claim.  
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The negative spiral of a stagnating economic growth, increasing urban unemployment and 
violence resulted in a disastrous situation. The institutional structure was undermined by 
informal rule of mafias, insurgency movements, and paramilitary groups and Medellín found 
itself at the brink of complete institutional collapse. In the context of the Colombian economic 
crisis of the late 1990s, Medellín’s economy reached a historic low with negative growth rates 
of around 5% in 1999. Since labour-intensive industries had been the backbone of job-creating 
growth throughout much of the twentieth century, the crisis hit the urban labour market 
particularly hard.  
However, since the turn of the millennium, Medellín’s economy has been experiencing a 
remarkable turnaround. Economic growth has returned in a very impressive manner, 
increasing by 9.6% in 2004, which was much above the average Colombian economic growth 
of 5.3%. This trend continued until the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007/08 
started to affect the city’s economy (figure 2.4). In recent years however, economic growth has 
returned. In 2014 Medellín’s economy grew by 4.2% per capita, making the city the fastest 
growing urban economy not just of Colombia but of the entire Latin American region 
(Brookings, 2015). Changes in the city’s employment rates have been similarly positive. While 
unemployment was at a record high of over 20% in 2000, labour market trends have turned 
positive since. Medellín’s employment numbers have increased substantially, reaching growth 
rates of just above 3% in 2014. Reflected in figures 2.4 and 2.5, these positive trends are, for 
many observers, crucial elements in the city’s “miraculous” success story.  
 
FIGURE 2.4: GDP GROWTH RATES MEDELLÍN AND COLOMBIA 
 
SOURCE: DATA FROM DEPARTAMENTO ADMINISTRATIVO NACIONAL DE ESTADÍSTICA (DANE), OWN 
CALCULATIONS 
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FIGURE 2.5: INDEXED EMPLOYMENT AND GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH RATES MEDELLÍN  
 
SOURCE: OXFORD ECONOMICS DATABANK, BROOKINGS (2015b)  
 
Overall, these developments have had positive impacts on human development and poverty. 
The human development index (HDI) has improved drastically since 2004, particularly in the 
poorest areas of the city. As seen in figure 2.6 the North-Western comunas 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8 and 
the Eastern comuna 13, which have historically been the most marginalized, deprived and 
violent-prone areas, made impressive progress. Reductions in poverty and extreme poverty 
rates are similarly positive. While poverty rates were at an all-time high in the late 1990s, 
making Medellín’s population one of the poorest in the country, this trend has reversed 
considerably since the early 2000s (figure 2.7).  
 
FIGURE 2.6: HDI IN MOST MARGINALIZED COMUNAS  FIGURE 2.7: POVERTY AND EXTREME POVERT 
 
SOURCE: ALCALDÍA DE MEDELLÍN (2012)   SOURCE: ALCALDÍA DE MEDELLÍN (2012) 
 
Another ‘stylized fact’ that supports the “miracle” claim is the reduction in violence. Since the 
late 1970s and coinciding with Medellín’s deindustrialization, violence started to increase 
before it spiralled out of control in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It was during this time that 
the infamous drug lord Pablo Escobar and his Medellín Cartel ruled the streets of the city, 
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bringing Medellín to fame as the most dangerous urban area and ‘murder capital’ of the world. 
Fuelled by conflict over drug-trafficking routes and political territory, Medellín descended in a 
dark era of open warfare that resulted in a skyrocketing of the city’s homicide rates, increasing 
extortions, forced disappearances, and petty crimes. The most staggering negative trend, 
however, was the large number of murders: between 1990 and 2002 more than 55,000 people 
were killed in the streets of Medellín.  
However, after 2002 this number decreased six fold and by 2005 Medellín’s murder rate was 
not only below the Colombian average, but even lower than the murder rates of cities such as 
Baltimore, Detroit or even Washington D.C. The radical decrease of homicidal violence is truly 
remarkable and the rapid decrease is often presented as proof of a “miracle”. Maclean (2015, 
p. 2) argues that the “Medellín miracle” is represented in the sharp decline in homicides 
making the city “known for the astonishing decline in violence that has occurred over the last 
20 years”. Figure 2.8 shows the trends in Medellín’s murder rate. 
 
FIGURE 2.8: HOMICIDE RATES MEDELLÍN AND COLOMBIA (PER 100.000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: DATA FROM INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE MEDICINA LEGAL Y CIENCIAS FORENSES, REGIONAL  
NOROCCIDENTE (MEDELLÍN) 
 
These remarkable developments prompted a series of theoretical and empirical engagements 
with the case of Medellín, which either describe the phenomenon as a “miracle” or try to 
explain how and why these transformations happened. The next section reviews and discusses 
this literature. While the conventional wisdom of the academic debate stresses that the 
underlying factors of the miracle reside in recent governance and institutional changes as well 
as in the personification of these transformations in Mayor Sergio Fajardo, we also present 
more critical strands of the literature that highlight alternative explanations for Medellín’s 
turnaround.  
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2.2 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SUCCESS – A REVIEW OF THE “MIRACLE” LITERATURE  
As shown above, the putative “rebirth” (Fukuyama and Colby, 2011) of Medellín began around 
the turn of the millennium. Most academic as well as and non-academic contributions see the 
starting point of this turnaround in the 2003 electoral victory of Mayor Sergio Fajardo at the 
head of the political movement Compromiso Ciudadano (Citizen’s Commitment). This new 
coalition introduced institutional reforms in order to overcome the “bastion of old-style policy 
making” (Devlin and Chaskel, 2010, p. 3). Conventional explanations of the foundations of the 
“miracle” hence support the idea that a particular reform agenda, supported by what the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) calls the “Medellín Model of Good Governance” (IDB, 
2011), was responsible for taking Medellín “from fear to hope” (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007a; 
Gutiérrez et al., 2012).  
The analysis of Medellín’s development is dominated by contributions from the academic 
disciplines of urban planning, geography or architecture. However, the extent to which this 
particular disciplinary debate has been able to fully explain the city’s institutional and 
economic transformations is highly limited. Increasingly, contributions from the disciplines of 
political sciences, history, or institutional economics are weighing in on the topic. The first part 
of this section discusses a variety of interdisciplinary contributions that focus on the analysis 
institutional changes through the combination of the ‘Medellín Model of Good Governance’ 
and physical urban interventions. The second part of the section discusses the literature that 
engages with the analysis of developmental outcomes of this changed institutionality.  
2.2.1 COALITIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE, AND URBAN RENOVATION POLICIES 
Between 2004 and 2012 the Fajardo coalition6 implemented a set of policies known as 
urbanismo social (social urbanism) (Devlin and Chaskel, 2010; Echeverri, 2008). Part of these 
social urbanism policies were the so-called Proyectos Urbanos Integrales (Integral Urban 
Projects, PUI), which were urban public space projects and infrastructure interventions around 
specific areas in Medellín. Fajardo’s policy agenda was based on the idea that the creation of 
public space and the physical upgrading of the poorest neighbourhoods can overcome 
inequalities and other socioeconomic problems that are deeply rooted in Medellín’s society. 
The multimillion dollar project Parque Biblioteca España (Spain Library Park) in comuna 1 and 
the electric escalators in comuna 13 (both historically marginalized neighbourhoods located in 
                                                          
6 Sergio Fajardo was elected Mayor in 2003 and ruled the city until 2008 when his political ally and 
Secretary of Government Alonso Salazar took over after winning the 2007 elections (Fajardo could not 
run again due to constitutional rules). Salazar continued with the same policy programme and focus on 
‘good governance’ reforms. We hence see the years 2004-2012 as period of a continuous policy agenda 
and talk about the “Fajardo coalition” in a broader sense.  
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Medellín’s hillside areas) are two prime examples, alongside a cable-car system Metrocable 
connecting both of these neighbourhoods to the central metro lines.  
The conventional literature on the “miracle” finds that it was the combination of Fajardo’s 
commitment to ‘good governance’ and his social urbanism policies that lie at the heart of the 
city’s transformative developments (see Dávila, 2013). Brand and Dávila (2013) argue that 
Medellín’s success story is based on the double strategy of the social urbanism reforms and 
the Metrocable. The authors argue that through increased mobility and physical investments 
around the library parks and the new Metrocable stations, the Fajardo administration was 
effective in improving the living conditions of the urban poor. Dávila and Daste (2011, p. 122) 
find that Fajardo’s policy approach has also had wider impacts on the city’s institutional 
landscape, resulting in increased levels of accountability and confidence in local political 
actors. Turok (2014) supports these findings, arguing that urban “catalytic projects” were the 
main drivers of positive institutional change and economic development. The focus of Turok’s 
(2014) contribution on urban planning and social urbanism resonates with the large majority of 
academic literature that offers geographical or architectural explanations for Medellín’s 
successful turnaround.  
Echeverri and Orsini (2010, pp. 16–17) argue that the style of leadership and the governance 
formula of the Fajardo coalition were responsible for “a public policy focused on the reduction 
of the profound social debts that were accumulated of the past decades as well as of the 
violence problems”. The Secretary of Government under Fajardo and his successor as Mayor, 
Alonso Salazar echoed this in an interview with the author: “Sergio (Fajardo) reflected about 
problems of the city and how to tackle the challenges […] of violence, inequality and the 
historical social debt we had with the city. And we addressed these problems through the 
creation of public space” (Salazar, 2014). Cited in Coupé et al. (Coupé et al., 2012, p. 54) 
Fajardo also emphasizes this redistributive element of the social urbanism strategy: “we 
carried out wealth distribution without appealing to a discourse of anger or aggression. And in 
that sense […] we have built library parks” (Sergio Fajardo, interview, Medellín, December 10, 
2007). According to this view, the coalition succeeded to implement institutional reforms that 
helped to achieve improvements in public education, created space for the development of 
cultural programmes, and most importantly laid the foundations for an improved local 
entrepreneurship that “changed the skin of the city” (Fajardo, 2008). 
In a closer discussion of the coalition-building process, Fajardo and Andrews (2014) present an 
analysis of the different governance actors. Reviewing the process that led to the election of 
Sergio Fajardo in 2003, the authors find that the diversity of stakeholders and their ability to 
engage main business and civil society agents in their governance coalition, was decisive for 
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Medellín’s successful institutional transformation. Fajardo and Andrews (2014) argue that the 
cornerstone of success was the foundation of the so-called Grupo de los 50 (Group of 50) in 
1999 and the subsequent creation of Compromiso Ciudadano in 2001. This diverse coalition of 
NGO representatives, academics, the business sector, academia, and the media “focused on 
how to translate their frustration with Medellín’s political class into action” (Fajardo and 
Andrews, 2014, p. 4).  
While Fajardo and Andrews (2014) claim that there were formal and informal factors that 
supported and strengthened the coalition-building processes, the analysis of these issues falls 
short in explaining the interests of the different stakeholders in these coalition-building 
processes. In parallel with the literature presented so far, they fail to analyse how the coalition 
could overcome the heterogeneity of interests. The authors also fall short in analysing the 
different stages through which the governance model of Medellín emerged to become the 
dominant developmental approach – both in the context of local-level politics as well as in the 
wider context of national and global development trends. Many of the contributions to the 
scholarly literature stressing the importance of institutional changes and governance 
capabilities of the “miracle” coalition further fail to show conclusive evidence of direct links 
between the discussed policy changes and developmental outcomes.  
Bahl (2012) provides a much more contextualized approach to the question of governance and 
institutional change over time. He stresses that the social urbanism policy emerged as part of a 
wider ‘good governance’ framework in Medellín that made the city “a beacon of urban 
development innovation” (Bahl, 2012, p. 7). The author thus points out that governance in a 
transnationalized world needs to look at the role of cities and the capacity of urban actors to 
shape an institutional agenda for effective urban development. Bahl (2012, p. 7) finds that 
Medellín, as part of this global trend, has adopted “a model of good governance—one that 
promotes effectiveness, agency, equitable distribution and interdependence.” These 
processes, however, did not occur without the agency of local actors that shaped a particular 
brand of ‘good governance’ agenda that is very much unique to the city of Medellín. Bahl 
(2012) sees this as a result of how governance and government was understood throughout 
much of the twentieth century. Since the early 1900s in Medellín there existed a “marginal 
citizenry” that became embedded into a “sharply segregated and exclusionary” urban fabric 
(Melguizo and Cronshaw, 2001, p. 114). Bahl (2012) uses this historical analysis to argue that 
these exclusionary elements gave rise to resistance movements in the 1980s that coincided 
with the rise of Pablo Escobar’s Medellín Cartel. Carvajal (2011) finds that during this period 
“the logics of narcotrafficking and the associated violence became embedded in the local 
economy, social and political practices;… indices of corruption and clientelism became 
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elevated… and levels of poverty worsened”. It was hence “illicit governance and violence” that 
became an effective institutional tool in exercising control over capital and power, not only for 
the drug class but also for the political and economic elites of Medellín (Bahl, 2012, p. 20). 
Barón and Mond (2001, p. 26) argue that the historical structure of governance in Medellín 
produced a “negative stalemate” in which the illicit governance actors, alongside formal state 
institutions were able to fully take control.  
It was in this setting in which the 1991 Constitution engendered neoliberal restructuring and 
the large-scale roll back of the state. Bahl (2012) argues that the resulting “low-intensity 
democracy” and the retrenchment of the state in Medellín did not create the desired 
conditions in which increased political and economic competition facilitates the attraction of 
foreign direct investments (FDI). On the contrary, neoliberal reforms are seen as promoters of 
privatization of violence that constrained economic activity (Bahl, 2012). Throughout much of 
this phase of governance in the 1990s, the local government was hence a “weak agent… 
bargaining as if it were on the same level as other armed groups. It never appear[ed] as the 
legitimate locus of power with the right to impose its will” (Melguizo and Cronshaw, 2001, p. 
127). Bahl (2012, p. 21) finds that this created a “cyclical pattern…in which violence and 
clientelism exacerbated the weakness of public institutions, and in turn, permitted further 
violence”.  
Bahl (2012) links the Fajardo effect to an increased willingness of the municipal state to 
address these local crises through participatory methods, which he contextualizes in 
Colombia’s wider institutional restructuring following the 1991 Constitution. However, these 
contextualized analyses of governance changes fall short in discussing historical political 
economy changes in the productive economic development, Medellín’s (failed) 
industrialization attempts, and elite interests. Furthermore, while Colombia’s neoliberal shift is 
analysed with regards to the general attraction of FDI and the role of the state in security 
policies, the contributions fail to include a discussion about the impacts of neoliberal 
restructuring on state capacities in general and capabilities to generate productivity growth 
and investment.  
Gutiérrez et al. (2011) also provide a more contextualized analysis of governance restructuring 
that led to what the authors call a “metropolitan miracle”. Gutiérrez et al. (2011, p. 1) argue 
that the miracle “was the result of a set of institutional underpinnings basically related to the 
1991 constitution”. The authors include an analysis of the Constitution of 1991 and its far-
reaching implications for local governance structures and discuss how participation and 
decentralization reforms implemented as a consequence of the Constitution lie at the core of 
Medellín’s success. For Gutiérrez et al. (2011) these underpinnings opened new opportunities 
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for political and economic actors to influence decision making through the formation of 
coalitions and the focus on a ‘good governance’ formula. For Gutiérrez et al. (2009, p. 2) “the 
metropolitan miracle happened because a new, heterogeneous, governing coalition came to 
power”.  
In Medellín, this “heterogeneous coalition in which NGOs and the intellectual left were 
conspicuous, but where entrepreneurs, the Chamber of Commerce, and the media also found 
a place” (Gutiérrez et al., 2009, p. 6) questioned the values and governing styles of the political 
class “which governed through longstanding partisan networks… (and) had no incentive to 
escalate organisational complexity” (Gutiérrez et al., 2009, p. 4). The old political class had 
interests “to maintain a ‘flat and penetrable’ set of agencies” (Gutiérrez et al., 2009, p. 4). For 
the authors, this was incentive enough for the new coalition under Fajardo to question the 
governing style based on political patron-client relationships that had secured seats and power 
for traditional politicians (Gutiérrez et al., 2009, p. 8).  
The inclusiveness of the discourse of the new, alternative Fajardo coalition “had an 
idiosyncratic twist to it, claiming to be disentangled from representation” (Gutiérrez et al., 
2012, p. 190). For the authors, this was crucial in achieving the miracle, as this anti-
particularism could transcend the interests of classes and groups. While the authors find that 
such a discourse can to some extent be associated with the neoliberal paradigm implemented 
through the 1991 Constitution, they claim that in Medellín the discourse was not anti-statist, 
as was typically the case in neoliberal Latin America. Instead the anti-particularistic discourse 
clearly advocated an increase in state and capacity building. The authors claim that “interest-
based bargaining was shunned, and specific social and economic sectors were not privileged” 
(Gutiérrez et al., 2012, p. 190). However, the authors fail to include discussions on how the 
limited role of the neoliberalized local state affected governance capacities to implement 
economic policies to achieve growth and development through direct market interventions.  
Guerrero (2011) and Devlin and Chaskel (2010) take a closer look at the ‘good governance’ 
model that followed Fajardo’s victory in 2003. Analysing “the Political Economy of Medellín’s 
Recovery” Guerrero (2011, p. 2) provides qualitative and quantitative evidence “that a quick 
upgrading in the city’s less favored districts, combined with a stronger enforcement of the rule 
of law, may have successfully raised the traditionally low levels of political and institutional 
support in the city, breaking the equilibrium of distrust in government”. The paper finds that a 
‘good governance’-style institutional formula and particular institutional spill overs helped to 
achieve economic and political developmental outcomes that support the miracle claims.  
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In a similar vein, Gutiérrez et al. (2012, p 194) stress that the new coalition’s governance 
model “was based on guaranteed stability of property rights and reduced corruption”. This 
institutional understanding and governance structure was strongly supported by the urban 
business elite who were willing “to surrender direct access to decision-making through 
clientelist links to individual politicians (in exchange for) lower transaction costs, better 
infrastructure, and increased predictability, as well as a sense of contributing to public good” 
(Gutiérrez et al., 2012, p. 195, emphasis added). In turn, the business elite could establish 
other channels of influence, which allowed them to be “incorporated… much more strongly 
into the new municipal government” (Gutiérrez et al., 2012, p. 196). The mechanisms through 
which these institutions were established, the different interests of the actors in the coalition, 
as well as how the new elite bargain affected power constellations and policy outcomes 
remain underexplored in this contribution. 
Devlin and Chaskel (2010, p. 2) find that Medellín’s ‘good governance’ agenda, implemented 
by an “independent mayor” who was “fed up with flagrant corruption and betting”, was based 
on the concept of transparency. Citing an interview with Fajardo the authors stress that 
“transparency is the equivalent of trust, and that is the best political capital you can have” 
(Devlin and Chaskel, 2010, p. 8). The authors argue that through efforts to decrease corruption 
and increase government accountability, the city was able to improve its fiscal situation 
drastically, which in turn is seen as a necessary and sufficient condition for Medellín’s 
improved economic growth. And indeed, while up until 2004 Medellín had to pay obligations 
of 84.4 billion Colombian Pesos (COP) with a total income of only COP 7 billion (Devlin, 2010: 
8), the Fajardo administration was able to “clean up” the balance sheets, and in turn double 
public investments between 2004 and 2008. Both Guerrero (2011) and Brand (2010) stress 
that this was particularly due to the improved management of Empresas Públicas de Medellín 
(Public Enterprises of Medellín, EPM), the public utility provider mandated to give 30% of its 
net profits to the city.  
However, all contributions fail to analyse the formal and informal mechanisms through which 
the new coalition engaged in interest-based bargaining to secure support from the business 
elite as well as from civil society organizations. The authors do not sufficiently explain how the 
new coalition gained and maintained power and how particular interests that are very much 
aligned with neoliberal ideals and ideas dominated the new ruling coalition. Besides analysing 
the role of the media through which Fajardo was able “to signal his otherness”, Gutiérrez et al. 
(2013, p. 7) also inadequately explain how homogeneity was achieved in order to successfully 
implement policies despite the “heterogeneous” character of the coalition. Furthermore, the 
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authors fail to analyse what the new governance formula entailed, which interests dominated 
in implementing policies, and what wider developmental outcomes were achieved. 
In a detailed analysis of the actors behind the “miracle”, Maclean (2015, 2014) tries to fill this 
gap. She provides an insightful contribution to the literature that looks at how interest-based 
bargaining mechanisms formed the coalition’s governance formula. Similarly to Fukuyama and 
Colby (2011), who find that the Medellín “miracle” is based on the strong position of a 
“uniquely civic minded business elite”, Maclean (2015) finds that this business elite and its 
representative economic group, the Grupo Empresarial Antioqueño (Antioquian Business 
Group, GEA) largely influenced the politics of the miracle. Hence, using their powerful position 
in the Fajardo coalition through various channels of institutional influence, the business elite 
was able to “structurally change the economy and, crucially, invest in education, to enable 
political actors from different perspectives to work together and find common aims” (Maclean, 
2014, p. 46). The strong presences of business associations, such as the GEA and its influential 
think-tank ProAntioquia, as well as the large role of the Chamber of Commerce in the coalition 
have been “necessary conditions for the Medellín miracle” (Maclean, 2014, p. 46). At the same 
time, however, Maclean (2015) finds that the increased influence of these actors also included 
a “shoring up” of the business interests in the formation of a governance structure and the 
implementation of certain policies. Furthermore, the author argues that the ruling coalition 
was able to “overthrow the Liberal/Conservative duopoly in Medellín and change the political 
elite” and work with the business class to shape a “political processes of change” (Maclean, 
2014, p. 38).  
However, Maclean (2015) takes the occurrence of the “miracle” for granted and limits her 
analysis to the context in which these “miraculous” transformations happened. Questions of 
power relations remain underexplored, which, particularly in the context of the suggested 
overthrow of traditional bipartisanship, is a crucial analytical oversight. The author’s uncritical 
stance towards the increased interest bargaining of the business elite and the underlying 
implementations of this new power distribution limit the explanatory value of Maclean’s 
(2015, 2014) contributions. The contributions further fail to analyse the entrepreneurial ability 
of the GEA and the organizational powers of the ruling coalition vis-à-vis this strengthened 
business elite to develop governance capabilities necessary for policy implementation. For a 
conclusive evaluation of developmental outcomes, we need to include discussions of how the 
domination of the business elite affected Medellín’s ‘good governance’ formula and hence 
policies that help to achieve sustainable levels of political and economic viability.  
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2.2.2 MEDELLÍN – A “LOCAL DEVELOPMENTAL STATE”? 
The literature analysing the concrete developmental outcomes of the ‘Medellín Model of Good 
Governance’ picks up on contributions that find positive effects of an improved management 
of public institutions on economic performance. Coupé and Cardona (2012) argue that ‘good 
governance’ structures and physical interventions helped in incentivizing an increase in private 
investments, particularly into small businesses along the Metrocable lines and around the 
library parks. The policy programme, the authors argue, incentivized private entrepreneurs to 
open businesses and fuelled the construction of housing, making “the real estate market in the 
affected commuas more dynamic than in the rest of the city” (Coupé and Cardona, 2012, p. 
93). The authors take these results, the increase in total employment figures, and the 
improvement of the HDI in Medellín as proxies to conclude that the social urbanism and ‘good 
governance’ policies had positive economic developmental impacts (see figure 2.6). Turok 
(2014) finds that the physical and institutional redevelopments of Medellín under Fajardo have 
been fundamental in the city’s economic transformation that have created and retained jobs 
through public provision of “generous business support services to micro enterprises… (whose) 
revenues have helped to finance the city’s social and infrastructure programmes and 
compensate for the low tax rate” (Turok, 2014, p. 577). Turok (2014, p. 578) argues that this 
“economic and social advancement” has been supported through investments in 
organizational capacity building “both within the public sector and among non-governmental 
organisations and social movements”. Particularly Medellín’s “transformative policies and 
programmes”, backed by the alliance of a variety of stakeholders in the Fajardo coalition, are 
seen as crucial for the city to overcome the “tough predicament of mass unemployment and 
deep inequality” (Turok, 2014, p. 578).  
Bateman et al. (2011, pp. 1–2) find that Medellín’s ‘good governance’ framework, combined 
with the state-controlled EPM as a growth driver, was the basis for Medellín to become “the 
pioneer in developing a new Post-Washington consensus local economic policy model”. Taking 
a variety of local-level institutional interventionist policies into account the authors portray the 
Fajardo coalition as “pro-active in building the institutional and organisational infrastructures 
required for growth-oriented micro-, small and medium enterprises to emerge and succeed” 
(Bateman et al., 2011, p. 2). The authors see these organizational infrastructures as the 
institutional underpinnings for the emergence of a “local developmental state” (LDS), in which 
the local-level public utility company EPM plays a crucial role in financing state-led and state-
coordinated economic and industrial growth. The authors hence present several “LDS-style 
interventions”. Besides EPM as a state-owned financer of targeted economic policies, Bateman 
et al. (2011) stress the particular importance of the Cultura E programme established in 2004. 
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This ‘culture of entrepreneurship’ programme includes the setting up of 14 business support 
centres for microbusinesses in marginalized areas (Centros de Desarrollo Empresarial Zonal, 
CEDEZOs), as well as a state-owned microcredit institute Banco de los Oportunidades (Bank of 
Opportunities) that provides small loans at low interest rates. According to Bateman et al. 
(2011, p. 3) these interventions have helped to overcome local demand constraints and to 
explore and ‘re-localize’ “existing local industrial and state demand patterns”.  
Bateman et al. (2011) conclude on a cautionary note with regard to the insufficiency of the 
Cultura E programme in sustainably promoting economic development. However, the authors 
do not sufficiently explore the institutional framework supporting the idea of a supposed local 
developmental state in Medellín. While an analysis of the role of the local state-owned utility 
company EPM does indeed provide an interesting point of entry into the discussion of 
Medellín’s policy model, Bateman et al. (2011) do not analyse the particular organizational 
capacities of EPM or the distribution of power in the city’s society affecting the ways in which 
this model is implemented to achieve development. As the distribution of power and the 
organizational capacities of actors underlying the institutional environment of a polity is an 
important variable in understanding possible “LDS-style” developmental approaches and 
outcomes, a closer analysis of the particular interests that drive EPM’s interventions is 
necessary. With the strong position of the business elite in the Fajardo coalition, EPM’s ‘state-
led’ character is also more than questionable. The analysis of a “local developmental state”, 
one would assume, needs to include a closer discussion of state capacities to create incentives 
and compulsions for technology-driven growth and a climbing-up on the productivity ladder. 
Such a discussion, however, is missing entirely from this contribution. Furthermore, the 
contribution fails to analyse how the Cultura E programme as part of the ‘good governance’ 
model has affected economic developmental outcomes that go beyond small-scale 
microbusiness development. 
Higuita Palacio (2015) takes a closer look at the impacts of Medellín’s “miraculous” 
institutional transformations on technology and innovation-driven economic growth. Inspired 
by Medellín winning the title of the “most innovative city in the world”, the author finds that 
“Medellín has converted itself into a regional system of innovation, which was led by the local 
state… until the point at which the city can be categorized as the capital of innovation in the 
Latin American context” (Higuita Palacio, 2015, p. 41). He finds reasons for this transformation 
in Fajardo’s effort in increasing public investments in education, as well as in science and 
technology. This, coupled with the coalition’s focus on providing entrepreneurial support 
through the Cultura E programme lies at the foundation of the “miracle” (Higuita Palacio, 
2015).  
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However, akin to the analyses of most other contributions, Higuita Palacio’s (2015) article falls 
short in providing sufficient qualitative and quantitative evidence to support the claim that 
Medellín succeeded in technology and innovation-led economic growth. Furthermore, most 
analyses of the “Medellín miracle” fail to include historical political economy discussions of the 
institutional shifts and their respective developmental outcomes. Questions of power and elite 
interests remain secondary to most academic contributions. Explanations of the institutional 
change either focus on the ability of new political actors to “signal their radical otherness while 
at the same time appeasing the economic elites” (Gutiérrez et al., 2013, p. 7), or on the fact 
that the people of Medellín were simply tired of clientelist political corruption (Devlin and 
Chaskel, 2010, p. 2). Similarly, while most contributions study the nature of the governance 
model the city has implemented, they fall short in evaluating the connections between the 
political and economic factors behind the institutional change, the subsequently introduced 
policies, and their respective developmental outcomes.  
 
2.3 COUNTERING THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: CHALLENGING “MIRACLE” CLAIMS TO UNDERSTAND 
URBAN TRANSFORMATIONS  
In contrast to the vast amount of contributions that find evidence supporting the occurrence 
of the “miracle” due to the efforts of an “independent mayor” who led a “heterogeneous 
governance coalition” to achieve “inclusive outcomes”, there is very little literature that 
critically engages with this miracle claim in a structured way. This section reviews the few 
scholarly contributions that counter the conventional wisdom surrounding Medellín’s recent 
developments. The section also presents remaining shortcomings of these critical 
contributions and closes with a discussion of the gaps in the literature that this thesis tries to 
address.  
In a critical review of the institutional functioning of the Fajardo government, Moncada 
(forthcoming) stresses that the administration’s interests in changing the city’s image stem 
from the strong position of the business elite and GEA in the ruling coalition. Hence, a changed 
perception of Medellín would not only increase FDI into GEA-dominated sectors, but would 
also allow the business elite to re-establish influence within the local government (Londoño, 
2004). Countering the findings that the Fajardo coalition is “anti-particularistic” and “anti-
corrupt”, Moncada (2016) argues that the GEA had a large influence on the policy direction of 
the local government. Moncada (forthcoming, p. 28) finds that “the private sector also faced 
particularistic incentives to support infrastructural development. For example, the leader of 
the GEA, Nicanor Restrepo Santamaría, was also the head of the board of Conconcreto S.A., 
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the construction firm that built the city’s first cable car line”. Hence, “private interests 
indirectly profited from the reshaping of the city’s image, but also from direct participation in 
the development of infrastructural projects integral to that revised image” (Moncada, 
forthcoming, p. 28). While these are valid claims, the author does not engage in a closer 
analysis of the particular abilities of Medellín’s business elite to use its dominant position for 
the development of possible entrepreneurial and technological capabilities. Moncada (2016) 
presents little empirical evidence about the developmental impacts of the combination of this 
power structure with the particular interests of the GEA to develop infrastructural projects.  
Some contributions to the academic literature analyse Medellín’s recent developments in the 
context of global processes and networks established since the colonial period. Mendieta 
(2011) for example discusses how the insertion of Medellín in globalization patterns of formal 
economic activities and illicit cocaine production has spurred economic growth and 
development in the city. Brand (2013) takes the insertion of Medellín into global patterns of 
accumulation as the starting point for his critical evaluation of Fajardo’s ‘good governance’ 
model and the associated social urbanism policies. He finds that the narrative around the 
“miracle” has to be renewed due to the increasing social inequalities in Medellín. Brand (2013, 
p. 11) hence notes that Medellín’s governance model “has become increasingly inclined 
towards the spectacular and its marketing potential, caught up in a dizzy spiral of competition 
and the short-term logic of capital”. These pressures to insert Medellín into global value chains 
have reinforced Medellín’s weak position in “the corporate globalisation agenda, inducing 
deindustrialisation and increasing economic dependence on primary products and the formal 
and informal service sector” (Brand, 2013, pp. 11–12).  
In a critical analysis of “Medellín’s makeover” Hylton (2007, p. 71) finds that “Medellín is a 
media-saturated, image-conscious city, dominated by advertising and public relations”. In a 
historical analysis of the city’s ruling class, Hylon (2010) stresses that the recent changes at the 
city’s institutional level, beginning with the election of Fajardo, are far from being a “miracle”. 
The author explains that the reduction of violence has less to do with the election of the 
Fajardo, but is rather linked to the 2002 presidential victory of Medellín’s native son, Álvaro 
Uribe Vélez. Uribe Vélez’ close ties to “the ‘rising class’ of traffickers and import-export men” 
(Hylton, 2007, p. 78) and the subsequent (para-)militarization of Colombia’s security are 
presented as main factors behind the reduction in overall homicides. This development, the 
author argues, came at the cost of social repression of “students, teachers, journalists, 
lawyers, and especially trade unionists and peasant activists… (who) were subject to 
assassination” (Hylton, 2007, p. 81). 
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Hylton (2010) claims that Fajardo’s governance approach promotes market-driven 
development, contextualized in Colombia’s neoliberal policy regime. Besides Uribe Vélez’ 
paramilitarized influence, the author finds that reduced homicide rates can be explained by 
looking at the parallels between the neoliberal development approach of the Fajardo coalition 
and paramilitary interests in avoiding to be “left behind by the engine of globalization” and to 
create the “necessary climate so that investment returns, particularly foreign investment” 
(Hylton, 2007, p. 81). These power balances in Medellín have created hegemonic interests 
between the formal and informal institutional operations of the city, which Hylton (2007, p. 
88) sees as the underpinnings for “Medellín’s model of a dynamic, narcotics-based, finance 
and service-sector economy”. Medellín, as “the beacon of neo-conservatism in Latin America” 
is hence being controlled by a ruling class that has secured hegemonic power by having turned 
to narco-capital and paramilitaries (Hylton, 2007, p. 89). Hylton (2010) critically concludes that 
the recent shift of the ruling class under Fajardo towards securing property rights and 
profitability is hence based on weak and informal foundations, which “provide little grounds 
for the new order’s legitimacy” (Hylton, 2007, p. 89). 
However, like the general “miracle” literature, these critical analyses of recent transformations 
in Colombia’s second city need further exploration of several key issues if they are to add 
explanatory value to the understanding of Medellín’s development. While most contributions 
mention issues of power regarding the institutional capacities, this is largely underexplored. 
Hence, the critical approaches to Medellín’s development fall short in the analysis of the 
distribution of power. While they provide a critical engagement with the domination of Álvaro 
Uribe Vélez and the neoliberal-minded business elite, the analyses remain vague on how 
globalized processes and the changing interest constellation in Medellín’s polity have impacted 
institutional mechanisms and ultimately economic developmental outcomes. Furthermore, 
there exists no political economy analysis of Medellín’s deindustrialization, which is crucial in 
the understanding of the evolution of power structures, entrepreneurial and technological 
capabilities of Medellín’s firms and sectors, and hence the institutional effectiveness of 
achieving sustainable levels of economic and political viability.  
While many scholarly observers find that Colombia’s shift to neoliberalism with the 1991 
Constitution has been a major institutional underpinning for Medellín’s recent transformation, 
there is no analysis of how this affected the development of productivity growth of Medellín. 
Furthermore there is a general lack of analytical engagement with historical and social 
processes and factors that shaped the power constellation in Medellín’s society, the particular 
interest bargaining between different elite factions, governance capabilities, and 
entrepreneurial abilities. While Hylton (2007) claims that Medellín has gone from an industrial 
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capital to become a finance- and service-sector based economy, he does not provide 
conclusive theoretical and empirical evidence that would support this claim.  
 
2.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The existing literature on Medellín’s transformation has been insufficient in providing a 
conclusive understanding of recent changes in institutional structures and governance and 
their respective implications for economic growth and development. There is a general lack of 
a more sophisticated and in-depth approach to questions of economic governance for inclusive 
and sustainable productivity growth that include a clear theoretical engagement with the role 
of institutions and empirical evidence that goes beyond simplistic data of increased GDP 
growth and reduced violence rates. Furthermore, there is a need for a contextualized 
analytical engagement with historically determined political and economic factors that 
influence how governance and development are interlinked. Questions of power distribution, 
elite interests, and governance capabilities of the state are central factors in this debate.  
This thesis links Medellín’s current development trajectory to wider historical changes in 
Colombia, such as the development of specific political and economic dynamics during the 
region’s (failed) industrialization attempts and following the implementation of far-reaching 
neoliberal reforms. While some contributions have engaged in such a contextualized analysis, 
this thesis presents and elaborates on a theoretical framework that systematically analyses the 
impacts of Colombia’s neoliberal turn on institutional mechanisms capable of creating the 
conditions for economic growth and political stability. While there exists a wide array of 
theoretical literature on the role of institutions in economic development, this thesis presents 
alternative political economy considerations in theorizing and analysing institutional 
functioning. Hence, we find that institutions and their effectiveness in creating and enforcing 
particular policies that generate developmental outcomes are interdependently linked to 
political factors of power distributions. Changes in the Colombian policy environment following 
neoliberalization of the economy are thus analysed in the context of how they affect the 
distribution of power, which then drives the creation of institutions and determines political 
and economic outcomes. Particularly, we look at the impacts of globalized processes such as 
elite transnationalization on the interdependency between power and institutions. When 
interactions of powerful actors and institutions achieve a sustainable level of growth and 
stability a ‘political settlement’ emerges. 
This alternative to institutional approaches that focus on ‘good governance’ explanations for 
Medellín’s development is also important in conceptualizing other changes in the Colombian 
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society, polity, and economy. Political decentralization in the context of state-weakening 
liberalization reforms also affected power structures as it weakened the position of an 
organized state in Colombia further. Besides the upward transfer of state capacities to 
supranational organizations and transnational actors, decentralization in Colombia fragmented 
organizational power through considerable downward transfers of administrative, political and 
fiscal capacities. This can have considerable consequences for the creation and enforcement of 
particular institutional mechanisms, which in turn impact political and economic 
developments.  
We argue that without a historical understanding of these factors in Medellín’s polity any 
theoretical and empirical analysis of Medellín’s current development will have limited 
explanatory value. This is why this thesis does not only address gaps in the literature regarding 
recent analyses of Medellín’s development. The analysis presented here is also concerned with 
obtaining a better understanding of Medellín’s political settlement in the city’s 
industrialization process. Hence, our research also includes a historical political settlements 
analysis of how the interdependency between power and institutions can explain why 
Medellín’s industry failed to move on to the use of more advanced technology. Before 
engaging with the analysis of Medellín’s historical and social processes and recent institutional 
transformation, the next two chapters will set out and develop the theoretical framework that 
informs our theoretical and empirical discussion of the case of Medellín.  
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CHAPTER THREE: POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS: FRAMING A POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH 
FOR A THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF POWER, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND 
GOVERNANCE 
The primary concern of this thesis is to analyse and understand how institutional settings and 
policies can have developmental outcomes that very much depend on the context in which 
they are implemented and enforced. The political economy theory of institutions adapted and 
developed in the next two chapters hence considers context-specific developments of Latin 
America in general and Colombia in particular. We find that decentralization reforms and a 
radical economic and financial liberalization agenda in Colombia has impacted the context in 
which institutional strategies and policies can be implemented and enforced to achieve 
sustainable levels of political and economic viability. While there are several academic 
contributions that theorize the “hollowing out” of the nation state through globalized 
processes (Jessop, 2004), there is a lack of systematic theoretical analyses of how state 
restructuring in the form of liberalization and decentralization reforms have impacted 
governance capabilities for local administrations in Latin America.  
The review of the literature showed that conventional analyses of Medellín’s “makeover” fail 
to present conclusive explanations of several factors. Similar to most contributions to 
questions on urban governance the analytical scope of the “miracle literature” remains limited 
to an application of the core features of New Institutional Economics (NIE). We argue that for 
an in-depth empirical and analytical engagement with urban development we need to have a 
more detailed theoretical understanding of how institutions affect the implementation and 
enforcement of particular policies in ways that influence political stability and economic 
growth. In this chapter and in chapter four we aim to present a theoretical framework of 
institutions that can help to provide more comprehensive explanations of Medellín’s 
transformation. However, before we can engage in a systematic theoretical discussion of 
urban governance in Latin America in chapter four, we need to explore alternative institutional 
approaches that can add explanatory value to the understanding of governance and growth in 
less developed countries.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: section 3.1 provides a general discussion 
of urban governance, local institutional developments, and their implications for growth. The 
section argues that conventional approaches to urban governance fall short to explain a 
number of central aspects of local institutional and economic dynamics. The section concludes 
by pointing out that the explanatory failure of conventional theoretical approaches to urban 
governance resides in a general misconception and misinterpretation of institutional 
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functionings in less developed countries. We argue that this can be addressed by looking at 
political economy theories of institutional change and development in general, and Khan’s 
(2010a) political settlements approach in particular. Section 3.2 discusses how the political 
settlements framework can add analytical value to the theorization of governance in general, 
and property rights, transaction costs, and conflict in particular. The section argues that NIE 
theories fall short to distinguish between several types of costs and their implications for 
developmental outcomes. Section 3.3 discusses how the analysis of interdependencies 
between distributions of power and institutions can help to mitigate these shortcomings of 
conventional approaches. Section 3.4 explores how these interdependencies underpin 
conditions for the creation and distribution of different types of rents and their related 
implications for development, given the characteristics of a political settlement. Section 3.5 
brings the discussions of the different variables together in analysing how this political 
settlements framework provides an alternative entry point for understanding institutional and 
policy changes and their effects on growth and stability. The main argument of this section is 
that in order to understand institutional functionings and developmental outcomes we need to 
engage in an analytical discussion of the interaction between political factors (e.g. power 
distributions and governance capacities) and economic factors (i.e. technological capabilities of 
entrepreneurs) in a political settlement. It is crucial to analyse the compatibility between these 
factors and institutional strategies to create incentives and compulsions for successful growth-
enhancing change. Growth-enhancing institutional strategies need to focus on creating and 
distributing rents that can overcome principal-agent problems of financing learning. The 
likelihood of effective governance capabilities to arise that can overcome such appropirability 
problems (i.e. through ensuring that financing for learning is not misallocated or wasted) 
depends on the political characteristics of the political settlement. Section 3.6 concludes and 
argues that the insights from the political settlements framework can be helpful in proposing 
an alternative institutional approach to urban governance and development. 
 
3.1 URBAN GOVERNANCE, INSTITUTIONS, AND DEVELOPMENT  
Conventional institutional approaches to urban governance follow the ‘good governance’ 
literature in arguing that a standard set of institutions is necessary for less developed countries 
to achieve the ‘right’ underpinnings for policies for successful growth and development. This 
widely supported policy recipe for local economic development has been promoting the 
decentralization of government, accompanied by other institutional reforms to achieve better 
transparency, higher accountability, and less corruption (World Bank, 1992, 2000). The ‘good 
governance’ agenda together with the promotion of decentralization has served as a blueprint 
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for less developed countries to achieve development. Commonly implemented ‘good 
governance’ reforms in less developed countries have thus focused on downsizing states to 
minimize market-distorting interventions that are seen as a source of transaction costs (see 
Hall and Pfeiffer, 2000; UN-HABITAT, 2015).  
However, the decentralization and ‘good governance’ literature does not engage with closer 
institutional analyses of how policies can be implemented in contexts where spatio-economic 
changes have affected power relations, state capabilities, and political factors in general. There 
is no reference to capitalist development, local elites, or other powerful agents. There is no 
political economy analysis of the interests, ideologies, or the roles played by transnational 
organizations, particularly of financial institutions. Considerations of the emerging influence of 
the transnational capitalist elite on institutional mechanisms and governance capabilities is 
also completely missing. However, a holistic discussion of governance and growth in urban 
Latin America must also consider how the region’s political decentralization as well as its 
economic liberalization and the consequent return of many countries’ comparative advantages 
to low value-added economic activities have affected institutional capacities to achieve 
growth. These issues are largely ignored in the decentralization and ‘good governance’ 
literature. The move towards ‘good governance’ strategies can thus be seen as an attempt to 
create governance capabilities that are required to create market-enhancing conditions 
building on neoliberal reforms of liberalization and market-driven growth (Khan, 2008, p. 110).  
Regardless of the shortcomings of contemporary institutional explanations of restructuring 
local governance, there have been only very limited attempts to explore alternative 
institutional strategies for productive economic development for urban areas in less developed 
countries. Proposals for a “local alternative for decentralization and economic development” 
(de la Cruz et al., 2011) or a “productive transformation of cities in Latin America” (UN-
HABITAT, 2015b) do not depart from ‘good governance’ ideas and ideals. Academic scholars, 
international organizations, and policy makers alike have thus continued to promote 
institutional reforms based on recommendations that fail to consider several crucial elements 
for understanding why nations, regions, or cities have succeeded or failed to climb up the 
value ladder. This is particularly true for urban Colombia where decentralization and reforms 
of “good urban governance” (Gilbert, 2006) are the conventional institutional policies used to 
achieve economic development. 
Critical theories of urban governance discussing the impacts of the reorganization of economic 
and political landscapes under economic liberalization and political decentralization have been 
dominated by geographers, sociologists, or heterodox economists analysing the 
transformation of the role of the state. Swyngedouw (2000, p. 64) maintains that “the 
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literature and political rhetoric obfuscates, marginalises and silences an intense ongoing 
sociospatial struggle in which the reconfiguration of spatial scales of governance takes a 
central position”. In the analysis of the urban as a key arena for such a reconfiguration of 
governance he confirms Sassen’s (1991, p. 27) findings that globalization processes have led to 
the ascendance of “global cities” as a key spatial dimension in the re-scaling of strategic 
territories, leading to a “partial unbundling or at least weakening of the national as a spatial 
unit”. Castells (1996, pp. 403–404) finds that major urban areas have become “nodes of the 
global economy, concentrating the directional, productive, and managerial upper functions all 
over the planet: the control of the media; the real politics of power; and the symbolic capacity 
to create and diffuse meanings".  
Overall, this literature finds an “enhanced role of regional or local states in economic 
development” as well as a “development of transnational linkages among regional or local 
authorities” (Jessop, 1997, p. 36). Brenner and Theodore (2002, p. 368) see regional entities in 
general and cities in particular as “increasingly important geographical targets and institutional 
laboratories for a variety of neoliberal policy experiments form place-marketing,… local tax 
abatements,… public-private partnerships, and new forms of local boostering of workforce 
policies, property-redevelopment schemes,… and a host of other institutional modifications 
within the local and regional state apparatuses”. Urban areas have thus become territories of 
“actually existing neoliberalism” (Jessop, 2002, p. 452). Peck et al. (2009, p. 57) find that 
through their insertion into global capitalism “cities today are embedded within a highly 
uncertain geo-economic environment, characterised by monetary instability, speculative 
movements of financial capital, global location strategies by major transnational corporations 
and intensifying interlocal competition”. The ‘urban process’ thus “throws up certain 
institutional arrangements, legal forms, political and administrative systems, hierarchies of 
power, and the like” (Harvey, 1989, p. 6). The selective transfer of state capacities to 
supranational and subnational forms of governance has reconfigured power relations within 
local ruling coalitions (Harvey, 2013).  
These critical urban theories can also be of value for alternative political economy theories of 
institutional change and economic development that diverge from the mainstream focus on 
‘good governance’. However, there are only very few academic contributions that discuss 
urban governance and policy alternatives to achieve economic development and growth in 
medium and high productivity sectors. Jessop and Sum (2000) provide a “Schumpeterian 
analysis of entrepreneurial cities” with a detailed discussion of potentially growth-enhancing 
urban governance models, particularly for the case of Hong Kong. Nonetheless, and similar to 
Harvey’s (1989) discussions of ‘urban entrepreneurialism’, the analysis is mostly focused on 
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how institutional strategies impact wealth creation and the dynamics of urban property 
markets. The theoretical discussions are furthermore focused either on urban governance in 
advanced capitalist countries or on how city governments can influence growth and 
development in successful developmental states that have already achieved a considerable 
level of economic catching up, such as China, Japan or Korea (Jacobs, 2008; Lee and Shin, 2012; 
Oi, 1995).  
However, the difficulty of mimicking particular institutional strategies, often specific to political 
and institutional characteristics of successful developmental states, minimizes the analytical 
value of a comparison with today’s transitional or less developed countries. These features 
include a system of monopolization for productive investments and very high overall 
investment rates. Furthermore, there were often historically specific state-business 
relationships between a relatively independent bureaucratic state and technologically capable 
entrepreneurs that facilitated growth-enhancing rent management strategies in 
developmental states. The balances of power were thus favourable for the creation and 
enforcement of incentives and compulsions for productive investments. The power 
constellations in successful developmental states also allowed the state to credibly sanction in 
instances of non-performance by recipients of subsidies. As a result, these countries could 
implement successful technology acquisition strategies that helped their economies climb up 
the value ladder (Chang, 2002). 
Thus, and important for our analysis of urban governance in Colombia, less developed 
countries today face considerably different obstacles in creating and enforcing urban 
“entrepreneurial” or “Schumpeterian” institutions. The likelihood of achieving growth-oriented 
governance varies depending on the context in which the institutional changes are 
implemented. The context specificities of less developed countries are hence also important 
distinctions to East Asian “local developmental states” (Zhu, 2004). Similarly to the political 
factors discussed above, organizational capabilities endogenous to polities and societies have 
also been crucial for achieving growth-enhancing transformation on the local level through 
“Schumpeterian urban entrepreneurship” (Jessop and Sum, 2000, p. 2287). These distinctions 
need to be taken into consideration for a contextualized theoretical and empirical analysis of 
urban governance in Colombia. In the following chapters we identify several internal as well as 
external factors that determine whether or not favourable conditions for growth-enhancing 
change can emerge.  
Before we can engage in an analytical discussion about the internal particularities of 
Colombia’s political economy as well as specific exogenous factors affecting urban governance 
and economic development, we need to review and analyse the literature discussing theories 
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of institutional change and development. However, since theoretical discussions of the role of 
institutions in economic development are dominated by conventional approaches to 
institutional economics that claim to have a one-size-fits-all answer to problems of 
development, we will explore theoretical arguments that challenge this simplistic view. 
Drawing on critical political economy theoretical literature on institutions in general, and on 
Khan’s (2010a) political settlements framework in particular, the subsequent sections engage 
in a theoretical discussion of how we can re-evaluate the role of institutions and governance in 
creating conditions for successful and sustainable development.  
 
3.2 TRANSACTION COSTS, INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE ROLE OF DISTRIBUTIONS OF POWER – VIEWS 
FROM CRITICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORIES 
Transaction costs are defined as the costs of creating, enforcing, and monitoring outcomes 
associated with a particular institution (i.e. property rights), or “costs of running the economic 
system” (Arrow, 1969, p. 48). Standard neoclassical economics assumes transaction costs to be 
zero or only present at the point of exchange itself and never as part of reaching agreement 
about or enforcing an exchange. Where they do exist they are modelled into mainstream price 
theory based on demand and supply equilibria. The costs that determine supply in this 
approach now include all kinds of production costs, transportation costs, taxes, and the like. 
Allen (2000) argues that goods with high transaction costs will lead to higher prices for that 
good, with demand adjusting passively. This means that in the neoclassical theory transaction 
costs are not seen as an explanatory factor of inefficiency. Market failures thus never arise due 
to transaction costs, but rather because of missing property rights, which leads to externalities 
or moral hazard (i.e. public goods, monopolies, principal-agent problem). In turn, for 
neoclassical economics, property rights only emerge if the gains of internalization of these 
externalities exceeds the costs of internalization. 
Contrary to the neoclassical assumptions, NIE theories acknowledge the existence of 
transaction costs and attribute market failures to cases in which transaction costs are high. The 
creation and enforcement of property rights or other “rules of the game” (North, 1990) is 
usually associated with the need to reduce transaction costs and hence to achieve market 
efficiency. While North (1984) also discusses the creation of inefficient institutions and 
property rights like monopolies where the objective is to capture rents, the NIE generally sees 
the existence and persistence of market failures as a result of missing or insufficiently defined 
property rights and attributes this to overly high transaction costs of introducing or enforcing 
such rights or institutions. This creates inefficiency (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008, 2000), and 
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the persistence of such market failures can lead to the failure of nations (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2012). States can overcome market failures and decrease transaction costs by 
implementing reforms that create the ‘right’ institutional framework (Acemoglu et al., 2006) in 
which property rights and incentive structures induce decision-making processes that result in 
reduced transaction costs of acquiring information, and of reaching, enforcing and observing 
agreements. This is the basis for achieving beneficial contracts for everyone involved as well as 
social welfare gains.  
For the NIE, the failure of less developed countries to achieve sustainable development is thus 
rooted in their failure to create and maintain stable, well-protected property rights (Acemoglu 
et al., 2004; Kauffman et al., 1999; Krueger, 1974). Due to weak property rights the transaction 
costs of achieving favourable institutional change are impeding social and economic 
advancement. The corresponding policy implications focus on the establishment of 
governance reforms to achieve and maintain stable property rights. This is summed up in the 
‘good governance’ agenda, which arguably constitutes the most prominent policy prescription 
for less developed countries or regions today. The political economy theory proposed here 
shows that the focus of NIE theories on the reduction of transaction costs as the determinant 
variable for functioning formal institutions (i.e. property rights) is misleading. The remainder of 
this section discusses how and why challenges faced by less developed countries and regions 
need to be theorized differently from these conventional approaches.  
While this thesis recognises the validity of property rights theories regarding the importance of 
different types and allocations of property rights for economic growth, it adopts different 
interpretations of several factors important to the understanding of the role of institutions for 
development. Instead of limiting the focus of property right analysis on market-based 
efficiency, we also look at the importance of formal and informal institutions for productivity, 
including the creation of incentive and compulsion structures, as well as the extension of time 
horizons. Furthermore, the framework of this thesis also includes the analysis of distributive 
functions of institutions, which conventional discussions on institutions fail to recognize (Khan, 
2010a, 2009).  
Drawing on Khan (2009), the framework proposed here argues that any institutional change 
has implications on costs in one way or another. However, different effects of these costs 
exist. While some institutional changes induce transaction costs that are unimportant for 
growth-enhancing change, others are growth-constraining. Khan (2009) argues that only such 
“growth-constraining transaction costs” (GTC) should be considered. Hence, GTC do not 
include all kinds of transaction costs, but only focus on the costs that hinder growth-enhancing 
changes. In turn this means that a general reduction of transaction costs does not 
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automatically lead to positive developmental outcomes. A reduction of an irrelevant, non-
growth-constraining transaction cost might even lead to negative outcomes, for example by 
inadvertently strengthening powerful organizations that block growth. While this would not be 
a problem in the hypothetical case of zero transaction costs, when transaction costs are high, 
the distribution of transaction costs matters.  
This approach to transaction costs departs from the NIE theory. However, the distinction is 
necessary as some types of property rights and institutions can make growth-enhancing 
change more difficult. The exclusive focus on GTC allows us to consider growth-constraining 
cost effects of a specific reform to pre-existing property rights structures, for example when 
the destruction or change in existing rights leads to an increase in transaction costs. For this 
analysis, one needs to identify the beneficiaries of any policy that reduces transaction costs as 
well as the groups that are negatively affected by this change in order to assess their potential 
to resist or obstruct change to existing property rights structure.  
Thus, the particular net effect of institutional changes and the indeterminate outcome of this 
can only be understood once we take into consideration the possibility of costs that occur 
through resistance to or obstruction of these changes. Khan (2009) calls these costs “transition 
costs” (TSC). These are costs that arise depending on the intensity of the resistance against 
distributive implications of the institutional change in question and they are a function of 
organizational powers of potential winners and losers of institutional change. The extent of 
political transition costs that arise when contestants impose costs on each other depends on 
the underlying organizational power of the losing party to resist such changes. Hence, and 
contrary to the NIE theory that models transition costs as part of transaction costs, Khan 
(2009) proposes a model in which the organization of (negotiated) institutional changes results 
in costs due to the time and effort put into possible complex negotiations. 
In sum, the intensity of the conflict and consequently the level of transition costs depend on 
the underlying distribution of political power, but also on organizational power among 
contestants (i.e. their ability to mobilize support for their positions, their links with the state, 
and the like) (Khan, 2009, p. 53). This makes the analysis of organizational powers so important 
in the discussion of institutional change and development, as this largely explains why a ruling 
coalition is able to push through certain property rights or why they fail to do so. If for example 
the ruling coalition wants to push through growth-enhancing policies but faces transition costs 
in the form of high-cost resistance by excluded groups with high organizational power, they 
might not be willing to implement the policy. The ruling coalition might still be willing to do so 
if they have incentives in the form of rent extraction from this policy that exceeds the political 
transition costs of implementing the changes. Khan (2009, p. 55) concludes that “(t)he 
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likelihood of any particular growth-enhancing property right transformation being 
implemented depends on the transition costs they unleash”.  
For a conclusive analysis of developmental outcomes of institutional changes, we hence need 
to expand on our understanding of power. However, conventional NIE approaches to power 
have largely focused on power as a purely economic measure of how long one side can hold 
out and engage in a conflict (see Knight, 1992, pp. 41–42 on the concept of holding power). 
We go beyond this narrowly defined notion of power and expand this economic analysis of 
power to non-economic aspects, including a discussion of “how the relative power of 
organizations in that society affects the enforceability of different institutional rules” (Khan, 
2011, p. 1). This organizational power further includes considerations regarding capacities of 
groups and classes to mobilize against imposed costs (i.e. through demonstrations) and to 
absorb pain (Khan, 2009, p. 55). Hence, power in less developed countries not only depends on 
a group’s ability to 'hold out' due to their access to economic resources as suggested by Knight 
(1992), but also includes other factors, such as the control of political processes and ability to 
organize in society as a whole or within a particular group or organization. With this notion of 
power distribution in mind we can analyse elites, powerful groups, and subordinate classes not 
only according to their economic power, but also in terms of their political, organizational, and 
ideological capabilities. The distribution of power is thus one crucial element that helps to 
explain (the likelihood of) institutional change and the possibilities of achieving positive 
developmental outcomes.  
The distribution of power in less developed countries differs substantially from that in 
advanced capitalist countries. Often, colonial legacies in less developed countries left behind a 
distribution of power that can be described as oligarchic where powerful elites can block 
growth-enhancing changes if they feel these changes would undermine their position in 
society, their privileged access to assets, and an income distribution that favours them. The 
oligarchy of many less developed countries thus holds a substantial amount of power and 
controls the allocation of rents and patronage (Winters, 2011). In their much-cited analysis of 
institutional change and development, Why Nations Fail, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) take 
these findings into consideration. They extend their theory that economic development 
requires ‘good’ institutions and stable property rights (Acemoglu et al., 2002, 2001) to 
considerations of political power. The stability and disparity of property rights hence also 
needs a stable and balanced distribution of political power. For Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) 
this is not necessarily the case in most less developed countries, which the authors take as one 
explanation of why nations in the ‘Global South’ fail. However, their analysis does not explain 
why some countries managed to achieve substantial progress despite the absence of the ‘right’ 
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structure of power and property rights. The analysis also fails to discuss how to achieve the 
transition from a weak state to a strong political foundation that can deliver resource 
allocation that results in net economic and social benefits. Acemoglu and Robinson (2013, p. 
174) furthermore stress that “economic analysis needs to identify, theoretically and 
empirically, conditions under which politics and economics run into conflict”. While the theory 
elaborated here agrees that politics need to be taken into account, we find that it is much 
more the historically contingent compatibility of political factors with economic growth-
enhancing institutional strategies matters, rather than conflict between politics and economics 
(see Rodrik, 2014). 
In less developed countries, power is often not aligned with the formal capitalist institutions 
identified as important for achieving compulsions and incentives for productivity growth, and 
instead depends on informal institutional mechanisms – especially in ‘pre-capitalist’ societies. 
This makes the mimicking of institutional policies of advanced capitalist countries or successful 
developmental states so difficult. This has prompted scholars like Rodrik (2008) to argue that 
less developed countries should solve their context-specific market and state failures with 
“second-best institutions”. While some aspects of Rodrik’s (2008) argument are useful for our 
analysis, we focus much more on how informal institutions affect the reduction of GTC and 
TSC. Thus, for less developed countries we need to take formal as well as informal changes to 
institutions into consideration when analysing institutional enforceability problems as factors 
that determine political and economic outcomes. 
For this, we use Khan’s (2010a, p. 10) definition of informal institutions as “patterns of 
behaviour of individuals who are following internalized norms and values…(and) rules that are 
not formally written down…but which are nevertheless enforced by third parties” such as 
patronage structures, mafias, or patron-client networks. The insight from the framework 
presented here is that in less developed countries informal institutions may be needed 
alongside formal institutional mechanisms to reduce transaction costs and transition costs. 
Consequently, studying informal institutions can often provide a better understanding of why 
developmental outcomes from institutional change differ so largely. Informal institutions are 
often mechanisms that bring the distribution of benefits into closer alignment with the 
distribution of organizational power. For the institutional analysis of successful development, 
we further need to recognize the importance of the creation of (informal) institutions that can 
incentivize new entrepreneurs and transform property rights so as to create compulsions for a 
resource allocation that facilitates productivity growth. 
The different variables discussed so far are summarized in figure 3.1. The distribution of 
economic and political holding power drives the creation of formal and informal institutions. 
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Arrows A and B show how the distribution of power drives the creation and changes of formal 
and informal institutions as well as how these institutions in turn sustain a certain distribution 
of benefits. The type and form of the created institution depend on how power is aligned with 
formal institutions. Arrow C shows how this distribution of benefits in turn supports the 
distribution of power. 
 
FIGURE 3.1: THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF POWER AND INSTITUTIONS  
  
SOURCE: KHAN (2010a, p. 25)  
 
Other than in the NIE analysis which sees informality primarily as cultural difference or as 
inequality in the access to and distribution of formal rights (North et al., 2009), the approach 
proposed here considers informality an important mechanism for the creation and distribution 
of different types of rents. The political economy framework adopted here further differs from 
the NIE in regard to the evaluation of rents. The NIE sees rents as sources of market distortions 
that lead to market failures. In our approach rents can also have positive effects on economic 
growth and development. As figure 3.1 shows, the power structure determines which 
institutions are created and enforced. Rents created by this institutional change are distributed 
according to this power structure. If this is compatible with rent-management strategies that 
incentivize investments into medium or high technology sectors, rents can lead to productivity 
growth. Some rents are furthermore essential to maintain political stability and prevent 
violence (North et al., 2009). The next section examines in closer detail the role of rents and 
rent management in achieving growth-enhancing institutional structures.  
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3.3 GOVERNANCE STRATEGIES AND RENT MANAGEMENT: INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES OF LEARNING 
AND TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION 
Another important factor for the institutional analysis of growth and development is the 
understanding of rents. NIE theories see rents as costly source of inefficiency and corruption. 
This strand of literature in turn proposes that a standard set of ‘good governance’ reforms is 
necessary to reduce corrupt rent-seeking behaviour. The political settlements approach 
adapted here differs from such conventional understanding of rents. Firstly, we understand 
rents not purely as costs, but much more broadly as all income flows. Secondly, and depending 
on the effectiveness of rent-management strategies, rents can result in positive developmental 
outcomes, as they can be channelled to productive dynamics. Using the findings made so far, 
we argue that for an understanding of successful rent management strategies, we need to 
analyse the underlying distribution of power in a society and the organizational power of 
different groups and organizations. 
In standard theoretical literature rent seeking is associated with high costs for individuals or 
groups who spend resources to influence the state or attempt to create market advantages. 
Rents result in the deviation from the competitive market equilibrium, which generates social 
welfare losses. Ultimately, neoclassical economists see rent seeking as a government failure, as 
rents are created through interventions that create conditions in which the market is 
inefficient (see McKenzie and Tullock, 2012). Krueger’s (1974) model, for example argues that 
any type of government intervention to create rents leads to welfare losses that are as high as 
the cost of intervention itself, plus the value of the rents (see Krueger, 1974, p. 301).  
NIE economists agree with the neoclassical approach that rent seeking is one of the main 
constraints on development. However, NIE sees that economic policies to remove rent-
creating market restrictions require institutional underpinnings in line with the so-called ‘good 
governance’ agenda. As mentioned, this agenda stresses that to achieve economic 
development it is not sufficient to remove market restrictions in order to obtain an optimal 
market equilibrium. Reducing rents that hinder market efficiency needs institutional support 
through changing inefficient private property rights structures. While some proponents of the 
NIE, such as Stiglitz (1998), correctly argue that rents are endemic in market structures and 
often necessary for economic dynamism even in advanced capitalist countries, the bulk of the 
NIE literature stresses that the ‘right’ or ‘good’ property right structure is a necessary and 
sufficient condition to achieve market efficiency and growth. This more rigid strand of NIE 
theories ignores structural impediments to the effective implementation of reforms that 
would make property right structures more efficient in less developed countries.  
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By contrast, Khan (2000a, 2010a, 2010b) suggests that political factors and institutional 
conditions determine the effects of rents. A positive outcome depends on the types of rents, 
the policies that create these rents and the enforceability of conditions that would make these 
policies effective. This again depends on the governance and enforcement capabilities of the 
state, the overall distribution of power in society, as well as the position of technologically 
capable entrepreneurs in that context. Rents created through growth-enhancing institutional 
strategies that are compatible with these factors can achieve positive welfare and productivity 
gains. Given that in many less developed countries the distribution of power is not aligned with 
formal institutions, we need to consider rents and off-budget resource allocations that are 
created and enforced through informal patron-client networks. While such rents can lead to 
growth-enhancing outcomes and can stabilize the polity, the growth effects of these rents are 
often indeterminate and they can lead to growth-constraining monopoly rents or disrupt the 
enforcement of conditions on potentially useful rents (see Khan, 2000a; Khan and 
Blankenburg, 2009).  
Of particular interest for our analysis of an urban region in a less developed country are so-
called learning rents. These rents can be created by policies and interventions that support 
firms in sectors that are targeted as potential growth escalators. Since learning is a lengthy 
process, transfers, tariffs, or tax breaks can give entrepreneurs time and room to manoeuvre 
and invest in activities that could otherwise be perceived as too risky. Private and public 
financing for these sectors may be more forthcoming, as investors have more security of 
achieving positive returns on their investments. These rents facilitate entrepreneurial learning, 
and the adoption and adaptation of technologies that can enhance productivity growth 
(Amsden, 1989). Khan (2000a, p. 21) argues that these strategies can result in the creation of 
competitive firms and through imitation the creation of clusters that can add up to significant 
net social benefits. 
Governance capabilities are required for the creation and effective allocation of this type of 
rent. Learning rents can only create incentives and compulsions for growth-enhancing 
investments if, firstly the state has the governance capabilities to enforce the conditions that 
are necessary for the achievement of productive outcomes potentially associated with 
learning; and secondly powerful groups possess the necessary entrepreneurial and 
technological capabilities in sectors and technologies that are supported. State capabilities are 
particularly needed to withdraw and re-allocate rents if recipients do not perform in a growth-
enhancing manner. These governance capabilities can be undermined if the favoured capitalist 
groups are very powerful or can make alliances with powerful groups to capture these rents 
without investing in productivity growth. Governance capabilities are particularly crucial to 
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facilitate the learning process of acquiring tacit knowledge through learning-by-doing. As 
investors will have periods of financial hardship and loss making while acquiring tacit 
knowledge, effective management and coordination of learning rents and the enforcement of 
appropriate conditions are crucially needed governance capabilities.  
The most development-constraining market failure in this context is that investors who may be 
willing to invest in learning processes cannot be sure that they will be able to enforce the 
levels of effort on the organizations they are supporting that are necessary to make their 
investment viable (Khan, 2010b, p. 1). The market failure here is “the institutional difficulty of 
ensuring high levels of effort when learning is being subsidized” (Khan, 2010b, p. 22) but also 
several so-called appropriability problems that limit future profits of investors and can 
therefore result in low levels of investment in new sectors. Thus, market failures in the sense 
of inadequate investment in new sectors and in the acquisition of tacit knowledge stem from 
formal and informal institutional failures to enforce effort and to address other appropriability 
problems through the creation and enforcement of the appropriate contracts and property 
rights. Without these governance capabilities, attempts to address market failures will remain 
unsuccessful.  
While the consequences of failures to ensure effort through contracting have been discussed 
in the literature, Khan (2010b) points out that important market and governance failures 
related to technology acquisition and adaptation are linked to limited capacities and/or poor 
policy design that ignore particular growth-enhancing factors. These market failures include 
underinvestment in skilled personnel due to possible positive externalities that cause 
appropriability problems (Dosi, 1988; Khan, 2000b). For example, it is often easier and cheaper 
to employ workers who have received their tacit knowledge or formal training elsewhere than 
invest in skills development within the firm, particularly as workers can then leave for other 
firms. Governance capacities are required to provide subsidies or other forms of support to 
workers or firms in ways that ensure investments in skills actually take place. Governance 
capabilities are also required to ensure monitoring and withdrawal of public funding in case of 
non-compliance.  
A different appropriability problem can arise as a result of insufficient protection of intellectual 
property rights. When no protection is provided, rapid imitation leads to very short-lived 
technology rents for innovators, which can disincentivize investments. Nonetheless, and this 
might seem paradoxical, protection mechanisms that are too complex can harm innovation as 
they slow down the flow of knowledge to new innovators, which underpins the argument of 
Cimoli et al. (2009) and Stiglitz (2014) that intellectual property rights agreements have slowed 
down technology transfers to less developed countries. If a sufficient level of appropriability of 
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technology rents is ensured, Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) may be more willing to finance 
investment in less developed countries that brings in new technologies, which can benefit 
industrial manufacturing development. However, the less developed country often has little 
control over the long-term decisions of MNEs regarding their location or other investments 
into medium or high productivity sectors. In this context a government should primarily be 
concerned about possible effects on backward and forward linkages of the transferred 
technology to domestic firms in medium and high technology sectors. Capabilities that make 
MNEs transfer more and more technologically advanced parts of the production value chain to 
the developing country are necessary, for example through invoking domestic content as a 
condition for policy support.  
However, the attraction of new technology should not be so advanced that domestic 
producers cannot imitate and enter these segments relatively quickly, resulting in a 
technological dependence on a few foreign firms. Policies to prevent this from happening “are 
predicated on broader governance capabilities to induce technological capability development 
in other sectors and to ensure that incentives and compulsions exist to ensure high levels of 
efforts in sectors where learning is being assisted. Without these governance capabilities, 
dependence on multinational investments may in the long-run constrain developing countries 
to lower technological trajectories, as well as making them vulnerable to multinational 
locational decisions” (Khan, 2010b, p. 30).  
A third appropriability problem arises with the financing of discovery. Hausmann and Rodrik 
(2003) argue that less developed countries have comparative advantages that need to be 
discovered. A country can have a comparative advantage due to innate differences between 
countries that exist, but are largely unknown until an entrepreneur tries and discovers what 
works by setting up production. Hence, comparative advantages can be discovered through 
the organization of production (i.e. discovering-by-doing). Khan (2010b, p. 31) argues that “the 
appropriability problem is that these pioneering firms cannot appropriate sufficient profits 
that would justify their investments in the discovery process”. This highlights the need for the 
development of governance capabilities that can enhance the scale of investments for 
discovery through appropriate financing strategies. However, and since there may also be 
insufficient efforts to engage in the learning-by-doing that is required to achieve higher 
productivity in firms, we also need to include an analysis of how success in discovery may 
implicitly require effective learning-by-doing. This is entirely missing in the Hausmann and 
Rodrik discovery model. For Khan (2010a, p. 32) the problem is “not discovering what you are 
good at but understanding why there was differential success in learning and then improving 
the organization of learning-by-doing across more sectors”.  
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In conclusion it can be said that if a state has weak governance capabilities vis-à-vis 
entrepreneurs with low technological capabilities in a particular society or is captured by an 
oligarchic elite that controls large parts of economic resources, then rent allocation to solve 
potential market failures might result in appropriability problems and social welfare losses. If 
entrepreneurs have considerable monopolistic or oligopolistic powers, the state may not be 
capable of enforcing growth-enhancing institutional changes that might include disciplining 
these very same entrepreneurs. Di John (2009) further finds the degree of centralization of 
political organization in a consolidated state another factor that influences whether the 
deployment of rents and patronage is likely to promote economic growth. Thus, polities with 
more centralized political organization “are most likely to promote economic growth… 
(whereas) in a consolidated state with fragmented political organization… patronage 
structures are less predictable and coherent because there is either less political party 
cooperation, or new factions either within the dominant party system or from outside 
successfully capture part of the state” (Di John, 2009, p. 10). This distinction is particularly 
important in the analysis of our study of decentralized urban Colombia.  
Insufficient protection of innovation or the excessive protection of the technology rents of 
powerful foreign companies, underinvestment in technology, and a failure to discipline 
wasteful rent capture in sectors being supported are examples of the types of phenomena that 
can emerge in these unfavourable contexts. An analysis of governance capabilities and of the 
institutional structures can therefore help to explain why countries or regions may be stuck at 
the low productivity end of the value chain. In polities where the state has insufficient 
governance capabilities to create effective incentives, or where an overly powerful oligarchic 
elite that generates income in low productivity and low technology sectors is too powerful, the 
effective targeting of growth-escalating sectors will be difficult.  
In sum, effective learning strategies and rent deployment require high levels of effort. Khan 
(2010a) sees effort as a function of four different institutional variables that determine levels 
of effort interdependently, making the likely effects of policies on effort non-linear in the 
sense that policy outcomes will depend on other characteristics of the context. The analysis 
suggests that effort depends on the independence of (a) the design of the financing 
instruments that are supporting learning; (b) the capabilities of the governance agencies 
enforcing and monitoring the conditions attached to these financing instruments, (c) the firm 
structures that are being supported, such as the internal hierarchies of firms, their relationship 
with the state and the market they operate in; and (d) the political settlement, which describes 
the relative power of the firms and agencies involved in the implementation of the support 
policy (Khan, 2010a, p. 4, 2010b, p. 42).  
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3.4 POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS AND THE GROWTH-STABILITY TRADE-OFF  
Recalling figure 3.1, a political settlement describes a relatively stable set of institutions that 
sustain a distribution of net benefits, which in turn sustains the specific distribution of holding 
power. This section draws the various elements of the political settlements framework 
together and argues that the institutional analysis through our particular political economy 
lens provides a dynamic understanding of institutional change. We furthermore look at how 
this dynamic framework can add explanatory value to analyses of policy design and 
implementation in ways that have implications for growth and stability. 
Figure 3.2 shows how theories of analysing the developmental effects of a particular 
institution needs to be expanded beyond the NIE approaches using the concept of political 
settlements. The NIE only provides an analysis of the efficiency and incentive effects of an 
institution with regard to the reduction of transaction costs. However, as we have discussed, 
the assumption that all reductions in transaction costs are efficient can be misleading. A more 
general analytical approach has to focus on the identification of particular transaction costs 
that constrain productivity growth and has to go beyond the NIE in identifying and explaining 
the enforcement costs of particular changes in institutions and policies to address these 
problems, given the distributive implications of the proposed institutional changes and the 
distribution of power in the political settlement. Figure 3.2 also shows how enforcement costs 
can arise either through resistance, which implies economic as well as political costs, or 
through imperfect or partial enforcement of the institution (Khan, 2010a, p. 36). The actual 
economic and political outcomes of institutional change can only be determined if we consider 
all of these variables in the theory of institutional analysis.  
 
FIGURE 3.2: INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, AND ENFORCEMENT  
 
SOURCE: KHAN (2010a, p. 35) 
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In this framework there are no ‘good’ or ‘bad’ institutions per se, but only favourable and less 
favourable interdependent combinations of power and institutions. With this in mind, Di John 
and Putzel (2009) find that efficient resource allocation is not bound to a particular institution, 
which makes a blueprint approach to institutions such as the ‘good governance’ agenda a 
largely ahistorical and seemingly apolitical model. According to Di John and Putzel (2009, p. 9) 
institutions are not intrinsically efficient and cannot be transferred or imitated, as their 
efficiency, their viability, and their growth-enhancing impact depend on the power distribution 
in the political settlement. This is why a growth-enhancing institution embedded in one 
political settlement might not have the same positive results in another political settlement. 
This makes it crucial to look at the different variables discussed so far to analyse the likelihood 
of enhancing productivity growth through institutional change.  
Enforcing particular institutions that can reduce critical GTC can face what Khan (2009) calls 
the “growth-stability trade-off”. This trade-off depends ceteris paribus on the distribution of 
power in a society, as this shapes the possible resistance to particular paths of institutional 
change. Figure 3.3 shows the trade-off between growth and stability, where the vertical axis 
measures stability and the horizontal axis indicates economic outcomes of incremental 
changes in the enforcement of potentially growth-enhancing institutions. Let us assume a 
political settlement (PS1) with an initial trade-off where growth is sustainably maximized at A1. 
The shape of the trade-off curve depends on the institutions in question, the strategies used 
for improving their enforcement and the effectiveness of governance agencies monitoring and 
enforcing the appropriate enforcement conditions (i.e. on subsidy recipients). To increase 
growth a ruling coalition could attempt to implement and enforce a particular institution that 
might have positive economic and developmental effects. If the strategy to achieve growth-
enhancing change is compatible with the power structure, transition costs are low and the cost 
of enforcing the institution is low. In this scenario, the trade-off curve is relatively flat, and the 
growth outcomes can be good (the political settlement can move to PS2 with the minimally 
stable growth-stability trade-off at A2). However, if resistance is high due to an incompatibility 
between the distributive implications of the institutional change and the distribution of power 
in the political settlement, political stability can decrease rapidly, implying a steep trade-off 
curve. Growth along this institutional trajectory will be low. In the worst-case scenario of 
particular trajectories of institutional change the political settlement descends into a crisis, 
which prevents the achievement of the minimum sustainable level of stability as well as the 
minimum rate of growth (PS3). In these extreme cases, new social mobilizations can be 
triggered that result in changes in the political settlement. 
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FIGURE 3.3: GROWTH-STABILITY TRADE-OFF AND DIFFERENT POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS 
 
SOURCE: KHAN (2010a, p. 38) 
 
Changes in the distribution of power in a political settlement that can affect the trade-off 
curve depend on a number of variables. Any significant institutional changes will result in a 
changed rent-seeking context that will eventually create a new distribution of power and a 
shift of the trade-off curve. Figure 3.4 shows that a settlement can change in ways that have 
positive or negative implications for the enforcement of particular institutions. Depending on 
the institution and the political settlement, a path of institutional improvement may be 
sustainable and generate positive effects on growth and stability, or lead to a crisis. In the 
initial settlement PS1 the trade-off between growth and stability results in an outcome at Y, 
where G0 is the minimal growth rate required to sustain the political settlement (see figure 
3.4). Assume the ruling coalition then triggers an institutional change to achieve higher 
growth. The internal mobilizations driving this policy or institutional change could be a variety 
of ‘agency’ decisions within the leadership or mobilizations by interested organizations. If the 
change is compatible with the broader political settlement the growth rate can increase to A1 
with only a minimal decline in stability, as contestation of the change and hence transition 
costs are low.  
This institutional path will enhance income and rent flows to organizations that support this 
direction of institutional change and as these organizations become stronger, the political 
settlement changes to reflect the new distribution of power. Diagrammatically, this implies an 
upward shift of the trade-off curve that looks at the growth-stability trade-off facing the 
institutional change. If this change in the distribution of power comes about, further 
improvements in the enforcement of the institution become possible, allowing a shift to say A3 
(see figure 3.4). In contrast to this incremental path of institutional change, some trajectories 
of institutional change can be rather discontinuous. For example, a strategy of institutional 
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change to increase the growth rate may be pushed too far in the context of particular power 
constellation in a political settlement like PS1. This could mean a shift to B1, where higher 
growth is achieved but contestation and high transition costs push the political stability 
beneath the minimum level of sustainability. The resistance and conflict may potentially lead 
to a destruction of the organizational power of the organizations that supported the change 
and as a result the political settlement could shift to a new one, PS3, which implies a more 
adverse trade-off for these institutional changes. The existing institutional strategy could then 
push political stability below the minimum level of political as well as economic sustainability 
and growth may eventually decline to B2 (see figure 3.4). The new political settlement PS3 may 
prevent the joint achievement of minimum levels of political and economic stability and this is 
a description of a political settlement in crisis, possibly with a high degree of violence. This will 
persist until a new settlement emerges that can achieve the minimum viability conditions. 
Overall, the political settlements framework provides dynamic, path-dependent and non-linear 
approach for the analysis of the impact of different reform trajectories on the levels of political 
and economic viabilities in particular societies (Khan, 2010a, p. 44).  
 
FIGURE 3.4: POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS AND GROWTH-STABILITY TRADE-OFFS 
 
SOURCE: KHAN (2010a, p. 43) 
 
The political settlements approach provides an alternative analytical and theoretical 
framework to the conventional institutional explanations of Why Nations Fail (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2012). Conventional ‘good governance’ explanations of why some less developed 
countries, such as Taiwan, South Korea or Malaysia have experienced drastic economic growth 
since the 1950s stress that these countries were successful in getting the fundamental 
institutions ‘right’ (i.e. secure property rights) to achieve market efficiency and 
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macroeconomic stability (World Bank, 1993). Thus, in assuming that any selective state 
intervention would constrain growth capacities the mainstream analysis of governance focuses 
on policies that minimize the role of the state, regardless of potential growth-enhancing 
effects of state intervention.  
Besides engaging with institutional theories and NIE analyses of why late-developing countries 
failed to achieve high levels of economic catching up, this thesis also aims to explore how 
political economy explanations can provide added explanatory value to our theoretical and 
empirical understanding of failed industrialization attempts in Latin America in general, and 
Medellín and Colombia in particular. Many academic explanations of failed attempts of less 
developed countries to achieve considerable levels of economic catching up either focus on 
neoclassical explanations of how oil discovery and subsequent “Dutch Disease” effects slow 
down manufacturing growth, or on policy explanations that focus on macroeconomic policies 
in the context of trade liberalization.  
The “Dutch Disease” literature largely focuses on how a country’s resource abundance can 
have negative effects on manufacturing growth. The increase in oil, gas, or other extractive 
revenues, it is argued, can alter internal price and production structures of the economy. Thus, 
rents from “enclave” extractive sectors can result in exchange rate revaluations, which, 
according to this strand of literature, reduces incentives to invest in manufacturing. The well-
above average profit margins and the increased rent from investments in the extractive 
sectors crowd out manufacturing investments. Hausmann (1990) for example finds that, 
assuming full employment in an economy exists, increases in inflows from extractive industries 
in Venezuela resulted in a change in relative prices favouring non-tradable goods, such as 
services and construction. Non-oil tradable goods from manufacturing and agriculture sectors 
become less profitable and thus investments are crowded out.  
Further, the revalued exchange rate has negative effects on the (export) competitiveness of 
the productive economy. The decreased competitiveness of manufacturing sectors is further 
reinforced through wage effects of oil booms. Thus, the increase in aggregate demand for 
labour as a result of the inflow of extractive rents can lead to an increase in manufacturing 
wages, making domestic production of manufacturing goods less competitive (see Keynes, 
1930; Neary and Van Wijnbergen, 1986).  
The common conclusion drawn in this literature is that booms in natural resources lead to 
negative effects for economic development in productive sectors and the entire structure of 
the economy (see Corden, 1984). That is, the crowding out of investments and the loss of 
competitiveness ultimately leads to a deindustrialization of the economy. These “Dutch 
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Disease” arguments have predominantly been used to explain failures of ISI policies in Latin 
American countries (see Ross, 1999; Usui, 1997; Van Wijnbergen, 1984). In a critical review of 
this literature, Di John (2009 p. 38-39) finds that the conventional arguments follow the logic 
that “an appreciation of the exchange rate leads to a decline in the competitiveness, and 
hence production and employment, of the traded-goods sector… Thus, the model predicts that 
oil booms inevitably lead to deindustrialization (see Corden and Neary, 1982; Neary and Van 
Wijnbergen, 1986).” 
The literature, however, does not engage in closer analyses of why the effects of resource 
booms are so different depending on the particular industry and the context specificities of the 
economy. Another problem that occurs with the “Dutch Disease” literature is that it assumes 
full employment and technology to be given. However, and even in an economy where full 
employment exists, additional export revenues from natural resources can lead to technology-
enhancing investments, if accompanied by appropriate industrial policies. This can help a late 
developing country to successfully catch up in their technology growth. If the policy further 
promotes incentives for learning, this can lead to productivity growth in manufacturing sectors 
and can further help in growing up (see Easterly and Serven, 2003). In several empirical 
studies, Neary and van Wijnbergen (1986, p. 10) find “that a country’s economic performance 
following a resource boom depends on a considerable extend on the policies followed by its 
government”.  
Thus, a second and more political economy strand of the “Dutch Disease” literature focuses on 
why increases in oil revenues are not accompanied by appropriate policies that would balance 
out the potential negative effects of oil abundance on a country’s competitiveness in light of 
overvalued exchange rates and wage costs. The main arguments of this literature evolves 
around the analysis of powerful infant industry owners and the urban middle class who oppose 
devaluations of the exchange rate and a decrease in real wages. However, the degree of 
urbanization does not necessarily indicate the power or the existence of an urban middle class. 
Furthermore, even in countries that remain largely urban, we see resistance to or lack of 
appropriate industrial policies that would counteract on negative effects of an “expensive” 
exchange rate or high real income levels.  
Other authors focus more on the correlations between macroeconomic distortions (i.e. 
exchange rate revaluations) and microeconomic policies. However, while trade deficits 
inevitably lead to trade deficits, microeconomic policies, such as trade protection, has 
indeterminate growth and export outcomes. Thus, the literature that fails to distinguish micro 
from macro reforms misleadingly associates industrial policy with macroeconomic instability 
(see Díaz-Alejandro, 1975; Rodrik, 1996). Furthermore, cases exist where high wages can 
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create incentives for productivity growth. In other cases, wages rose considerably, but 
remained below the levels of productivity growth. The argument of high wages being harmful 
for productivity growth is further untenable when looking at wage effects following structural 
reforms in Latin American countries in the 1990s: the decrease in unit wage costs did not have 
positive effects on manufacturing growth. 
Thus, strands of literature that finds that resource rich Latin America fell behind due to “Dutch 
Disease” effects and macroeconomic distortions are rather inappropriate for the analysis of 
the very variable and context-specific industrial growth paths and trends of deindustrialization 
in different Latin American countries. This makes it untenable to generally conclude that 
deindustrialization of Latin America happened largely due to the continent’s oil abundance or 
imbalances between micro and macro policy reforms (Haber, 1997). This conclusion prompts 
us to question some of the neoclassical and policy explanations for deindustrialization in Latin 
America and makes it necessary to analyse growth experiences through the context-specific 
political economy lens of political settlements.   
Other more heterodox analyses of growth experiences of late developers have exclusively 
focussed on the effects of state interventionist trade policies on productivity growth in 
manufacturing industries. These alternative explanations constitute the developmental state 
literature (Amsden, 2001, 1989; Evans, 1995; Rodrik, 1995; Wade, 1990; Woo-Cumings, 1999).  
However, the developmental state analysis cannot explain why countries some with similar 
factor endowments and similar policy strategies failed to develop while others succeeded. Di 
John (2009) argues that the developmental state literature is inadequate, as it focuses on 
isolated policy or institutional failures without recognizing the particular context in which they 
are embedded. He finds the “main problem with them is that they do not consider that 
governance is an interdependent process of institutional design where such designs are 
simultaneously specifications of incentives and political power over property rights, policy 
agenda, and policy implementation” (Di John, 2009, p. 136).  
The political settlements framework, by providing a more nuanced explanation of success, can 
also explain failures despite outward similarities and brings added explanatory value beyond 
conventional debates on market versus state. Developmental states were successful in 
catching up because their political settlements had favourable interdependent combinations 
of power and institutions and they had a supportive informal power structure that could 
enforce growth-enhancing changes (Khan, 2010a, p. 30). The emergence and success of 
developmental states is further linked to conditions that include sufficiently centralized 
political organizations, independent governance capabilities and government leadership, as 
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well as appropriate technological capabilities of supported entrepreneurs. “In other 
settlements, where clients of state policies were powerfully organized and divided into many 
factions, ambitious industrial policies failed” (Khan, 2010a, p. 30).  
In South Korea, for example, the combination of several critical factors and variables made 
selective state intervention successful. South Korea had a centralized and relatively 
independent bureaucratic state with capabilities of establishing and enforcing institutions that 
could create incentives and compulsions for investments into medium and high productivity 
sectors. At the same time, the state could effectively discipline sectors or firms that were being 
supported (Khan, 2009). Private investments were supported by public investments in the 
form of supportive subsidies and subsidized loans from state-owned banks (Amsden, 1989). At 
the same time, the historical particularities of the South Korean class structure, where 
bureaucratic elites maintained a powerful position during capitalist development vis-à-vis the 
emerging capitalist elites, made growth-enhancing enforcement of learning rents compatible 
with the distribution of power in the South Korean political settlement. Furthermore, South 
Korea’s domestic capitalist elite had sufficient entrepreneurial and productive capabilities in 
technologies that were being supported, which was another important factor in the country’s 
push from “easy” import substitution industrialization (ISI) to more difficult and technologically 
advanced strategies.  
Khan and Blankenburg (2009) show that Latin America had less successful experiences in 
moving up the value chain. While state intervention in Venezuela for example was able to 
generate growth in the early stages of ISI, the state could not provide the institutional 
framework that could support the development of late industrialization based on technological 
upgrading and advanced technologies. This was partly due to a combination of technological 
and institutional strategies that were incompatible with political power constellations. 
Venezuela had a much more fragmented state and a capitalist elite that – very much 
influenced by history to be exporters of natural resources – did not have the capabilities 
needed for big-push industrialization strategies (Di John, 2009). As for most other Latin 
American countries, these structures “impeded, or at least slowed down, the evolution of a 
modern and professional state apparatus” (Khan and Blankenburg, 2009, p. 360).  
The added explanatory value of this political economy approach is that an analysis through the 
political settlements lens helps in understanding the success or failure of institutional changes 
by studying the compatibility of these changes both with particular political conditions 
(governance capabilities, the organization of the state, the distribution of power across 
organizations) and economic factors (the technological and entrepreneurial capabilities of 
firms).  
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3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter argued that in less developed countries the urban scale has become an 
increasingly important unit of analysis for a theoretical and empirical understanding of the role 
of institutions in creating and enforcing policies that achieve growth and stability. We pointed 
out that most analyses of urban institutional changes and development have been focusing on 
conventional ‘good governance’ approaches arguing that it is necessary for urban areas in less 
developed countries to implement a standard set of policies in order to develop. This chapter 
argued that this simplistic approach to institutional economics ignores several crucial issues in 
the understanding of governance capabilities in less developed countries. 
The chapter engaged with alternative political economy approaches that overcome these 
shortfalls. We argued that the political settlements framework provides a theoretical 
understanding of why the transfer, imitation and superimposition of institutional 
arrangements from a successful late developer to a less developed country are unlikely to 
work in most cases. The framework proposed here focuses on the compatibility of underlying 
power configuration such as organizational, administrative and institutional capacities 
required to implement growth-enhancing development strategies and reforms. It highlights 
how differences across political economies, in particular the distribution of organizational 
power, can explain why similar mechanisms of compulsions and incentives were successful in 
achieving high-productivity development in some countries, while they were less successful in 
others.  
However, despite its validity for an alternative theoretical understanding of institutional 
change and development, the political settlements framework can be further developed along 
several dimensions. Decentralization reforms as well as an increased urbanization of Latin 
America are but two factors in this discussion. Furthermore, the focus of the political 
settlements approach that balances of power in a society necessarily shape the policy arena in 
which institutional change can be implemented and developmental outcomes achieved needs 
to be expanded. The interests of dominant capitalist groups and the influence of ideational 
change shaping these interests need to be taken into closer consideration. This is particularly 
true for ideational change through crises and external shocks that followed the insertion of 
many Latin American countries into global capitalist value and production chains. Hence, the 
effects of recent changes in the global economy and globalized networks on the organization 
of different settlements need to be discussed in closer detail. The rise of transnational 
capitalist interests in Latin American societies following liberalization and decentralization 
reforms need to be included in the analysis of power, organizational coordination, governance 
capabilities in rent allocation and the creation of incentives and compulsion for technological 
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transfers and productivity growth, and the evolution of formal and informal institutions. The 
next chapter will therefore adapt the political settlements approach to discuss the political 
economy context of economically transnationalized and politically decentralized Latin America. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: URBAN PROCESSES AND TRANSNATIONAL CAPITAL – THE POLITICAL 
SETTLEMENTS THEORY REVISITED 
The previous chapter discussed that theories of urban governance are dominated by 
institutional approaches that find a standard set of ‘good governance’ capabilities necessary 
and sufficient for achieving economic growth and development. We argued that there is a 
need to explore alternative political economy understandings of the interaction between 
institutions and development that go beyond the simplistic and rather static conventional 
theories. In particular, we discussed the importance of exploring interdependencies between 
power and institutions to understand factors contributing to successful growth-enhancing 
economic policies. This chapter specifically focuses on the impact recent developments in the 
global economy and state restructuring in Latin America have on governance capabilities to 
achieve a growth-enhancing institutional environment.  
As widely discussed, Latin America’s shift to neoliberalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
involved the implementation of reforms to promote economic liberalization, deregulation, and 
privatization (see e.g. Williamson, 1990a). However, and following the neoliberal idea that rent 
seeking and corruption have been the main obstacles to development, Latin American 
countries also introduced a wide range of state restructuring reforms that included the 
decentralization of government (Faguet and Pöschl, 2015; Falleti, 2010). The main aim of the 
interconnected policies of economic liberalization and political decentralization was to make 
government more democratic, transparent, and accountable by reducing the discretion of 
central authorities to create rents and bringing decision making closer to civil society. The main 
argument for decentralization in this context is to reduce politically motivated rent-seeking 
behaviour in an overly complex and bureaucratic central state. The conventional argument for 
decentralization of political and fiscal decision making (inter alia put forward by the 
international financial institutions, IFIs) is that it serves as a remedy for corruption (Abed and 
Davoodi, 2000; Abed and Gupta, 2002). 
By contrast, the theoretical framework adopted here is more concerned with the effects of 
economic liberalization and political decentralization on the distribution of power and on 
consequent governance capabilities to create and enforce institutions that can achieve 
sustainable productivity growth. The radical roll back of government and the reduced space for 
discretionary interventionist strategies have weakened the role of the state considerably. The 
fragmentation of power structures following decentralization can furthermore lead to 
distributional conflicts. The distributional function of formal and informal institutions becomes 
more prominent. This chapter argues that the increases in holding power (defined more 
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comprehensively in section 3.2 above) of a particular business elite faction that benefited from 
neoliberal reforms vis-à-vis a weakened and rolled-back local state makes growth-enhancing 
institutional strategies less likely. Intensified competition between local decentralized 
governments, which by the conventional wisdom increases efficiency as it encourages 
experimentation and innovation in public policy (see Grazzi and Jaramillo, 2015, p. 114), can 
also have adverse effects on economic development. Competing cities in economically 
liberalized Latin America can accelerate a race to the bottom by attracting FDI into low-skilled 
and low-wage activities. In such a context, increased competition between cities can 
perpetuate differences of uneven productive development at the local level. 
Furthermore, and as argued by Rodrik (2014), elites and policymakers of less developed 
countries are not exclusively driven by vested material interests they seek to maximize through 
rational-based choices (see Rodrik, 2014). Instead, actors are heavily influenced by ideational 
changes within a political settlement or as part of exogenous shocks (i.e. paradigm shifts in the 
global economy). Economic liberalization and globalized structures and processes have 
substantially changed the political and economic interests and ideas of Latin America’s elite 
factions. Regional business elites, strengthened by the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s, 
expanded their assets to become local factions of what Robinson (2010) calls the 
“transnational capitalist class”. The transnationalization of capitalist interests through 
increased inward and outward FDI, mergers and acquisitions had two important effects. First, 
it made the transnational capitalist elite the natural partners for fiscally constrained local 
governments who saw the attraction of FDI as a substitute for state-created rents and income 
flows. Any policy reform by a local government would thus benefit companies most likely to 
attract and broker FDI, thus strengthening the internal organizational and holding power of 
these factions through their alliance with foreign investors. Secondly, as the transnational 
capitalist elite generates most of its income from participating in global value chains it is less 
motivated to develop the domestic economy instead of promoting global capitalist growth. 
This is fittingly summarised by Khan and Blankenburg (2009, p. 366) who find that the “fairly 
radical shift towards neo-liberalism” led to Latin America’s “return to its underlying static 
comparative advantage of natural resources and unskilled labour” that had “detrimental 
effects on its productivity and growth performance”. To understand this shift and its 
developmental outcomes in urban Colombia, this chapter outlines the need to look at the 
constellation of political settlements in a contexts where rolled-back local states have low 
governance capabilities and low organizational power vis-à-vis strong local factions of the 
transnational capitalist elite with low entrepreneurial and technological capabilities.  
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This chapter sets out to explore the political settlements approach of analysing institutional 
performance and its impacts on economic outcomes in a historically specific process of 
interdependency between power and institutions. More precisely, the exploration of 
compatibilities between political factors (i.e. a changing distribution of power) and economic-
institutional strategies provides a theoretical foundation for a richer understanding of 
developmental outcomes in the decentralized and liberalized Latin American context. 
Particular attention will be paid to the role of the region’s transnational capitalist elite. The 
exploration of transnationalized and decentralized Latin America through the political 
settlements lens can provide answers to the questions set out at the beginning of this thesis.  
The first section of this chapter discusses the increased importance of the urban dimension as 
a spatial unit for political and economic decision-making processes following liberalization and 
decentralization reforms. Downward transfers of state capacities to local governments have 
been contributing to a “hollowing out” of the nation state. While policy prescriptions for urban 
governments in less developed countries mirror conventional policy prescriptions as set out by 
the ‘good governance’ agenda, there is a general lack of detailed institutional and economic 
understanding of how these policy reforms affect the distribution of power and the likelihood 
of creating and enforcing growth-enhancing institutions and outcomes. Section 4.1 attempts to 
fill this gap.  
Section two of this chapter complements the discussion of the “hollowing out” of the nation 
state by discussing the effects of the transnationalization of Latin America’s business elites. 
Building on Robinson’s (2010) empirical and theoretical findings on Latin America’s capitalist 
class and their impact on economic development in the region, we analyse how changes in the 
interests of the business elite affect power structures, institutional strategies, and the 
likelihood of achieving inclusive and sustainable developmental outcomes. While our focus is 
mainly on the theoretical exploration of Latin America’s elites in general, the section also 
identifies several particularities of elite transformation in Colombia.  
Section 4.3 highlights the implications of processes of urbanization, decentralization, and 
transnationalization on the political settlements framework and its core variables. The section 
suggests a further exploration of Khan’s (2010a) contribution in the light of our findings on the 
preceding sections. This includes changes in the distribution of power and their effects on 
institutions, informality, governance capacities, rent-management strategies, entrepreneurial 
capabilities, and developmental outcomes. This wider understanding of power structures of 
local political settlements in transnationalized Latin America then provides a revised and 
extended political settlements framework for the empirical analysis of our case study 
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developed in chapters five, six, and seven. Section four presents the methodology and data 
used in this thesis. 
 
4.1 DECENTRALIZATION AND URBAN INSTITUTIONALISM IN AN ECONOMICALLY LIBERALIZED CONTEXT 
Academic contributions using historical political economy analyses of institutional change and 
development have argued that in Latin America it was the incompatibility of technological and 
institutional strategies with political factors of inner-societal power constellations that 
impeded a successful catching-up beyond the early stages of ISI (see Di John, 2009; Khan and 
Blankenburg, 2009). In response to the end of the ISI development model, elites in Latin 
America started to reorganize the basic institutional setup of the dominant post-war 
settlement. The 1980s and 1990s saw what Hirschman (1981, p. 155) coined fracasomania, 
that is, an obsession with seeing everything that preceded as a complete failure. During this 
phase, most Latin American countries (above all Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and 
Venezuela) deployed a wide range of radical neoliberal policies that implemented, inter alia, 
far-reaching liberalization reforms of trade and finance, an extensive privatization of public 
assets and services, fiscal austerity, as well as a very substantial deregulation of state control 
over industry and flexibilization of labour markets. In addition to the implementation of these 
‘Washington Consensus’ economic reforms (see Williamson, 1990a), this market-led 
development agenda also involved the political, fiscal, and administrative restructuring of the 
state. Besides the selective transfer of state capabilities to supranational institutions, such as 
the IFIs or the World Trade Organization (WTO) as part of Latin America’s economic and 
financial liberalization paradigm, policies also included a wide range of different 
decentralization reforms, which often coincided with ever increasing dynamics of urbanization 
processes (Falleti, 2010; Montero and Samuels, 2004).  
In the context of Latin America’s extensive economic liberalization, reducing the extent of 
state intervention, and moving towards perceived higher degrees of democratization, 
decentralization reforms thus became a widely supported set of policies for development 
(Menocal, 2004). Since the late 1980s and following the crisis of the state-interventionist 
development model, Latin America moved from its “state-centred matrix” to become the first 
region worldwide to implement a strategic decentralization process (Cavarozzi, 1992). Since 
many governments have implemented such reforms, scholars have increasingly turned their 
attention towards local governments and the impacts of these reforms on the shift of the 
distribution of power from the centre to the local level (Ames, 1999; Angell et al., 2001; Faguet 
and Pöschl, 2015).  
76 
 
Discussions of decentralization, however, have been dominated by the a priori adoption of an 
almost unconditionally supportive stance towards this type of state reform. Support for 
decentralization reforms spanned almost the entire political and academic spectrum. From a 
political perspective, decentralization in Latin America is viewed as an institutional tool to 
bring state services and political legitimacy closer to the people to support and consolidate 
democratization processes (Faguet and Pöschl, 2015). From a more economic-centric 
perspective, NIE scholars and neoliberal technocrats have tended to regard decentralization as 
a kind of magic bullet to promote economic prosperity through increasing economic efficiency, 
combatting corruption, and improving the use of public financial resources (Grazzi and 
Jaramillo, 2015). From the latter perspective, “decentralization has been promoted because of 
the incentives market-preserving federalism is supposed to have on economic development” 
(Faust, 2006, pp. 164–165). Following fiscal federalism theory, a concept first promoted by 
Tiebout (1956), scholars argue that fiscal autonomy of subnational entities can improve 
resource allocation and increase competition between cities to attract investments (see 
Bennett, 1990; Weingast, 1995). However, the nature of these investments, their effect on 
productivity growth and the liberalized economic context within which they take place are not 
taken into consideration by these theories (Falleti, 2010; Faust, 2006).  
The political settlements framework set out in the previous chapter can add explanatory value 
to the study of urban governance as it combines a critical analysis of political factors and 
power constellations that affect economic factors to achieve productivity growth with 
theoretical considerations on the role of institutions. The theory explores “institutional 
performance as a historically specific interactive process between political and economic 
strategies” (Di John, 2009, p. 13). However, as the context of economically liberalized and 
politically decentralized Latin America has challenged and changed this interactive process, we 
need to analyse the implications of the political and economic strategies of state restructuring. 
The remainder of this section discusses how the processes of liberalization and 
decentralization in Colombia, and the increasing importance of the urban dimension as a key 
area of governance analysis, matter for the political settlements framework and the variables 
discussed in the preceding chapter.  
We recognize that the varying degrees and depths of liberalization and decentralization 
reforms, as well as the contexts in which they are implemented, affect different polities 
differently. Furthermore, and as Angell et al. (2001, p. 131) point out, we recognize that in the 
political economy analysis of decentralization and economic development several factors 
matter that “are partially independent from decentralization, but may strongly affect its 
outcome”. These factors include the underlying resource endowments, physical and economic 
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structures of the region, the industrial base of a country, the macroeconomic context 
(including tax policies), the social and political context, the strengths of the public sector, and 
the overall organizational capabilities of organizations to coordinate policy interventions. 
However, and looking at similarities across Latin America in factor endowments and in general 
patterns of liberalization, decentralization and urbanization, we can draw valuable theoretical 
conclusions on how broader processes in the region affect the explanatory value of the 
political settlements framework for the discussion of urban governance in Colombia. 
Decentralization has undoubtedly changed the structures and distribution of power within 
most Latin American polities. Proponents of decentralization and ‘good governance’ reforms 
have suggested that a smaller state has positive effects on discretionary control and can make 
public spending more effective and efficient. As pointed out earlier, such analyses, according 
to which a standard set of institutions and governance capabilities are identified as necessary 
for urban areas in less developed countries to develop, fail to recognize context-specific 
factors of the societies where they are implemented. For example in Latin America, 
decentralization has led to increasing uncertainty about the institutional environment and to a 
decrease in the political and macroeconomic legitimacy of political parties and central 
governments (Grazzi and Jaramillo, 2015, p. 114). Di John (2009) furthermore argues that 
decentralization reforms may also contribute to an increasing factionalism and other political 
and economic conflicts within political organizations as well as in the entire society. 
Analysing the case of Venezuela, Di John (2009, pp. 217–218) finds that factionalism, “a growth 
of multiparty competition and the fragmentation of the party system… reduced the possibility 
of effective coordination of government policies.” Faust (2006, p. 167) argues that “the 
intensity of conflicts and coordination problems depend to a high degree on the heterogeneity 
of interests and the varying degree of organizational strength among the political actors 
involved.” While coordination problems and distributive conflicts are endogenous to every 
process of decentralization (Faust, 2006), decentralization can also leave power structures 
more fragmented, interests more heterogeneous, and the central ruling coalition with less 
organizational powers. These coordination problems and distributive conflicts can thus cause 
political conflicts as they leave room for the rise of new, often populist or violent political 
actors who polarize and destabilize local political settlements. Following decentralization in 
many Latin American countries one could witness an increase in civil society tensions and 
conflict between different regional elites over resources, power and status (see Demmers et 
al., 2004, pp. 66;115). Informality can increase with these processes, as formal institutions of 
patronage distribution have become less viable. Since in the framework proposed here both 
formal as well as informal institutions matter for the allocation of rents, benefits, legitimacy, 
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and policy responsibilities, we need to acknowledge the discretionary powers of clientelist 
patron-client networks linked to grey markets and illicit economic activities.  
In most Latin American countries decentralization coincided with liberalization reforms and 
neoliberal pressures for fiscal austerity. Central governments were often compelled to 
implement decentralization reforms so as to pass on fiscal pressures to local governments and 
to free up resources at the national level (Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998; Bresser Pereira, 1993). 
These reforms, together with the devolution of political power, have overall strengthened 
regional elite structures. At the same time, and as discussed in the next chapter, in the case of 
Colombia the policies led to the fragmentation of central government capacities and the 
devolution of organizational structures. This resulted in a decline of the powers of national 
political parties and the central state, as well as in an increase in vertical and horizontal 
bargaining costs.  
However, it would be misleading to assume a priori that decentralization always impedes 
productivity growth and sustainable development and that there could be no local input to 
creating and enforcing institutional strategies. “Decentralization for development” (Wiesner 
Durán, 1992) however, needs to tap into local capacities that focus on economic policies that 
support the development of medium or high technology sectors. The role of the central 
government in creating and allocating resources remains critical for the creation of institutions 
that focus on taxes, research and investment in technology, training programs for 
technological learning for targeted sectors and employees, infrastructure investment and the 
like. The likelihood of decentralization reforms leading to growth-enhancing institutional 
environment that can set political settlements on incremental and sustainable paths also 
depends on several other political economy factors. This becomes evident in the analysis of 
the growth-enhancing urban governance reforms that were successfully implemented in many 
urban areas of so-called late developers in East Asia.  
Bae and Sellers (2007, p. 543) for example find that South Korean cities benefited from 
favourable political economy conditions at the national level that led to the “the emergence of 
an urban growth politics and business-led growth coalitions”. Lan (2009) finds similar 
explanations for the development of Chinese “local developmental states”. He argues that 
“Shenzhen’s local growth political economy is highly embedded in the context of national 
intention for growth, (and a) biased planning system under growth-oriented urban 
governance” (Lan, 2009, p. 325). Segal and Thun (2001) also find that the productivity growth 
successes of Beijing and Shanghai depended very much on broader national structures that 
were favourable for interventionist growth models at the urban level. They furthermore argue 
that the centralized and concentrated organizational power of the Communist Party in general 
79 
 
were helpful for the creation and enforcement of growth-oriented structures. Similarly, Lee 
and Shin (2012, p. 1333) argue that the success of Seoul in achieving growth-oriented urban 
governance capabilities is linked to the fact that the Korean central government “still holds 
significant institutional power and policies”. In the same vein, Jacobs (2008, p. 1) finds that the 
success of growth-enhancing urban institutions in Saitama City can largely be explained by “its 
embeddedness in the Japanese Developmental State” and an organizational unified national 
government with interests in productivity-driven city development.  
In the organizational structures of most developmental states, horizontal and vertical 
fragmentation of power is minimal, which prevents coordination problems. This enabled the 
emergence of structures for successful allocation of centrally created rents to cities and 
regions, which incentivized local entrepreneurs to engage in high productivity activities and 
technologically advanced sectors. That these developmental states succeeded in being late 
industrializers and late democratizers thus helped growth-enhancing institutional conditions to 
emerge at the urban level (Bae and Sellers, 2007, p. 543). However, and as the remainder of 
this thesis points out, the organizational structure of Colombia’s political economy is very 
much different from these successful examples of local governance.  
In Colombia we find several internal factors that have driven transfers of selective state 
capacities to subnational governments, and these differ from the factors leading to the 
devolution of power in East Asian developmental states. Angell et al. (2001, p. 3) argue that 
“decentralization was adopted almost as an act of desperation in the search for a solution to 
the political impasse that afflicted the country.” Decentralization reforms were implemented 
as a response to both vertical and horizontal fragmentation of organizational capacities in the 
main two parties as well as in the entire polity following the end of the Frente Nacional in 1974 
(Gutiérrez, 2002). Decentralization was seen as a response to the organizational incapacity of 
the central government to create and enforce institutions that could guarantee sustainable 
levels of political and economic viability. Due to these generally less favourable conditions, 
Colombia did not only fail in moving from easy ISI strategies to more advanced technologies 
for late industrialization. These factors also affect decentralized urban governance until today, 
as is discussed in more detail in chapters five and six. 
In addition to internal factors affecting the political settlement, we identify several external 
factors that determine the effectiveness of achieving growth-oriented urban governance 
structures. Colombia’s economic and financial liberalization reforms were implemented in a 
political economy context of largely failed late industrialization attempts. The country’s return 
to static comparative advantages in low productivity sectors following the implementation of 
neoliberal policies needs to be considered in this discussion. This is considerably different from 
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East Asian developmental states that only engaged in liberalization reforms after they had 
successfully achieved industrial catching up. Consequently, when local governments in these 
developmental states were first exposed to specific and powerful globalized networks and 
processes, the institutional structures of the political settlement in which they were embedded 
had already put them onto sustainable trajectories of economic and political viability. 
Combined with the power structures that were compatible with growth-oriented governance 
capabilities, this had helped their economies achieve competitive advantages in 
technologically advanced sectors, preventing a return to static low productivity comparative 
advantages.  
The development of Colombia stands in stark contrast. Here, globalized value chains and 
increased capital mobility in financially liberalized markets have directly contributed to the 
development of rather low productivity economic sectors. Hence, organizational powers of 
central as well as decentralized entities in Colombia have been influenced by external changes 
that can be linked to wider market-oriented policies in the country (Ocampo, 2007, 2001). 
Alongside Washington Consensus-style structural adjustment programmes, the idea of a 
rolled-back and weakened local state became the dominant political recommendation in order 
to decrease the likelihood of interventionist policies that would create market distortions 
(Garay, 1998, p. 82). Decentralization reforms, it was argued, would facilitate the creation of 
institutional underpinnings for economic development and macroeconomic equilibrium 
through economic liberalization and transnationalization of value chains (Restrepo and 
Cárdenas, 2004). Fiscal decentralization as part of state restructuring reforms targeted 
potential risks of corruption and free riding, but also had the rationale of reducing public 
deficits and removing obstacles for private sector development. Besides the use of 
privatization to reduce public deficits, urban areas in Colombia also used financial liberalization 
to debt-finance expenditures and to attract investment (Montero and Samuels, 2004, p. 16). 
Furthermore, in the context of the country’s underdeveloped productive sector, these 
processes have indirect effects on growth trajectories of urban economies in Colombia as they 
have had considerable impacts on elite interests and power structures. Hence, the underlying 
distribution of power, the organizational capacity of the state, the productive abilities of the 
capitalist elite, and overall governance structures for achieving growth-enhancing governance 
in developmental states differ largely from the capacities and capabilities of powerful 
organizations in Colombia’s political settlement. This again demonstrates the importance of 
context-specificity in the theoretical discussion of institutions, governance, growth and 
development.  
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We further find Di John’s (2009) arguments in regard to Venezuela a very useful entry point for 
an alternative political economy theory for local governance and growth in the economically 
liberalized context of Latin America. Di John (2009, p. 110) “suggest(s) that economic 
liberalization and political decentralization has not strengthened the state… The ‘good 
governance paradigm’… downplays the task of reconstructing or building political 
organizations. This is because of the influence of the rent-seeking and corruption literature in 
informing policy on state capacity building and the negative view of politics that flows from 
that analysis.” Similarly, our analysis of institutions and governance in economically liberalized 
and politically decentralized Colombia departs from ‘good governance’ approaches as it 
stresses the importance of political factors in urban political settlements, such as the 
constellations of power and organizational capabilities for achieving positive developmental 
outcomes.  
In sum, the ascent of the urban as a key institutional dimension, presupposed by and 
contextualised in a transformed spatiality of global capitalism, has altered the distribution of 
power in Latin America in general and in Colombia in particular. As power relations affect the 
institutional landscape, and institutional structures affect political and economic outcomes, 
these spatio-institutional and economic shifts have far-reaching consequences for institutional 
performance and developmental outcomes.  
With these considerations in mind, we need to re-evaluate some of the processes depicted in 
figure 3.1 and extend our analysis to a political settlement in which decentralization has 
challenged the centralized context of organizational and holding powers. Formal and informal 
institutions remain with the functions of enhancing or decreasing efficiency. However, they 
become increasingly important in terms of their distributive implications. Thus, formal and 
informal institutions do not only have distributive functions of reducing enforcement costs and 
centrally maintaining viable political stability at the national level, but also at the local level, 
including the distribution of benefits, such as rents, patronage, and income resources to 
regional elites and urban political actors. The institutional processes through which these 
benefits are distributed include direct elections of mayors, deregulation and privatization 
reforms, patron-client networks that benefit from reforms and agreements, and the like.  
In the decentralized political settlement formal and informal institutions have similar 
functions. However, with the increase in distributive conflicts within and among regional elite 
factions following decentralization, (informal) institutional mechanisms to pay off outsiders 
and to maintain local stability might be more prominent in a decentralized settlement where 
interest heterogeneity proliferates. Consequently, and particularly in Colombia’s context 
where a) state capabilities are limited and political power structures fragmented, b) regional 
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elites have strengthened their economic powers through benefitting from deregulation and 
privatization reforms, and c) capitalists have low technological and low entrepreneurial 
capabilities, formal and informal efforts to create and enforce institutions are less likely to 
achieve positive productivity growth outcomes. Hence, decentralization and regional 
fragmentation make the (power) relationship between state and business actors less 
straightforward as such state reforms add an additional layer of formal and informal 
relationships that influence the overall distribution of net benefits and the distribution of 
power in a political settlement (see section 4.3).  
The interdependency between power and institutions, however, has not only changed 
following state restructuring through the rise of the urban dimension as a key arena. 
Decentralization and liberalization reforms also included adjustments of elite interests that 
affected the variables of the political settlement discussed above, such as the role of informal 
institutions of creating rents that reduce GTC and TSC. The next section discusses the 
phenomenon of elite “transnationalization” in Latin America to set the context for section 4.3, 
which revises some of the critical aspects of the political settlement analysed thus far.  
 
4.2 THE ROLE OF IDEAS AND TRANSNATIONAL CAPITALIST ELITES IN SHAPING POWER AND INSTITUTIONS  
Of particular interest in the analysis of effective institutional change through the political 
settlements lens are the powers, interests and position of the capitalist elite (if one exists) in 
the political settlement, as well as their entrepreneurial and technological capabilities. 
Decentralization and liberalization have affected the context of Latin American polities. 
However, these reforms have also had great impacts on the structure of the region’s capitalist 
class and have led to a “transnationalization” of their interests (see Robinson, 2010).  
There exists some academic literature on political settlements in a globalized context where 
changes in elite interests as well as ideational change are taking into consideration. However, 
there is a need for a more in-depth approach to the exploration of the political settlements 
framework in this changed context, particularly with regards to elite interests, exogenous as 
well as internal changes of dominant development ideas, the interdependent relationship 
between power and institutions, and any developmental outcomes. This section analyses 
several changes in these factors, which is necessary for a systematic exploration of the political 
settlements framework and its application in a decentralized and liberalized Latin America 
(further developed in section 4.3).  
83 
 
Recent academic contributions to the political settlements literature actively seek to broaden 
the framework by stressing that other political economy factors challenge the validity of 
Khan’s (2010) approach. Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2013) argue that the standard political 
settlements approach needs to be extended by including discussions of how globalized 
structures and ideas impact the character of the political settlement and change institutional 
complexity (see Levy, 2014). Drawing on Hickey (2013) the authors particularly “emphasise the 
extent to which political settlements are located within and closely shaped by the globalised 
context that involves national actors interacting with transnational actors, institutions, 
processes and also ideas” (Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 2013, p. 5). This literature, largely 
originating from the University of Manchester’s Effective States and Inclusive Development 
Research Centre argues for the incorporation of multi-levelled approaches that move beyond 
the idea of elites as merely national actors.  
Hickey (2013, p. 14), for example, argues that there is a need for a relational approach that 
compliments frameworks that “operate within a narrow frame of methodological 
nationalism… (and are) thus unable to capture the broader range of processes and factors that 
shape the politics of development, particularly in terms of the role of ideas, the agency of 
subordinate groups and the influence of transnational level factors”. In particular, the author 
finds that that the political economy analysis of power and institutions needs to “treat elites as 
transnational… who are subject to influence by incentives and ideas that operate at more 
global levels… Globalisation fundamentally alters the character of bargaining both between 
elites and between elites and lower-level groupings in ways that are largely ignored within the 
development mainstream” (Hickey 2013, p. 13; 20).  
Lavers and Hickey (2015) use these theoretical considerations in a conceptual and 
methodological analysis of underlying power relations in the politics of social protection in 
Africa. The authors find that “political settlements frameworks tend to downplay the 
importance of transnational actors in favour of detailed analysis of domestic politics” (Lavers 
and Hickey, 2015, p. 26). The process of governance and institutional change “can also be 
affected by exogenous factors and actors” (Bebbington, 2013, p. 11). This is especially true for 
sectors that are “characterized by an important presence of international companies, 
multilateral agencies, international advocacy networks and transnational nongovernmental 
organizations, as well as by international commodity price volatility which can also elicit 
domestic coalitional and institutional change” (Bebbington, 2013, p. 11). In such globally 
exposed and integrated sectors it is important to acknowledge transnational factors more 
generally “such as policy diffusion and institutional mimicry” (Dressel and Dinnen, 2014, p. 5). 
However, and as Mohan and Asante (2015, p. 4) point out, “our understanding of these 
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processes is still quite black-boxed and we have yet to establish causality between 
international interests, specific coalitions, and outcomes”. 
In his contribution, Hickey (2013, p. 22) discusses several transnational factors, such as “the 
ways in which colonialism helps establish initial conditions, the character and timing of how 
countries are inserted into the global capitalist political economy, the influence of 
transnational flows of ideas and also the direct role of international actors in certain policy 
coalitions” that impact power constellation and institutions. He further explores other critical 
theories that can offer powerful insights to the political settlements framework in order to 
move toward “a broad conceptual framework which includes a wide range of variables and 
processes” (2013, p. 22). Thus, Hickey (2013) clearly maps out a variety of important 
underlying processes and factors that influence the original political settlements theory.  
The approach adopted and developed here builds on these insightful analytical considerations. 
We aim to theoretically and conceptually explicate how ideas and ideologies as well as 
transnational factors affect power and governance capabilities, how they impact 
entrepreneurial and technological capabilities of firms and sectors, and what implications they 
have for rent creation and rent management as well as achieving and implementing growth-
enhancing institutions. Furthermore, and this is generally true for the political settlements 
literature, there is a need for alternative institutional political economy analyses focusing on 
the implications of changes in elite structures, power distribution, and institutions on 
economic and political development in Latin America.  
4.2.1 IDEAS AND INTERESTS 
As Rodrik (2014, p. 189) rightfully points out, “(i)deas are strangely absent from modern 
models of political economy”. In part, this is also true for the political settlement framework 
presented so far. Rodirk’s (2014) main argument is that the neglect of ideas in political 
economy makes it difficult to account for policy change. This is because the context and the 
policy space are shaped by how ideas motivate actors to implement policy change. When ideas 
are put aside due to the dominance of analyzing vested interests in political economy theories, 
“social science squeezes normative policy analysis out of useful existence” (Rodrik, 2014, p. 
209).  
Similar to the findings proposed in the Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) model for economic 
technological discovery, Rodrik (2014) argues that ideas are an important factor for achieving 
innovative economic policies through “discovery-by-doing”. Furthermore, in the process of 
discovering policy innovation for a particular context, policymakers, elite groups and other 
powerful actors often take ideas from other contexts. This policy emulation of so-called “best 
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practices” that prevailed elsewhere can be an attractive source for policy ideas. However, and 
as argued above, the success of mimicking policies is limited, since the successful 
implementation and enforcement depends on the particular interdependency of power and 
institution of a political settlement.  
Another source of policy innovation is the existence of crises. Rodrik (2014) uses the findings of 
Blyth (2007, p. 762) who argues that “(i)n moments of uncertainty, crisis-defining ideas not 
only tell agents ‘what has gone wrong’ but also ‘what is to be done’.” Lavers and Hickey (2015) 
take this one step further to argue that in moments of instability ideational influence is much 
stronger than in a stable polity. In this context, ideas can potentially provide “a means of 
addressing new problems and/or promoting stability” (Lavers and Hickey, 2015, p. 21).  
In the discussion of ideational influence on policy reforms Rodrik (2014, p. 193) finds that 
“ideas may fall on either side of some of the biggest controversies in the history of economic 
thought”, such as questions on an interventionist versus a laissez-faire model, debates on 
protectionism versus free trade, demand- versus supply-side fiscal policies, and whether 
monetarism, Keynesianism or Washington Consensus-style neoliberalism creates conditions of 
macroeconomic stability. All of these debates that have shaped political economies across the 
world are heavily influenced not just by the vested interests of actors – as usually argued by 
political economy models – but also by the elites’ understanding of reality. In turn, the 
consequences and outcomes of policies influence the way in which new ideas lead to a 
paradigm shift in the “conventional wisdom” of economic, political, and social policies (see 
Gore, 2000). Many of these factors contributing to ideational change and thus driving 
economic outcomes are exogenous to local or even national processes. 
Another weakness related to these issues resides in the assumption of economic frameworks 
and most political economy models that policy actors have perfect knowledge of their material 
interests and act rationally according to these interests. However, and as Rodirk (2014, p. 191) 
argues, “much human behavior is driven by abstract ideals, sacred values, or conceptions of 
loyalty that cannot be reduced to economic ends.” The knowledge about the particular 
interest and the evolvement of this interest are shaped by the idea about how the world works 
and about the socially-constructed identity of the policy actors within that world.  
This underlines the need to challenge the assumption that policymakers and elites act 
rationally according to their vested material interests and according to their position within a 
power equilibrium of a society. A look at political science literature can help contextualize 
these claims and provide an entry point for including ideas in our political settlements 
framework. Thus, rather than acting out of their material interests, elites and policy actors 
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“rely on perceptions of… [a] context that are, at best, incomplete and that might often prove 
to have been inaccurate after the event” (Hay, 2011, p. 67). As such, interests are shaped by 
more than the aim for material improvement. Rather, interests are socially constructed and 
arise from ideologies, values, norms and believes and are “irredeemably ideational, reflecting a 
normative… orientation toward the context in which they will have to be realized” (Hay, 2011, 
p. 67). Béland and Cox (2011, p. 10) even find that interests are “one form of idea”. Thus, 
elites, powerful actors, and policymakers act according to their interests as well as their ideas 
and worldviews.  
These considerations can provide a useful entry point into the adaption of the political 
settlements framework. Khan (2010b, p. 20; 61) considers ideas largely as an informal tool by 
elite factions or subordinate groups to mobilize in support of or against an institutional 
change. Ideas are thus incorporated in considerations of imperfect enforcement of institutions 
and are seen as important in understanding the organizational capacities of actors to induce or 
absorb transition costs. However, the political settlements model generally treats ideas as 
outcomes of incentives and interests, not as factors that shape power constellation and policy 
space (see Hickey, 2013).  
Similar to other political economy models the political settlements theory is based on the 
analysis of vested interests of elites and policymakers, the distribution of power in a society, 
and economic institutions or “rules of the game” that influence economic efficiency and 
political equilibrium (North, 1990). This prompts us to expand Rodrik’s (2014, p. 206) criticism 
of political economy models focusing on vested interests and his “explicit consideration of the 
role of ideas... for policy analysis”. We thus argue that ideas and exogenous factors to a 
particular political settlement shape the political economy landscape beyond the policy space 
and influence the distribution of power, relations between powerful groups, and the 
implementation and enforcement of as well as the resistance to institutional changes.  
The relationship between powerful groups in a society and its impact on economic growth is a 
widely debated topic in political economy models. Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) for example 
discuss how growth-enhancing policies were not attempted in some contexts (i.e. in 19th 
century Europe) due to a particular constellation of power. The authors argue that industrial 
growth and urbanization can adversely affect elites whose traditional base is very much rural 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013). Potential growth-enhancing reforms are thus not pursued 
because of unintended consequences for the distribution of power. Hence, and similar to 
Khan’s (2010b) consideration on the distribution of benefits that maintains the political 
settlement between powerful groups stable (see figure 1), the authors mainly focus on vested 
interests, which are largely seen as given. However, and reiterating the points made above of 
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taking politics into account, ideas shaped by changes exogenous to a political settlement are 
an important factor in creating a compatibility between potential growth-enhancing economic 
policies and the political equilibrium in a political settlement. Well-informed political ideas can 
lead to growth-enhancing results that are compatible with the underlying distribution of 
power in a political settlement. Rodrik (2014, p. 197) finds that political ideas can “relax 
political constraints, enabling those in power to make themselves (and possibly the rest of 
society) better off without undermining their political power”.  
However, ideas can also be the reason for changes in the configuration of power. This is 
particularly true in situations of institutional stability or even ‘Knightian uncertainty’ (i.e. policy 
actors are unsure about their own interests), when elites and policy agents question their 
ideational and ideological paradigms guiding their decision making and look for new 
approaches and conventional wisdoms (see Blyth, 2002). A focus on ideas in such a period, 
Lavers and Hickey (2015, p. 14) write, “reinforces previous calls to examine political 
settlements in historical and dynamic perspective (Di John and Putzel 2009, Khan 2010b, 
Hickey 2013), given that the paradigmatic ideas underpinning settlements are likely to 
change”.  
The dynamism of the different variables shaping the political settlement and the contestation 
between different elite groups implies some form of instability as the natural order. While 
institutions are seen as promoters of stability and economic growth (see Khan, 2010; North, 
2007), the transition costs they might unleash can also be a source of instability (see above). In 
a situation where a ruling coalition in a political settlement holds substantial organizational 
powers, there is very little opportunity for outsiders to influence the ideational paradigm that 
underpins the political settlement. However, if the distribution of power is widely dispersed, 
outsiders can take advantage of uncertainty and crisis to challenge a ruling coalition through 
ideational change. This is particularly true when contesting elites engage in negotiation over 
future policy trajectory with each other or with subordinate groups. This can lead to a 
paradigm shift of the conventional wisdom about development strategies and ideas that have 
thus far underpinned the settlement.  
Ideas that can influence the political settlement can arise from conflicts within the ruling 
coalition, within a powerful organization, or as a result from exogenous shocks, including 
spatial changes in the political economy (i.e. decentralization, global economic integration, and 
the like). In the cases of structural reforms in less developed countries it was thus often the 
implementation of new ideas by the ruling coalition – rather than a transformation in the 
distribution of power – that was an important factor for change. As Rodrik (2014, p. 206) 
summarizes, “reform often happens not when vested interests are defeated, but when 
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different strategies are used to pursue those interests, or when interests themselves are 
redefined”. Ideas as an exogenous factor that influence elite interests and reform strategies 
explicitly need to be taken into consideration when looking at policy change and 
developmental outcomes. 
Looking at the efficiency and distributional functions of institutions, we also need to analyze 
ideas in their role of potentially reducing transaction costs and minimizing transition costs. As 
such, we need to consider the role of ideas in compensating potential losers of institutional 
changes. If, for example, economic liberalization adversely affects some powerful elite faction, 
these reforms need to be accompanied by compensation to generate efficient outcomes and 
to minimize political disequilibria (see Rodrik, 2014, p. 196).  
We can conclude that the attempts by actors to influence reform processes through innovative 
policy ideas as well as the impact of ideas in shaping the constellation of power in a society 
depends on the compatibility of these ideas with the political settlement. Transnational factors 
and actors increasingly play an important role in shaping ideas and influencing local political 
settlements through exogenous shocks and paradigmatic ideas (i.e. through the IMF’s 
structural adjustment programs). The next subsection discusses some of these transnational 
factors and actors, changes in their interests and ideational convictions, and their influence on 
institutional change and development.  
4.2.2 LATIN AMERICA’S TRANSNATIONAL CAPITALIST ELITES 
The integration of Latin America into global capitalist dynamics largely followed a paradigm 
shift towards ‘Washington Consensus’ and ‘post-Washington Consensus’ policies. Particularly 
the latter, which was not only coined by the “substantive differences with earlier approaches, 
but also the nature of the change in the disciplinary matrix and worldview” (Gore, 2000, p. 
790) remains to be a very strong economic development paradigm influencing policy reforms 
in Latin America and beyond. As such, we need to understand the region’s radical shift to 
neoliberalism as a result of shifts in the vested interests of elite factions and policy actors as 
well as a consequence of changing ideas. We argue that neoliberalism in Latin America – to use 
Max Weber’s words – provided a dialectic relationship between interests, ideas, institutions 
and social orders (see Weber, 1978, p. 184). Latin America’s global economic integration 
implied not only the introduction of drastic liberalization reforms, the radical privatization of 
public assets and services, and far-reaching deregulation of state control over industry, but 
also led to the transnationalization of local capitalist assets and elite interests. We thus 
understand transnationalization as an important variable strengthening the dialectic 
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relationship between ideas, interests, institutions, social orders (e.g. political settlements) and 
development outcomes.  
In a systematic analysis of economic transnationalization and elite transformation Robinson 
(2010) finds that Latin America’s domestic capitalists transformed drastically and 
transnationalized their assets after the region’s neoliberal turn in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Using these insights for our analysis of internal changes within the region’s capitalist elite, we 
identify two general patterns. First the capitalist elite has increasingly concentrated its assets 
in sectors that have large participation in Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and are often 
themselves drivers for capital transnationalization. In urban areas it is mostly the service 
sectors of finance, telecommunication, real estate, retail, and tourism. Additionally, this elite 
group also holds majority shares in extractive industries and non-traditional exports – 
economic activities that are closely linked to the global economy. Secondly, and as Robinson 
(2010) points out, “the new transnational capitalist groups are not self-made… (They) date 
their fortunes and class status to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as capitalism 
developed in Latin America”. While the transnational capitalist elite is qualitatively different 
from the well-paid junior partners of imperialist capital, it has many of its origins in this old-
style comprador class (see Reyes, 2003).  
With an increasing dynamic of globalization Latin America’s elite progressively “integrate their 
holdings and operations into global production chains if they want to remain competitive… 
(making it) increasingly difficult to separate local circuits of production and distribution from 
the globalized circuits that dictate the terms and patterns of accumulation worldwide” 
(Robinson, 2010, p. 29). Thus, and unlike in nation-state capitalism, the transnational faction of 
the elite has little interest in developing productive markets domestically, but focus instead on 
the advancement of specific globalized networks and processes in which they participate and 
through which they generate incomes from. This pressure on capitalist elites to insert their 
economies into the global chain of production and value creation while accepting the static 
and low-productive nature of the comparative advantages of their economies has several 
implications for Latin America’s development that require further discussion.  
The first set of implications regards possible allocative and distributional conflicts that arise 
with the transnationalization of the elites’ economic interests. Thus, the “contradictory logic 
between national and global accumulation” (Robinson, 2010, p. 32) has in many cases led to 
conflicts between national factions that are declining in power and ascendant transnational 
factions of local elites. The tensions that arise between these groups are global as well as 
internal through interregional conflicts. Both have implications for institutional functions and 
mechanisms. With industrial and traditional exports in crisis, the post-ISI development phase 
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resulted in tensions between elite factions. Traditional industrialist elite factions were losing 
economic power and hence the ability to distribute benefits to maintain a favourable growth-
stability trade-off. Competing elite factions that had been outsiders of the dominant coalition 
contested fragile power constellations based on traditional rent management, which was 
reinforced through the dynamics of state fragmentation discussed above.  
However, the implementation of neoliberal reforms in Latin America also conjoined with 
mergers between transnationalizing elite factions and political actors to form new coalitions 
and projects of hegemony. In many cases these were able to help stabilize the new political 
settlements, as the transnational capitalists formed coalitions that gathered around “a new 
axis of class fractionation” and that helped “(n)ew transnational capitalists and transnationally 
oriented elites…[to emerge] around globalized circuits of accumulation” (Robinson, 2010, p. 
168). In this vein, Rettberg (2005, p. 38) finds that in Colombia loose and often informal 
“networks of legally independent firms, affiliated with one another through mutual 
shareholding or by direct family ownership” have formed so-called grupos (diversified 
conglomerates). Grupos combine the interests of Colombia’s landed oligarchy and traditional 
industrialists with the interests of urban transnational elites to concentrate capital and power. 
Rettberg (2005) further finds that in Colombia grupos have contributed to the weakening of 
older business associations that were largely linked to industrial capital in their power to 
influence political decision making. These grupos have also led to an increased capital 
concentration and changed business organization. This is reflected in the elite’s “fear of being 
invaded in their own back yards" (Reyes, 2003, p. 11) by elite factions engaging in interregional 
or transnational competition.  
Robinson (2010, p. 173) finds that Latin America’s contingents of transnational capitalists have 
secured their economic power by developing capacities as political actors and gaining 
considerable political power. Together with technocratic elites Latin American capitalists have 
“established new institutional bases from which to develop programs and assemble teams, 
largely constituted by new private sector associations and elite foundations” (Robinson, 2010, 
p. 173). Through these institutional bases these agents have used state apparatuses for the 
promotion of neoliberal polices to advance globalization and to weaken the nation state. This 
also included “a shift in subsidies that states provide, away from social reproduction and from 
internal economic agents and towards transnational capital” (Robinson, 2010, p. 33). Thus, the 
elite factions that managed to assimilate and benefit from processes of transnationalization 
became dominant in the changing environment of most political settlements in Latin America 
(see Khan and Blankenburg, 2009).  
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Linked to the impacts of transnationalization are implications for developmental outcomes of 
these shifts. The tendency of transnational capitalism to insert the economies of Latin 
American countries, regions, and cities at the lower value-added end of global value chains 
reinforces static comparative advantages in sectors marked by low productivity. Latin 
America’s elite still holds major assets in labour-intensive industries, such as textile, food 
processing, and manufacturing of other non-durable consumer goods. Furthermore, and with 
some of the industrial capital in recession, Latin America has witnessed an expansion of 
tertiary economic activities leading to a "tercerization" of their political economies (Robinson, 
2010, p. 126). The participation in the global production chain through the transnationalization 
of assets and interests attracts transnational investments into these labour-intensive 
industries at the lower end of the value ladder. Hence, the region’s transnational elite factions 
benefit from the acceptance of low productivity comparative advantages. 
Beyond the strengthening of a regional elite that has decreasing incentives to invest in 
potentially growth-enhancing domestic sectors, this development also affects technology-
driven growth, labour market dynamics, and wages. Following the logic of global value creation 
and market-driven resource allocation, Latin America’s large pool of unskilled and cheap 
labour becomes an increasingly natural and unchallenged competitive advantage of the region. 
However, as pointed out by Khan (2010b, p. 7), less developed countries do not catch up 
because of their competitiveness in low wages and pools of underemployed labour, as 
competitiveness also depends on labour productivity, the effective use of inputs, and the 
quality of a good. As discussed in section 3.3, the process of acquiring tacit knowledge is 
particularly relevant in this context. In an economy where cheap labour supply is abundant 
(reinforced by low-wage policies of suppressing real wages), investments and efforts in 
learning and acquisition of technology to discover higher-value comparative advantages are 
likely to be marginal, as profits are generated through labour-intensive activities at the lower 
end of the value ladder. In this situation the appropriability problem of a lack of private 
investment in training personnel and raising skills arises, as capitalists prefer to generate 
profits through cheap labour in labour-intensive activities. These processes also reinforce low 
labour productivity and high gross employment elasticities, as additional GDP growth will lead 
to job creation in low-waged sectors (i.e. services) rather than to investment in technology-
intensive sectors. Economies in which periods of learning-by-doing are absent find it difficult to 
compete in production higher up the value ladder. Without the capabilities of inducing 
technological upgrading and with persisting appropriability problems, urban areas in Latin 
America are not able to create and ensure incentives and compulsions for sectors where tacit 
learning is needed. This increases dependency on technology transfers through FDI, which 
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makes urban Latin America more vulnerable to multinational locational decisions while at the 
same time constrains domestic firms to lower technological trajectories. 
Further developmental outcomes include the increased participation of the region’s 
transnational capitalist elites in financial services and the intensified financialization of Latin 
America’s economies. Capitalist growth has been largely driven by speculative capital 
accumulation in the region’s financial markets (see UNCTAD, 2015). Through the 
interconnectivity of Latin America’s elite with transnational finance capitalism, FDI linked to 
financial capital has become one of the main sources of income flows (rents). Closely linked to 
these speculative developments is the creation of property value through mechanisms of 
financial intermediation, bolstering growth of ‘value-added’ in real estate in urban economies. 
However, many of these accounting profits are not realized, as pre-sales of non-built 
apartments and houses dominate the urban real estate market. Low interest rate policies 
facilitate an increase in sub-prime mortgages and incentivize speculative investments, which 
also generate inflows of transnational capital and lead to the transnationalization of mortgage 
securities. Financial services and their close connection to transnational capital have thus 
become lucrative, yet very speculative and fragile substitutes for state-created industrial rents.  
Besides attracting global capital investments in real estate and in finance Latin American 
metropolises have become key arenas for global capital operating in tourism – another sector 
that is predominantly controlled by the transnational capitalist elite (see Hylton, 2007; 
Robinson, 2010). While tourism can become a very well-integrated demand-generating sector 
of the broader urban economy, it is hardly a contributor to inclusive development and 
sustainable productivity growth. Similar to the more traditional labour-intensive industries the 
tourist industry might generate employment growth, but it heavily relies on low wages and can 
have detrimental productivity outcomes. This is reinforced through generating demand in 
other low-wage service sectors, such as transportation. Tourism furthermore spurs land 
speculation and real estate development, with the associated speculative risks. 
Information technology (IT) is often promoted as an alternative high productivity sector in 
Latin America’s urban areas. However, most IT enterprises operating in the region are far from 
being sources of high value-added productivity growth, as their production base is mainly 
characterized by low productivity, low technology and low entrepreneurial skills. This is also 
due to the fact that these IT firms in Latin America are predominantly outsourced service hubs 
of transnational companies that “would more accurately be characterized as informational 
maquiladoras: low wages, long hours, Taylorist discipline, and a hostile anti-union 
environment” (Robinson, 2010, p. 127).  
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The transnationalization of Latin America’s (urban) elites and the decentralization of political, 
fiscal, economic, and administrative decision making after the region’s neoliberal turn have 
various related implications regarding developmental outcomes for urban areas. The next 
section aims to broaden our theoretical understanding of these processes further, by exploring 
the political settlements framework in the context of decentralized and transnationalized Latin 
America.  
 
4.3 THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS THEORY REVISITED  
The arguments made regarding the spatio-economic and institutional changes in Latin America 
through processes of urbanization and decentralization, as well as the transnationalization 
prompt us to further explore some of the theoretical considerations of chapter three.  
According to the theoretical framework developed in chapter three the ability to influence the 
agenda setting of the ruling coalition depends inter alia on the political and economic powers 
of the capitalists and their technological and entrepreneurial capabilities. For Khan (2010a) 
these capabilities are mainly a product of domestic capital accumulation and of relationships 
between the capitalist entrepreneurs and the ruling elites. These factors are influenced by the 
sources of rent creation and the institutions that dominate the distribution of rents (Whitfield 
and Therkildsen, 2011). As established in the previous sections, several factors related to 
decentralization and transnationalisation have upset traditional mechanisms of rent 
management and power structures. The role of ideational change, the ascendance of the 
transnational capitalist elite, and the increased importance of the urban level affect our 
understanding and analysis of the interdependency between power and institutions in a 
political settlement in specific ways.  
We find that political settlements at the local level in Latin America do not only drive 
institutional changes and impact policy spaces for economic development, but are very much 
affected by a variety of exogenous factors. Besides the presented arguments of Khan (2010b) 
that contending elite interests define the growth-stability trade-off in a political settlement 
influencing economic development outcomes, for the local level analysis we also need to 
include the effects that are exogenous to political settlements at the city level. 
Aiming to theoretically expand on the most conventional approaches to the study of 
institutions and development, we used Khan’s (2010b) original insights that indeterminate 
outcomes of institutional changes are shaped by the compatibility of these changes with the 
particular power structure in a political settlement. The interdependency between the 
distribution of power and institutions shape the context in which policies are introduced and 
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enforced. The success of the institutional change is also influenced by the degree to which it 
can decrease growth-constraining transaction costs and maintain political transition costs low, 
which again depends on the organizational capacities of different actors in the political 
settlement.  
Using Rodrik’s (2014) arguments on the importance of ideas in political economy theories, 
Robinson’s (2010) considerations on Latin America’s transnational capitalist elite, and various 
findings regarding spatio-institutional changes following decentralization, we expanded on 
Khan’s (2010b) theoretical arguments.  
We argued that there exists increased influence of ideational paradigms on policy choices by 
local ruling coalitions embedded in fragmented political settlements that are marked by 
competition and contestation. The rather short-term time horizon of local policy actors 
diminishes possibilities of lengthy experimentation and innovation of economic policy 
implementation, for example through learning-by-doing. Furthermore, we argued that ideas 
play an important role in influencing policy choices in political settlements in crisis. 
In Latin American political settlements, the influence of transnational ideational changes and 
paradigm shifts towards neoliberalism and post-Washington Consensus institutionalism were 
particularly strong in the between the late 1980s and the early 2000s when many of the 
region’s economies were in crisis. The debt crisis, macroeconomic disequilibria, financial crises, 
and ever-increasing dynamics of deindustrialization led many Latin American elites to 
restructure their political economies. Fuelled by external shocks, such as oil crises and the 
Volcker shock, the uncertainty over policy and development trajectory opened windows of 
opportunity for new ideas to influence the framing of policies and perhaps even to alter the 
distribution of power on which the political settlements were based.  
We identified that neoliberalism played an important role in this ideational and ideological 
shift that substantially changed the ways in which political settlements and their respective 
policy reforms were set up in many Latin American countries. With traditional growth-
enhancing sectors in crisis and the herewith associated decline of legitimacy of prevailing 
vested interests, Latin American elites and policymakers adapted new ideas and discourse 
fairly readily. Latin America’s resulting implementation of neoliberal reforms included of far-
reaching liberalization, privatization, and deregulation. 
In this period of crisis, the generally oligarchic and very powerful Latin American elites were 
thus more open to new ideas and to testing new remedies for economic decline. These 
included not only the opening of many Latin American economies to foreign capital, but also 
the transnationalization of local capitalist assets. Following the development paradigm that 
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countries are best-off if they concentrate on their relative comparative advantage rather than 
on the diversification of their economies, Latin America’s capitalist elites started to disinvest in 
capital goods sectors and concentrated on services and labor-intensive industries (see Khan 
and Blankenburg, 2009; Robinson, 2010). The shift can be understood not exclusively as a 
result of following vested elite interests of material self-maximization, but also as an outcome 
of increased ideational influence on policy choices and development strategies.  
The effects of exogenous shocks and internal crises is particularly important for the discussion 
of the political settlement on the local and city level. It is important to point out that local 
political settlements do not just drive changes in the policy area and the developmental 
outcomes at the city level, but are themselves affected by various changes on the national and 
supranational levels. As discussed above, in times of macroeconomic or financial crises, 
ideational change can have particularly strong influence on elite interests and investment 
structures. For a local level political settlement that is integrated into globalized capitalist 
networks, national macroeconomic crises or global financial crises can lead to ideational 
changes and substantially affect interests of local elite factions. Further, economic and political 
policies that are largely a result of dynamics that play out in the national level political 
settlements, such as trade liberalization or administrative decentralization, heavily influence 
the local level political settlement. Such changes that can be seen as “exogenous” to a 
particular local level political settlement thus need to be explicitly added to the analysis of 
local political settlements driving economic outcomes.  
Formal and informal institutions retain their primary functions of reducing growth-constraining 
transaction costs, as well as their distributive functions in aiming to maintain and sustain 
holding power. However, the role and types of institutions that derive from this shift in the 
power structure, as well as the sources and mechanisms of rent-creation and –distribution 
have changed. Traditional mechanisms of rent creation “such as infant industry protection 
(tariff and non-tariff), subsidised credit, high-level jobs in parastatals and marketing boards… 
have become far less salient as a form of rent deployment simply because the state now has 
less discretionary authority to intervene in markets and create rents” (Di John, 2010, p. 20). 
This needs to be considered in order to understand actual developmental outcomes of 
particular institutions driven from and sustaining the changed power structures. 
While in the decentralized and transnationalized context of power and institutions GTCs are 
still important for a comprehensive understanding of the effects of institutional change on 
transaction costs, the types of institutions that can influence changes along the path of the 
growth-stability trade-off have transformed and broadened. New formal institutions that 
promote capitalist development through global production and value chains and that are 
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connected to transnational capitalist actors need to be included in the analysis. These include 
for example financial institutions, marketing boards, central banks, the Bretton Woods 
institutions (and their conditionality on loans), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 
institutions promoted by the organization and the governance structures of domestic and 
foreign companies operating in a specific locality (see Hout, 2013). Such institutions are 
designed to serve the purposes of increasing global market efficiency by decreasing market 
and non-market transaction costs that arise through state intervention.  
Due to the fact that the interests of Latin America’s transnational capitalist elite factions reside 
less in the development of domestic productive sectors than in the extraction of profit from 
global capitalist value and finance chains, these structural changes reflect the interests of this 
elite who become increasingly powerful. In a typical Latin American economy that has low 
value-added comparative advantages, FDI concentrate on these internationally competitive 
low productivity sectors, where local factions of the transnational capitalist elites have 
entrepreneurial capabilities. In this context foreign companies are less likely to transfer 
technologically advanced parts of the production value chain to the country in question. This 
makes firms and capitalists in low productivity sectors the main recipients of rents and gives 
them priority in the allocation of benefits in form of patronage and rents.  
As the transnationalizing capitalists control the majority of sectors attractive for foreign 
capital, such as finance, tourism, and outsourced low-cost (IT) services, these groups of 
entrepreneurs become powerful agents in determining the creation and enforcement of 
institutions that coordinate the direction and nature of inward investments. The transnational 
faction of the domestic elite thus not only benefits through the inflow of FDI into their 
businesses, but also through influencing institutional mechanisms that distribute rents and tax 
breaks for increased foreign capital participation. These developments help this ascending elite 
group augment its economic and political holding powers (see Mohan and Asante, 2015).  
While the argument on the impact of globalization and the interests of local elites in 
generating incomes through their participation in global value and finance chains also holds for 
more centralized and less organizationally fragmented states, decentralization and the 
fragmentation of power can enhance these processes further. This is especially true for Latin 
America in general and Colombia in particular. We recognize the argument put forward by 
Angell et al. (2001, pp. 5–6) who stress that the changed contexts with Colombia’s 
decentralization may stimulate local productive activity through allocation of rents and 
infrastructure to small-scale projects, which can incentivize local entrepreneurs to invest and 
create employment in higher productivity sectors. However, the challenge of achieving 
growth-oriented rent allocation for Colombian local states is increasingly difficult. This is linked 
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to the uncertainty of Colombian local states over access to centrally-governed rents, 
potentially increased transition costs that arise through intensified local-national bargaining, 
and the generally small allocative capacities of the national government. Further, the minimal 
capacities and resources of local states in creating and enforcing productive rents might 
prevent successful growth-enhancing rent management. These factors may well outweigh 
potentially positive incentivizing effects of decentralization and increased interurban 
competition.  
Consequently, a smaller local state with limited capabilities and urban areas competing over 
resources can slow down and hinder attempts to create and enforce an institutional structure 
that is sufficient to incentivize investments into medium and high technology sectors. While 
Lan (2009, p. 325) argues that for the devolution of power combined with “a political economy 
of fierce intercity competition” were crucial factors in achieving growth-enhancing urban 
governance in China, this is hardly the case for countries that have smaller provinces or 
regions. In his analysis of Vietnam, Khan (2015) finds that despite high governance capacities 
of the ruling coalition and the absence of fragmentation of organizational power, interregional 
competition and parallel investments can result in coordination failures that slow down 
attempts to achieve a minimum efficient scale of investments. Khan (2015, p. 19) finds that in 
the context of smaller countries or countries with small sub-national administrative units, 
“greater coordination of infrastructure investments is required across provinces and regions to 
ensure efficient investments.” As smaller countries or smaller provinces often lack sufficient 
organizational and governance capabilities for effective rent management and coordination, 
efforts can result in suboptimal outcomes. Khan (2015) further finds that in this context, 
integrating transition economies into global trade and investment regimes creates additional 
rent-management problems. Hence, joining the WTO or regional trade agreements limits the 
scope of possible rent creation through subsidies and tariffs and complicates the negotiation 
of entry and content requirements for foreign capital. Thus, challenges of inserting learning 
within global value chains are not necessarily linked to a further fragmentation through 
decentralization but have in general become increasingly difficult. 
The main problem in any context remains that of identifying market failures that hinder the 
development of growth-enhancing sectors or firms, and the creation of rents for firms 
operating in these sectors. Other challenges include the enforcement of conditions that are 
identified as necessary for technology-driven growth, which also depends on the governance 
capabilities of the state and on the entrepreneurial capabilities of the targeted firms. These 
capabilities also influence the effective selection of FDI with most advanced technology that 
can have the biggest potential to support the development of domestic firms in medium and 
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high technology sectors. The failures of effective coordination of investments into growth-
enhancing sectors or industrial clusters and to ensure investment into learning capabilities also 
remain crucial. 
However, we find that specifically in the case of Colombia these problems and challenges are 
difficult to overcome, because of the context-specific political and economic factors related to 
power constellations, organizational capabilities of governance structures, and the 
technological abilities of domestic firms. The organized control of Colombia’s polity has 
historically been much weaker than in the discussed successful developmental states, and the 
country has more dispersed and fragmented institutional structures, both vertically and 
horizontally. In this context, and combined with the fact that Colombia’s provinces 
(departamentos) are rather small, a further fragmentation through decentralization and an 
increase in interregional competition is unlikely to result in an institutional structure that 
incentivizes FDI inflow for growth of medium or high technology sectors. Interurban 
competition and parallel investments can thus lead to an intensification of coordination 
failures of effective FDI attraction in the context of a fragmented state with little organizational 
capabilities.  
Furthermore, the increased power of regional capitalists with transnationalized interests has 
several important consequences in the context of effective urban governance in Colombia. The 
transnational capitalist elites in urban Colombia have low interests and capabilities to invest in 
higher technologies and higher-waged labour. Local states with little governance capabilities 
and organizational power vis-à-vis the powerful transnational capitalist elite find it increasingly 
difficult to develop governance capabilities to identify possible growth-enhancing activities, to 
create streams of income for these, and to coordinate investments. Contrary to successful 
“local developmental states” in East Asia, ruling coalitions in Colombian urban areas have 
faced more difficulties in disciplining non-performing recipients of rents due to their weakened 
administrative capacities and organizational power. Hence, in such a transnationalized local 
political settlement institutions have limited abilities to create conditions for efforts in 
investing in tacit knowledge in growth-enhancing sectors through subsidies or other forms of 
rent-creating mechanisms. Governance capabilities for the attraction of FDI with more 
advanced technology and that can facilitate transfer to domestic firms in medium and high 
technology sectors are limited. Domestic investors are discouraged to invest in “discovering-
by-doing” strategies for higher-valued comparative advantages.  
Despite Colombia’s progress towards liberal democratization, the implementation and 
enforcement of formal rules and institutions through market-enhancing ‘good governance’-
style policies are unlikely to be effective due to the limited capacities of weakened urban 
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governments and their relatively limited organizational power. In the absence of enforcement 
capabilities of state organizations, informal institutions are important in this transnationalized 
political settlement for Latin American urban areas. Powerful informal organizations or third 
parties, such as patron-client networks, business associations or grey networks have thus 
influenced the activities of formal organizations, as well as created and enforced informal 
institutional structures. These have not only been very important in the transition towards 
transnationalization and decentralized states but also in sustaining power structures 
endogenous to the “new” settlement.  
Hence, the distributive as well as the efficiency functions of informal institutions that derive 
from the transnationalized urban political settlements and their associated distribution of 
power have to be reconsidered. Informal institutions such as patron-client networks with 
interests in promoting global capitalism can contribute to the reduction of the likelihood of 
conflict between elite factions to compete over rents and resources. Informal institutions can 
prevent larger conflicts as they help to homogenize and combine capitalist interests. Grupos, 
for example, can reduce possible transition costs by being inclusive of all or most elite factions 
and gathering them around new axes of transnational production and accumulation dynamics. 
However, there still exists interregional competition between grupos. Thus, while grupos can 
potentially reduce transition costs within a region or urban area, negative impacts of 
interregional allocative conflicts between regional grupos, patron-client networks, or even 
mafia-like structures (i.e. drug cartels) following decentralization might offset these positive 
effects.  
Through the concentration of ownership and capital grupos can have cost-reducing effects (i.e. 
by lowering transaction costs of finding contractual agreements). In attempts to become 
transnationalized actors themselves, grupos acquire or merge with foreign companies to 
become so-called multilatinas (Reyes, 2003). This has potential transaction cost-reducing 
effects and can help to increase efficiency through the integration of different stages of 
production as well as through decreased transportation costs. However, the grupos’s 
encompassing control of all economic sectors can also lead to the creation of monopoly rents 
due to the concentration of capital and power in the centralized governance structures of the 
conglomerates. Their interests in extracting profits from global capitalist value and finance 
chains can furthermore lead to rent capture in low technological and low productivity sectors. 
The focus of the grupos on such economic sectors might achieve high returns to capital for the 
grupos themselves, but it also further consolidates and reinforces the static and low 
productivity position of Colombian urban areas in global value chains. This again entails 
appropriability problems such as those discussed in chapter three. The return to comparative 
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advantages in low productivity sectors deters newcomers with potentially high technological 
capabilities, since rent distribution will most likely benefit labour-intensive sectors or activities 
linked to natural resources or construction. Private investment efforts into tacit learning of 
higher technologies are not likely to materialize in such a context as subsidies for high-quality 
companies that might be outside of the ruling coalition are unlikely.  
The changed institutional context of a transnationalized Latin American capitalist elite and 
upward and downward institutional transfers have not only affected power structures. These 
changes also have several implications on state capabilities to create and enforce growth-
enhancing institutions. Growth-enhancing rent management and productivity upgrading 
requires dealing with technological complexities, involves high costs, investment indivisibilities 
and large economies of scale, which in turn necessitates high investment and well-designed 
institutional strategies. This includes institutional frameworks to allocate resources to high 
productivity as well as export-oriented activities, which inter alia require the implementation 
of appropriate trade and industrial policies. This again depends on state effectiveness which “is 
associated not just with the ability of the state to create rents, but (much more importantly) 
[with] its capacity to compel the corporate sector to invest them in productive capacity 
diversification – i.e., continuously to shift resources towards products that would help to 
supply-upgrade along the so-called “learning curve”, and demand-adapt a country’s export 
productive capacity to an ever-changing international demand” (Palma, 2009, p. 204).  
In sum, and particularly in combination with economic liberalization in Latin America, a 
decentralized regime of rent management can reinforce pressures to maintain minimal 
technological inventories and static comparative advantages and organizational power in 
sectors marked by low productivity and unskilled labour. The discussed combination of 
political factors contributing to insufficient local governance capabilities to allocate resources 
to learning in high-productivity sectors are further discouraged by the reliance of Colombia on 
attracting FDI for technology transfers, which also increases vulnerability to locational decision 
making of MNEs. This also discourages incumbents with innovative and productive potential to 
invest in high-risk strategies, as returns on investments are not backed by a clear institutional 
structure. Consequently, local governments in Colombia face pressures to accept the low 
productivity comparative advantages of their economies, while at the same time maintaining a 
large supply of unskilled and cheap labour to be able to compete with other similarly endowed 
cities for the attraction of FDI into activities that are at the low productivity end of the global 
value chain.  
The interest of the transnational capitalist elites in Latin America in maintaining a cheap labour 
force at home is an indication for the elites’ preferences of developing global capitalist modes 
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of accumulation over a technology-driven development of their domestic markets. 
Investments in labour-intensive industries are less risky and can generate larger and more 
secure returns in the short-run. However, maintaining competitiveness through low wages 
reinforces negative developments in labour markets that are marked by an abundance of 
unskilled labour engaging in low productivity and low value-added activities. These 
developments generally have negative effects on productivity growth in high technology 
sectors as compulsions to invest in higher cost manufacturing decrease (see Palma, 2011).  
However, the institutional change of increasing casualization and flexibilization in the labour 
market makes resistance and opposition to institutional changes through organized strategies 
of the labour force less likely. At the same time, the development of labour-intensive 
industries – reinforced through FDI into these sectors – has immediate job-creation effects. 
From a political economy perspective, these two factors serve the ruling coalition as 
institutional tools to secure support from powerful trade unions and other “outsiders” of the 
ruling coalition that are affected by a particular change in policy (i.e. casualization and 
flexibilization) and demand compensation.  
Furthermore, ‘good governance’ policies create and enforce institutional conditions that 
facilitate such market-led development and distribute rents to actors that have interests in 
participating in specific globalized networks and processes. The relationship between 
transnational and domestic capital is a main feature that we need to take into consideration 
for the analysis of the reproduction of organizational power through particular institutions and 
mechanisms of rent management. The rent distribution in favour of sectors controlled by 
transnational capitalists has important implications for the growth-stability trade-off. While 
Khan’s (2010b) analysis suggests that the nature of changes to the growth-stability trade-off is 
not exogenous, we need to consider these external impacts on the power structure and 
ultimately on this trade-off. With global dynamics that are exogenous to the political 
settlement, the main focus of our analysis needs to be on the local elite faction that 
endogenizes these dynamics through institutional changes linked to processes of 
decentralization, transnationalization, and ‘democratization’. However, it is more than 
questionable whether these changes to the institutional strategies but also to the power 
distribution in the political settlement will be sufficient to create incentives and compulsions 
for investment into higher productivity activities.  
Concluding, the fragmented nature of the rent distribution system and “parallel processes of 
democratization, decentralization and economic liberalization… have overburdened the 
collective action capacities of Latin American societies” (Faust, 2006, p. 167) making a 
coordination of much more complex development strategies increasingly difficult to achieve 
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(see Di John, 2009, pp. 177–178 for a discussion of Venezuela). These processes depend on 
and shape various other factors linked with the transnationalization of interests of Latin 
America’s capitalist elite. These include a weakened state with less capabilities to manage 
rents and create and enforce growth-enhancing institutions, increasingly powerful regional 
transnationalizing elites with low technological capabilities, a changing nature of formal and 
informal institutions that are increasingly focused on minimizing transition costs arising from 
interregional and local-national bargaining games, and overall developmental outcomes of a 
politically stabilized and economically low productivity polity that sustains the distribution of 
holding power in Colombia’s transnationalized urban political settlements.  
 
4.4 METHODOLOGY  
This thesis adopts a case study approach, which can help the researcher to refine and support 
a theory and to test the consistencies between theoretical considerations and empirical 
evidence (Odell, 2001). The research design and the primary and secondary data collection 
through mixed methods of qualitative and quantitative research tailored to the research 
questions and hypotheses of this dissertation. 
A number of recent publications discuss qualitative research methodologies in general (e.g. 
Cassell and Symon, 1994; Creswell, 2003; Flick et al., 2004; Marshall and Rossman, 2010; Miles 
et al., 2014) and qualitative research methods through case studies in particular (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Gillham, 2000; Gomm et al., 2000; Woodside, 2010; Yin, 2009). Case study research has 
been defined in numerous ways, with Yin (2009, p. 18) proposing a broad but useful general 
definition: “A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
in depth and within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident.” The use of a case study approach is particularly 
appropriate for addressing the research questions and hypotheses of this dissertation, since it 
allows for a constructive and feasible combination of qualitative and quantitative empirical 
evidence to answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions about the institutional changes and their 
developmental outcomes. As Gummesson (1999, p. 86) argues, “(t)he detailed observations 
entailed in the case study method enable us to study many different aspects, examine them in 
relation to each other, view the process within its total environment and also use the 
researcher’s capacity for ‘Verstehen’”.  
The particular usefulness in of the case study methodology is the approach’s ability to include 
theory and conceptual categories to guide data collection, research, and analysis – both in the 
field as well as from afar. While some of the theoretical findings emerged from existing data, 
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the case study methodology adopted here allowed us to develop a theoretical framework that 
provides core conceptual reference points geared towards achieving a high degree of 
explanatory power on the basis of informed theoretical abstraction, thereby avoiding a purely 
descriptive empirical discussion devoid of any meaning outside a very specific context (see 
Hartley, 2004). This historically informed understanding of complex theoretical discussions of 
institutional conditions and socio-economic developments was fundamental for making the 
empirical research as specific as possible while avoiding unnecessary gathering of basic 
information.  
Researchers’ and respondents’ biases and the problematic aspects that arise with the non-
comparative aspects of a single case study were addressed through choosing multiple units of 
analysis (see Yin, 2009). The concentration on the analysis of different subunits (i.e. urban 
governance, elite structure, firm-level, the local labour market, etc.) within our larger case 
(Medellín) is what can be labelled an “embedded approach” (Baxter and Jack, 2008). The 
ability to analyse subunits separately, between or across the subunits allows us to 
contextualize our quantitative and qualitative findings in a much more structured and 
powerful way. However, we also used a “holistic approach” to analyse our larger case study 
Medellín in order to reintegrate our findings into a global context of the analysed phenomena. 
Overall, the single case study approach provided a conclusive narrative, which the context-
specific analysis of this thesis requires.  
The case of Medellín was selected for its intrinsic usefulness in elaborating the application of 
our extended theoretical political settlements framework. Roy (2013) points out that the 
political settlements framework can be used at the national as well as the sub-national level. 
Thus, the chosen unit of analysis is unproblematic “provided the appropriate distribution of 
organizational power and institutions are identified” (Roy, 2013, p. 96). Given that we include 
an embedded as well as a holistic approach for the qualitative and quantitative analyses of the 
urban political settlement in its transnationalized context, we can explain the performance of 
institutions relative to the political settlement. This study of relative performance helps in the 
analysis of particular sectors and policies. Furthermore, we inquire about the absolute 
performance of institutions within the local economy.  
There are two main theoretical claims this thesis makes: one is that standard institutional 
theories focusing on market-enhancing institutions and ‘good governance’ reforms are unable 
to explain developments of urban areas in Latin America. The second is that the heterodox 
approaches making important contributions to the understanding of a variety of 
developmental outcomes of institutions in less developed countries need to be explored 
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further to comprehend institutional effects in the politically decentralized and economically 
transnationalized Latin American context.  
In this sense, Medellín is a particularly good case study as the adverse effects of liberalization 
have been particularly strong here, without underplaying how neoliberal reforms affected the 
entire country and region. Furthermore, while Medellín was barely affected by the political 
violence present throughout Colombia for much of the twentieth century, this changed in the 
1980s when several factors, such as deindustrialization, a drastic increase of unemployment, 
and emerging drug cartels made Medellín the most violent city in Colombia. Recent 
developments, a drastic decrease in violence and above-average economic growth – which 
some observers titled the “Medellín miracle” – makes this case even more interesting, as most 
scholars have attributed these shifts to the ‘Medellín Model of Good Governance’. When 
answering why and how questions with our political settlements framework, we engage in 
discussions of different relevant institutions and organizations at various units of analysis. 
However, regardless of the unit of analysis we can identify an overarching issue: how 
institutions maintain (or fail to maintain) the power distribution within a political settlement. 
Thus, a thorough historical understanding of the political economy of our case study is 
necessary for the application of the theoretical framework – which is rooted in a historical 
political economy analysis of economic, political and social events itself. In the case of Medellín 
the historical background is particularly important for a comprehensive understanding of 
contemporary trends and developments, but also recent challenges. This is why chapter five is 
exclusively dedicated to the historical political economy analysis of institutions, power and 
development in Medellín and the region of Antioquia. The discussion of changes in power, 
institutions, rent-creation and rent-management helps to analyse formal and informal 
strategies of the ruling coalition to sustain a certain distribution of benefits as well as 
strategies of emerging elite factions to contest that distribution. Using the political settlements 
framework and applying it to the case study analysis we can explain the reasons for 
institutional changes and the degree of their enforcement. The discussions of the 
interdependency between power and institutions help us to understand whether political 
economy factors of power distribution were compatible with growth-enhancing institutional 
strategies. This, in turn explains developmental outcomes regarding political stability and 
economic development. 
The aim of the case study is to provide both a discussion of the most important institutional 
aspects and performances of Medellín’s political settlement, as well as a comprehensive 
analysis of the local economy and its sectoral dimensions. The analysis of the institutional 
characteristics of the political settlement (chapter six) relies on primary as well as secondary 
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qualitative findings. This was based on a critical literature review, particularly contributions 
engaging in discussions about historical and contemporary developments, and the evolution of 
power and political strategies in Medellín, Antioquia and Colombia. To underline and deepen 
these findings primary research was then conducted in two separate field trips. The first trip 
(four weeks) was in the context of the research project “Rethinking Urban Fringes in Colombia” 
to which the author contributed during his time as visiting research fellow at Columbia 
University, New York, in spring 2013. The second field trip that included stays in Bogotá and 
Medellín took place in 2014 and lasted seven months. During this second fieldwork trip the 
author independently conducted semi-structured interviews, in-depth interviews, ran focus 
groups, and chaired discussions with a broad range of actors. The interviewees are listed in 
appendix. The majority of the respondents are or have been members of the economic elites, 
the political elite, the emerging political clase emergente, or the local, regional, and national 
bureaucracies. Many of the interviewees provided insights on the formal and informal working 
of political and economic institutions. Individuals from the local and national media, 
academics, NGOs, and community activists provided additional information. The author 
further went on several visits to Medellín’s marginalized and gang-controlled neighbourhoods 
where he could observe various aspects of institutional and personal behaviour, which is of 
particular interest for the analysis of institutional enforcement problems and informality. For 
the analysis of informal institutions, patron-client networks, and mafia structures that remain 
very powerful in Medellín, the author also conducted several interviews with local human 
rights activists, former fighters for urban militias and paramilitary groups, and members of the 
guerrilla Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo (Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army, FARC-EP) in Havana, Cuba.  
The main hypotheses guiding this dissertation evolved with the findings made prior to the field 
trip, as well as during the field research. Different hypotheses were tested in interviews, focus 
groups and discussions by asking targeted questions and adapting to evolving variants of the 
core hypothesis, and by gathering responses from a variety of different actors. This helped in 
the progressive process of refining assumptions, which made it even more critical to get high-
profile respondents. The author’s knowledge of the locality and his extensive experience of 
working in Colombia were very useful to build a network of individuals with a broad range of 
opinions, interests, and perspectives. Overall, the author conducted over 60 semi-structured 
interviews (some on-record, others off the record), five in-depth interviews, led three focus 
groups and many other informal discussions. Most of the interviews, discussions, and 
conversations were recorded and subsequently transcribed and translated by the author. The 
106 
 
450 pages of transcribed material was analysed during fieldwork as well as after the return 
from Colombia. Follow-up interviews were conducted with some participants on Skype calls.  
The sectoral analysis of the local economy used secondary quantitative data from different 
sources, including the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (National 
Administrative Department of Statistics, DANE), the Banco de la República (Colombian Central 
Bank, BANREP), the Cámara de Comercio de Medellín para Antioquia (Medellín Chamber of 
Commerce for Antioquia, CCMA), the Sistema de Indicadores Estratégicos de Medellín (The 
System of Strategic Indicators of Medellín, SIEM) the Alcaldía De Medellín (Mayor’s Office of 
Medellín), the historical archives of the City of Medellín, the Planilla Integrada de Liquidación 
de Aportes para Seguridad Social (Integrated Account of Liquidation Settlement to Social 
Security, PILA), the Encuesta Anual Manufacturera (Annual Poll of Manufacturing, EAM), 
Medellín Como Vamos (Medellín How are We Doing), the Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano 
(Enterprise of Urban Development, EDU), and the Centro de Investigacion y Educacion Popular 
Programa Por la Paz (Centre for Investigation and Popular Education, Programme for Peace, 
CINEP). This quantitative analysis (chapter seven) is designed to provide quantitative empirical 
backing for core qualitative aspects of the analysis, where appropriate and meaningfully 
possible. The quantitative methods used have varied, depending of the unit of analysis (firm-
level, sector-level, urban, regional, national, global). Chapter seven provides a detailed 
discussion of the different methodological tools and the different units of analysis used in the 
quantitative approach.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: MEDELLÍN: A HISTORICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS OF POWER, 
INDUSTRIALIZATION AND CRISES 
As pointed out in previous chapters, a discussion of the detailed distribution of power between 
different groups and organizations is central to the approach adopted in this thesis. As Di John 
and Putzel (2009, p. 4) note, such a historical analysis is necessary “in exploring the formation 
and change of institutions such as the process of democratisation (Moore, 1966), the transition 
from feudalism to capitalism (Brenner, 1976), the effectiveness with which industrial policy is 
implemented (Khan, 1995; Kohli, 2004), and the closely related effort of historical 
institutionalists to explain the varied routes to capitalist transformation (Hall and Soskice, 
2001)”. This chapter therefore analyses the historical evolution of political settlements in our 
main case study, the city of Medellín. Our analysis focuses on how the formation of an 
industrial capitalist elite in Medellín shaped the power balances in Colombia’s political 
settlement, which had several institutional implications for the implementation and 
enforcement of industrial policies.  
We will discuss how the shifts in power balances and the resulting institutional mechanisms 
affected the developmental strategies of Colombia in general and Medellín’s economy in 
particular. In this context we analyse the changing distribution of power, state and institutional 
capacities, the evolution of Antioquia’s manufacturing sector, and the entrepreneurial and 
technological capabilities of the regional elite factions. This analysis facilitates the assessment 
of the compatibility (or otherwise) of the evolving political settlements with different 
developmental strategies throughout Colombia’s capitalist transformations from extractive 
and largely landed growth, via an easy ISI strategy to attempts at heavy industrialization.  
The historical analysis covers the period from the first attempts of industrialization in the early 
1900s until the emergence of the first signs of deindustrialization and partial liberalization in 
the 1970s and 1980s. The discussion does not provide a comprehensive analysis of every 
specific policy intervention, instead focusing on selected core policy reforms to illustrate the 
interdependency between political factors and institutional as well as economic policy 
changes.  
The main purpose of this historical analysis is to provide a contextualized discussion of the 
evolution of Medellín’s political settlement with all its different features and variables. This 
allows us to better contextualize recent institutional changes and their economic and political 
developmental outcomes. The main argument advanced here is that Medellín’s impressive 
industrialization in the twentieth century is a result of favourable conditions present in the 
local and national structures of the political settlement. The extensive power of an oligarchic 
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elite interested in modernizing and diversifying Medellín’s economy was compatible with 
institutional mechanisms that created and distributed rents for the development of light 
manufacturing industrial sectors. These power structures, as well as the low entrepreneurial 
and low technological capabilities of this oligarchic elite are, however, also partially 
responsible for Medellín’s industrial crisis that ultimately led to the city’s deindustrialization. 
We further argue that this crisis and the resulting inability of the dominant elite factions to 
manage rents successfully and to compensate outsiders of the elite pact destabilized the 
settlement and led to the rise of actors who contested the existing elite bargain in Medellín. 
Leftist urban guerrilla movements as well as an emerging new political class threatened the 
dominant power of the oligarchic elites. Several institutional mechanisms and policy reforms 
implemented in the 1980s attempted to stabilize Medellín at a sustainable growth-stability 
trade-off.  
The subsequent sections will analyse how political factors of power distribution and 
organizational capabilities shaped the institutional environment of Medellín’s political 
settlement and thus influenced the development trajectory. Section 5.1 analyses the historical 
developments of elite structures in Medellín with a particular emphasis on the shift from a 
landed elite with interests in mining and coffee to an industrial capitalist class. The section 
analyses the different rent-management strategies that were compatible with these structures 
and that created institutional conditions for successful ISI development. The emerging elite 
bargain also helped to stabilize the political settlement in Medellín. Section 5.2 goes on to 
analyse how structural interdependencies between power and institutional strategies became 
incompatible with ISI attempts to promote advanced and late industrial development. The 
power structures impeded or slowed down the creation of incentives and compulsions for a 
big-push industrialization strategy. Alongside other shortcomings of Colombia’s 
industrialization these incompatibilities add an explanatory context to the understanding of 
Medellín’s numerous economic and political crises after the 1970s. The analysis includes 
discussions of regional elite structures as well as the evolution of the political settlement at the 
national level.  
Section 5.3 analyses how economic crises challenged the compatibility of power structures 
with formal institutions that had helped in keeping the political settlement at sustainable and 
inclusive levels of political and economic viability. The section discusses the impacts of 
decreasing possibilities to create industrial rents, of several state reformation policies, and of 
the urbanization of an unemployed rural population on the political settlement. The section 
argues that these factors, the introduction of a mixed strategy of import substitution and 
export promotion, and the end of the Frente Nacional fragmented organizational structures 
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horizontally and vertically. Inter- and intraregional elite competition following these reforms 
led to a decrease in governance capabilities and coordination capacities of creating and 
enforcing growth-enhancing strategies. Medellín’s local settlement descended into violent 
crises, which inter alia resulted from the rise of resistance movements from leftist urban 
militias, and an emerging political elite, the so-called clase emergente, which established 
themselves as powerful actors alongside the dominant elite faction. The section discusses how 
the traditional elite responded with the creation of formal and informal institutional 
mechanisms to this contestation of power, which included wide-ranging decentralization 
reforms as well as the formation of an (informally) organized group, the so-called Grupo 
Empresarial Antioqueño (GEA).  
Section 5.4 discusses the rise of Pablo Escobar and the Medellín Cartel that led Medellín’s 
political settlement into a severe crisis. Violent oppression and the privatization and 
paramilitarization of control became common strategies to regain organizational authority and 
to increase political and economic holding powers. Section 5.5 concludes by presenting how 
the findings of this chapter help in engaging in a conclusive analysis of current capitalist 
transformations, elite development and other recent changes in Medellín’s governance 
structure. 
 
5.1 INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL ELITE STRUCTURES: HEGEMONIC POWER 
IN MEDELLÍN’S POLITICAL SETTLEMENT  
Since Colombia’s colonial times the structure of Medellín’s elite was dominated by a few 
mining and commerce families, such as the Echeverri, Restrepo, Echavarría, Ospina, 
Santamaría, and Montoya clans, who established themselves around the realms of political 
power in the province of Antioquia. However, with the stagnation in the mining sector at the 
turn of the 1900s this oligarchic elite understood that, if they wanted to increase the 
profitability of the mining industry and maintain their dominant position of power, they had to 
adopt new institutional strategies for technology upgrading.  
Medellín’s elite, which had strong representation in the national ruling coalition, could 
successfully create and enforce institutions that incentivized and stimulated economic 
development through investments into infrastructure as well as into efforts in tacit learning 
through the publically funded elite forge Escuela de Minas (Mining School) (see González-
Calderón et al., 2012; Mayor Mora, 2002). Public investments supported local private 
businesses in acquiring new technologies and in introducing innovative methods, which 
drastically increased productivity and led to a massive expansion of the mining sector. Several 
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tax reforms further incentivized private investments into increasingly diversified economic 
activities (Restrepo Santamaría, 2011).  
Following the years of the Thousand Days’ War (1899-1902) a shift of elite interests towards 
industrial-mercantilist activities became evident. Medellín’s elite saw that the path towards 
increased scale economies required large private investment strategies complemented by an 
effective management of state-created industrial rents (i.e. reduced electricity and water 
tariffs for industrial factories). These first attempts at industrialization, what Pombo (2002) 
calls “Colombia’s pioneering industrialization phase”, concentrated on technological 
modernization of the mining sector and the industrialization of the coffee sector, which soon 
became Colombia’s main trading and exporting sector. The state-led strategy of providing 
rents for importers and manufacturers of particular goods incentivized capital flows targeting 
imports of machinery (Mayor Mora, 1989; Poveda Ramos, 1976). Private investment efforts 
were supported through policies that facilitated elite access to state-created rents, creating 
incentives and compulsions (i.e. through import tariff reductions). Law 63 of 1903, for example 
guaranteed protectionist measures through the increase of import tariffs and barriers for 
clothes and fabrics, crockery, shoes, and other light industry; tax benefits for imported capital 
goods and machinery over three tons further protected and subsidized Medellín’s infant 
industries (Vellinga and Kruijt, 1983).  
The beneficial treatment and rent access for Medellín’s elite was guaranteed through their 
continued strong representation in the national ruling coalition, especially during the 
presidencies of Medellín’s natives Carlos Eugenio Restrepo (1910-1914) and Pedro Nel Ospina 
Vázquez (1922-1926).7 These favourable political conditions for growth-incentivizing 
institutional strategies also included rent distribution towards coffee producers. Resulting from 
this constellation of power, entrepreneurial capabilities of regional industrialists, and the 
institutional mechanisms implemented during the first half of the twentieth century, Medellín 
experienced high growth rates that were mainly driven by light manufacturing and coffee 
production (Restrepo Santamaría, 2011). 
The strategy of state-created industrial rents was also successful in incentivizing private 
lending and borrowing through financial institutions that were set up by the mercantilist-
industrialist and coffee families of the Antioquian oligarchy. During the early 1900s 
investments were primarily channelled towards the coffee sector. Vellinga and Krujit (1983, p. 
67) conclude that “[i]n this way a few big families of Antioquia controlled the coffee economy 
                                                          
7 Restrepo was from a traditional merchant-industrial family while Ospina was son of the largest coffee 
family in Colombia.  
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and were able to accumulate capital”. The combination of successful state-led rent 
management strategies with local wealth of Antioquia’s oligarchy marked the beginning of 
Medellín’s industrial capitalism.  
Coffee was the leading sector of the Antioquian economy in this period and became 
Colombia’s main export with shares rising from 30% in 1908 to 78% in 1925 (see Pombo, 2002, 
p. 5). The Federación Nacional de Cafeteros (National Federation of Coffee Growers, FNC), 
founded by members of the Antioquian elite in 1927, played a key role maintaining this 
favourable rent distribution and to coordinating the interests of coffee entrepreneurs. The FNC 
was a very effective network that combined regional elite interests – from financiers, 
merchants, large and small land owners, to industrialists – with national political interests of 
promoting growth-enhancing strategies for the coffee sector. The FNC, a private federation 
with quasi-state capacities (i.e. through tax-collection capacities) “had a dimension of social 
control, as the federation built up paternalistic relations with small coffee producers, who in 
turn both cooperated and depended on the federation and the local government” (Thorp, 
1998, pp. 59–62). The FNC could not only reduce growth-constraining transaction costs, but 
also served as an effective arena for elite bargaining that minimized transition costs and 
stabilized Colombia’s and particularly Antioquia’s settlement. It held together several powerful 
elite interests, while also distributing rents and other benefits to small producers and outsiders 
of the ruling coalition (Ocampo and Botero, 2000). Overall, during this early industrialization 
period, “coffee was the link between agriculture and industry; the expansion of coffee 
generated demand for agricultural machinery […] which was particularly strong in Antioquia” 
(Restrepo Santamaría, 2011, p. 20). 
This complementarity of coffee and industrial interest was not marked by the provision of 
direct market access for industry, but rather through a fast expansion of infrastructure, general 
growth of wealth, and urban development. The elite in control of coffee surpluses had 
entrepreneurial interests and technological capabilities to diversify their own asset portfolio 
and the entire regional economy. Many semi-industrial coffee-packing plants were founded in 
Medellín in this period, and became a major source of employment for many of the city’s 
working class (Farnsworth-Alvear, 2000, p. 47). Simultaneously, Medellín’s entrepreneurial 
elite horizontally diversified their assets into woollen mills, chocolate and food processing 
companies, breweries and distilleries, cigarette factories, a match factory, and other industrial 
manufacturing of non-durable consumer goods. Through the abundance of primary goods for 
textile production, such as cotton, the diversification of elite assets particularly benefited the 
rise of economic activities in the textile industry. Medellín soon became the undisputed textile-
112 
 
driven industrial powerhouse of Colombia, with a regional elite faction that expanded their 
economic influence also by acquiring textile companies in other regions of Colombia.  
The second phase of Antioquia’s industrialization took place between 1930 and 1945. This 
period was marked by the high growth rates of Medellín’s light manufacturing sectors, 
particularly of non-durable labour-intensive consumer goods, such as textile and processed 
food. In spite of the Great Depression of the 1930s and a slowdown of global demand for 
coffee as well as a decrease in imported primary goods and machinery, it was a period of 
economic prosperity for Medellín. Medellín’s elite had accumulated considerable wealth and 
had sophisticated financial capabilities to maintain production in light manufacturing 
industries. In particular, this elite started to invest in raw material inputs to increase the 
relative strength of the garment and textile sector. Due to horizontal and vertical 
diversification and integration, this sector did not heavily rely on imports of primary goods. 
Medellín’s inward-looking non-exporting manufacturing sectors of basic non-durable 
consumer goods and the increase of domestic consumption of manufacturers, as well as the 
relative industrial backwardness of the country were the underpinnings for Medellín’s success 
that was reflected in a considerable increase of the share of manufacturing in GDP (Vellinga 
and Kruijt, 1983).  
In this second industrialization phase, Medellín’s industrialists continued to receive beneficial 
access to state-created rents through reduced import tariffs for inputs. Sectors benefitting 
from this were the cotton weaving industry, textiles manufacturing, and food processing. The 
tariff reform introduced in Law 62 of 1931 increased import duties on all import-competing 
goods (Berry, 1983). Colombia’s relative isolation from the international markets furthermore 
served as natural protectionism. Overall, and despite the fall of ad-valorem tariffs from around 
50% in 1919 to 32% in 1930 (Ocampo and Montenegro, 1984), Antioquia’s GDP growth 
increased at rates above 3% on average annually while manufacturing value added grew at 
over 8% per year between 1930 and 1945 (Brew, 1977). 
The Medellín-based companies Coltejer, Tejidos Rosellon, and Fabricato played a central role in 
Colombia’s textile-led import substitution industrialization. In particular, Coltejer and Fabicato 
experienced large growth rates since their foundations in 1907 and 1920, respectively. The 
textile industry continued to grow rapidly in the 1940s and 1950s, a period referred to as 
“’golden era’ for a particularly Antioqueño brand of welfare capitalism” (Farnsworth-Alvear, 
2000, p. 6). Financed by high profits and by the emission of new stocks, Coltejer and Fabricato 
acquired other textile companies through various acquisitions and mergers during the 1940s. 
Between 1947 and 1950 both companies increased their net earnings by 178% and 289%, 
respectively. The Echavarría family alone, who owned and controlled both companies, 
113 
 
accounted for more than 50% of Antioquia’s textile production (Farnsworth-Alvear, 2000). 
Despite the importance of family ownership in the beginnings of manufacturing growth, 
companies rapidly became corporate entities that started to finance imports of capital-
intensive equipment through underwriting shares in the stock market (see Botero Herrera, 
2003; Pombo, 2002, p. 6).  
Wealth accumulated through the advanced elite capacities in financial speculation was 
reinvested in capital-intensive import to bolster growth in heavier industrial sectors. These 
developments did not only mean an increase in the numbers of Antioquian industrial 
companies from 356 in 1930 to 1,288 in 1945, out of which 789 were based in Medellín 
(Vellinga and Kruijt, 1983, p. 68). The shift towards more capital-intensive ISI development also 
marked the beginning of Antioquia’s third industrialization phase that took place, roughly, 
between 1945 and 1967 and was concentrated in the development of so-called late industries, 
such as plastics, paper, petrochemicals, rubber, basic metals, machinery, transportation 
equipment, and the like.  
With their strong influence in the Colombian government, Medellín’s industrialists continued 
to receive state-created rents for a heavier ISI strategy through strategies such as trade and 
non-trade barriers, domestic credit and subsidies. During the Presidency of Luis Mariano 
Ospina, son of one of Medellín most dominant patrones Tulio Ospina, import licenses and prior 
import deposits increased substantially and were primarily given to Antioquian industrialists 
with the necessary technological capabilities to incentivize heavy manufacturing and capital-
intensive growth (Restrepo Santamaría, 2011).  
There are three main tariff reforms in this phase worth mentioning. The first is Decree 2218 of 
1950, which introduced the ad-valorem system for 80% of the tariff schedule. Decree 1345 of 
1959 introduced large-scale tax-breaks for domestic producers of manufacturing goods. 
Decree 3168 of 1964 abolished the targeted tariff system and broadened exemption from 
custom duties. This resulted in an increase of nominal protection from 40% in 1950 to 65.6% in 
1964 (Martínez, 1986). The structure of tariffs and exemptions resulted in an effective 
protection level for manufacturing at around 53.3% in 1969. However, the specific structure of 
the system stimulated asymmetries in effective protection, which resulted in negative 
protection rates for some sectors (see Díaz-Alejandro, 1976). 
Between 1946 and 1950, and again later between 1955 and 1956 the gross industrial product 
of Antioquia grew at an average of over 10% per year, which marks the largest industrial 
growth in Colombian history (Vellinga and Kruijt, 1983, p. 69). Vertical capital integration 
through investments in production of durable consumer goods (cement, metallurgic, electric 
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appliances, etc.) as well as horizontal diversification in the production of new consumables 
(paint, paper, foodstuff, glass, plastics, etc.) resulted in a considerable expansion of paisa 
capital (Restrepo Santamaría, 2011). With the industrial deepening of Antioquia’s economy, 
the manufacturing share of total outputs grew from 14% in 1945 to 22% in 1967, leading to a 
drastic increase of Medellín’s industrial growth. 
Economic development in this period was also marked by an increase in the creation of 
holding companies, incentivizing financial sector development. In the 1950s stock issues 
became the main financing mechanism for capital accumulation, surpassing the reinvestment 
of retained profits. It was a period of experimentation with new investment instruments to 
channel long-term finance in manufacturing industries. Private efforts through the largest 
industrial investment bank in the country, the Medellín-based Banco Industrial 
Colombiano (Colombian Industrial Bank, BIC), were supported by public investment banks, 
such as the Instituto de Fomento Industrial (Institute of Industrial Promotion, IFInd) and the 
Fondo Financiero Industrial (Industrial Finance Fund) (see Pombo, 2002). 
An analysis of the growth of Medellín’s manufacturing industry through the political 
settlements lens helps to understand that it was by no means a marginal endeavour but rather 
the logical result of favourable political economy conditions in which power structures were 
compatible with institutional strategies to achieve industrialization through import 
substitution. It was particularly Medellín’s industrial capitalists that benefited from 
protectionist institutional mechanisms, also due to their leading role in the national ruling 
coalition. Farnsworth-Alvear (2000) finds that this position of political power and the access to 
protectionist tariffs was also strengthened through the elite’s interests to promote industrialist 
growth, which at the same time created employment opportunities in labour-intensive sectors. 
This latter point and the variety of other social benefits that came with employment in 
Medellín’s textile companies, such as secure housing, also served as means to pay off outsiders 
and subordinate classes, to keep the political settlement stable, and to prevent the rise of 
trade unions and socialist ideas. In this vein, Farnsworth-Alvear (2000, p. 14) finds that “the 
self-image of Antioquia’s emerging industrial elite – who saw themselves as modernizers of 
their country – predisposed them to raise real wages and the extend extra-wage benefits. 
Especially in the case of the different branches of the Echavarría family, owners of Coltejer and 
Fabricato, mill-owners’ understanding of social-Catholic teachings led them to view the factory 
as mechanism for preventing the spread of communist agitation in Colombia”.  
Low compensation costs and the job creation minimized transition costs in the form of 
resistance from groups excluded from the elite bargain. This helped the ruling coalition to push 
for growth-enhancing policies that incentivized manufacturing growth through the creation of 
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further industrial rents. The low transition costs and the stability of the local settlement in 
Medellín were tested during the outbreaks of the civil war La Violencia in the 1940s, in which 
the opposing political parties Partido Liberal (Liberal Party) and Partido Conservador 
(Conservative Party) were engaging. However, the distribution of power in the local political 
settlement could be maintained and stabilized, as the well-organized industrial elite continued 
to distribute rents and benefits to all sectors of the society regardless of political conviction 
(see Bergquist et al., 1992; Farnsworth-Alvear, 2000). Thus, and despite the general rise of 
violence, disorder, and massacres throughout Colombia during the 1940s, Medellín’s 
industrialist elites recorded large profits. Roldán (1992) describes this rather well: “Just as 
individuals were organising into armed popular groups… [and] refugees fleeing violence began 
their arduous exodus from their towns of residence the president of the (Medellín-based) 
National Association of Industrialists (ANDI) could coolly declare that Colombia’s economy had 
never been better” (Roldán, 1992, p. 113).  
The ANDI is a great example of how coordinated organization of Medellín’s elite served as an 
institutional mechanism for the reduction of growth-constraining transaction costs while at the 
same time maintaining relatively low transition costs. The ANDI promoted the idea that the 
industrialists represented modest and democratic owners, despite their famously paternalistic 
style of management. However, with efforts to distribute benefits to outsiders and with a 
general anti-union environment in the factories, the ANDI was an institutional tool to “guard 
against communism, and… [a] movement away from left-wing organizing efforts” (Farnsworth-
Alvear, 2000, p. 15), which increased the organizational capacity and power of regional 
industrialists considerably.  
The ANDI also served as a lobbyist apparatus and collective bargaining tool for Medellín’s 
industrial elites to express opinions vis-à-vis the state (see Restrepo Santamaría, 2011; Sáenz 
Rovner, 2007). The large power of Medellín’s industrialist elite secured them access to state-
created rents in the form of patronage, resulting in ‘revolving door’ movements of the 
industrial elites between key private and public positions (Restrepo Santamaría, 2011, p. 87). 
Pécaut (1979, p. 334) finds that “political positions were frequently held by industrial leaders… 
the industrialists frequently had a direct or intermediary influence in the political participation 
and… sought to convey their economic efficiency efforts to political management”. Especially 
between 1945 and the late 1960s the “sinuous or ambiguous line of demarcation between the 
public and the private” (Botero Herrera, 2003, p. 62) continued to be very present in 
Medellín’s society. This “entailment of entrepreneurs to senior political positions reflected a 
strong cohesion of the ruling elite and helped to preserve and strengthen it” (Restrepo 
Santamaría, 2011, p. 87). Acknowledging the strong influence of Medellín’s elites on policy 
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making processes, Alfonso López Pumarejo, President of Colombia between 1934 and 1938 
and then again from 1942 to 1945 said that the ANDI “represents the most powerful economic 
group and the best organized of the country… and they have achieved everything they 
wanted” (cited in Pécaut, 1979, p. 334). 
From the perspective of the political settlements analysis, it was the compatibility between 
political factors and formal and informal growth-enhancing institutional strategies that were 
key to Antioquia’s successful industrialization from the 1920s until the 1960s. State-created 
rents thus facilitated import substitution and incentivized stages of easy and heavy import-
substituting industrialization in labour-intensive sectors. Institutional rent transfers included 
guaranteed grants, protectionist measures, state subsidies as well as patronage privileges. 
Medellín’s match factory Fábrica Fósforos Olano is an exemplary case of a paisa industry that 
benefited from a political settlement in which the distribution of power was compatible with 
growth-enhancing strategies for industrialization. The company was selected as a growth 
driver and was “promoted… through a contract with the state that guaranteed non-
expropriation for 20 years, a protection through custom tariffs and consumption laws, and also 
an agreement not to implement new taxes for matches” (Restrepo Santamaría, 2011, p. 48). 
The founder of the match factory Ricardo Olano acknowledges these privileges in 
transportation for Medellín’s industries. In his memoires he notes, “the (public) railway 
granted a considerable discount for carriages destined for industries (in Medellín)”(Olano, 
2004, p. 30;46).  
In sum, until 1967 Medellín’s ISI industrialization was marked by an elite bargain that was 
stabilized by a variety of public as well as private-led institutional arrangements and 
organizations, such as the ANDI or the FNC (see Ross Schneider, 2004). The large holding 
powers of the industrial elite faction created and maintained a property right structure in 
which rents were deployed to growth sectors in labour-intensive industries that had low costs 
of coordination and adaptation. And despite the conflict of La Violencia, that generally 
increased tensions between industrial, landed, and military elite factions, Antioquia’s business 
elite emerged as the main ‘patrons’, influencing institutional strategies through formal as well 
as informal forms of influence (see Khan and Blankenburg, 2009, p. 363). The tensions 
between elite factions in the rest of the country calmed during the early years of the military 
dictatorship of the Frente Nacional (1958-1974). However, and despite the fact that Medellín’s 
industrialists managed, “to maintain a strong position in influencing the orientation of 
economic policies within the framework of national industrial protectionism” (Restrepo 
Santamaría, 2011, p. 96), this changed over the course of the dictatorship years.  
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During the course of the Frente Nacional the dominant elite bargain that marked local and 
national political settlements in which Medellín’s industrialists had a powerful position 
weakened in the 1970s. Successful growth-enhancing institutional strategies turned into failing 
attempts of moving the industry up the value chain. A political settlement emerged in which 
capitalists failing to develop further technological capabilities continued to hold powerful 
positions, reinforced through state-created rents for small-scale accumulation processes and 
blocking big-push industrialization strategies.  
The next section discusses the failures of attempts to ‘grow up’, the reversal of many of the 
protectionist mechanisms, and the decline in the political influence of Medellín’s industrialists. 
The section also considers the contribution of external developments to an industrial 
slowdown and eventually to Medellín’s deindustrialization. The section analyses a period of 
rupture for the political settlement that was dominant during the industrialization phases of 
most of the twentieth century.  
 
5.2 DEINDUSTRIALIZATION AND ELITE FRAGMENTATION: MEDELLÍN ON THE PATH TOWARDS AN 
UNSUSTAINABLE GROWTH-STABILITY TRADE-OFF? 
Between 1967 and the mid-1980s Colombia in general and Medellín specifically experienced 
drastic political economy changes. An economic slowdown and in particular a stagnation of 
industrial growth in Antioquia affected the national economy. Attempts to move towards 
advanced strategies for heavy and capital-intensive industrialization failed. Medellín’s 
industrialists did not manage in continuing the development of capabilities needed for 
successful late industrialization and export promotion. This section engages in an analysis of 
the effects of industrial stagnation on economic activities in Medellín. We further use the 
political settlements framework for a discussion of the reasons behind growth stagnation, 
which we broadly group into two different areas. Firstly, we argue that particular endogenous 
factors of the national political settlement impeded or slowed down successful rent 
management for late industrial growth. The Frente Nacional, in which Medellín’s industrialists 
became marginalized vis-à-vis the landed elite factions from Bogotá, resulted in a 
fragmentation of power structures and weakening of organizational capabilities. This led to 
incapacities of the state to create and distribute rents for export-oriented and capital-
advanced industrial growth. Secondly, we find that exogenous factors, such as external price 
shocks, debt crises in many Latin American countries, and increased competition from East 
Asian late developers were harmful for heavy industrialization attempts. This resulted in low 
incentives for Medellín’s industrial elites to invest in high-risk ISI strategies, leading to a 
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concentration on service sector development and capital accumulation through speculative 
activities.  
The year 1967 marks a turning point for Colombia’s developmental approach in general and 
for Medellín’s industrially-driven growth in particular. Between the late 1960s and the 1980s, 
Medellín’s economic growth slowed down drastically. This economic slowdown was caused 
inter alia, by stagnating technological capabilities of Medellín’s industrial oligarchy, the 
organizational incapacities of the state to create incentives and compulsion for heavy and 
export-oriented industrial growth, and the inability of Medellín’s business sector to overcome 
dependencies on imports of capital goods, which through the highly price-inelastic import 
demand made the city’s economy vulnerable to external shocks. Antioquia’s economic 
vulnerability to volatile global demand, the boom and bust cycles of coffee prices in the 1950s 
and ‘60s, and an overvaluation of the peso also contributed to the fragile economic 
environment.  
To counteract on these developments, but also to avoid major devaluations of the peso, the 
Colombian government implemented stringent controls on capital flows, introduced 
quantitative restrictions (QRs) on imports, adopted a crawling peg exchange rate regime, and 
diversified the export strategy. Degree 444 of 1967 effectively shifted the developmental 
regime from a (very short-lived) heavy industrialization model towards a mixed strategy of 
import substitution and export promotion. Partial economic liberalization reforms that 
facilitated mergers and joint ventures with foreign investors were hoped to incentivize 
technology acquisition (Ocampo, 1994). At the same time, subsidies were reduced drastically 
and industrial growth was largely funded through loans or the reliance on profits and earnings 
(see table 5.1). This made entry into high-rent markets more difficult for new industrial 
incumbents, which can have negative long-term effects on productivity growth.  
 
TABLE 5.1: SOURCES FOR INDUSTRIAL FUNDING (IN %)  
 Subsidies Undistributed 
earnings 
Loans  Total 
1950-54 33.5 39.1 27.4 100.0 
1955-59 33.1 41.1 25.8 100.0 
1960-64 27.8 30.1 42.1 100.0 
1965-69 9.9 47.9 42.2 100.0 
1970-75 6.5 46.8 46.7 100.0 
1976-80 4.8 36.6 58.6 100.0 
1981-85 4.9 44.6 50.5 100.0 
1986-90 5.2 50.7 44.1 100.0 
SOURCES: ECHAVARRÍA AND ZODROW (2005; 1979; 1995) 
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However, the state continued to play an important role in this mixed strategy development 
model. Manufacturing exports were promoted through tax rebate certificates, tariff 
exemptions for imports used for the manufacturing of non-traditional export goods, and pre-
financing of exports to minimize risks of exchange rate volatility. Institutional mechanisms of 
financing exports were handled through the newly created PROEXPO, a development fund 
administered by the Colombian Central Bank that provided loans for risk capital and working 
capital (Ocampo and Villar, 1992). Supported by an assembly regime introduced in 1969 this 
mixed strategy was successful in its primary stages. In Antioquia, between 1967 and 1975 GDP 
growth rates increased by around 6% annually, value added in manufacturing grew by around 
8% and export of manufactured goods grew by almost 30% annually. The effects of Antioquia’s 
shift from an industry dominated by the production of non-durable goods under the second ISI 
phase towards a regime of capital goods production after 1967 can be seen in table 5.2.  
The table shows that during and after the Frente Nacional Antioquian industrial capital 
continued to show some dynamism, particularly in durable consumer and capital goods. This 
can be explained by looking at the closed and vertically and horizontally integrated structure of 
Medellín’s business elite, which guaranteed continued industrial finance despite the 
marginalization of this elite faction in the national ruling coalition. The relatively dynamic 
development of capital goods in Antioquia’s economy changed drastically after the 1970s 
when Colombia embarked on first attempts of economic and financial liberalization. 
Furthermore, the oil boom in the early 1970s and the increased competition for Medellín’s 
business elite following first liberalization reforms effectively diminished incentives for 
Medellín’s capitalists to finance further growing up of local industrial production. This can be 
seen in the last column: after 1974 growth rates of all industrial goods stagnated or declined 
(table 5.2). This decline is largely a result of dynamics in the national level political settlements, 
where national policy switches impacted industrial interests of Antioquia’s elite faction.  
TABLE 5.2: GROWTH OF GROSS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT, ANTIOQUIA, 1958-79 (IN %) 
 1958-63 1964-67 1968-73 1974-79 
Non-durable consumer goods 6 5 11 2 
Intermediate goods 9 10 7 6 
Durable consumer goods and capital goods 14 7 16 12 
SOURCES: LONDOÑO AND URIBE (1980, P. 27) 
 
Table 5.3 confirms that after 1940 the contribution of non-durable goods in industrial 
manufacturing decreased slightly, while the contributions of intermediate and capital goods to 
production outputs experienced increases. The difference in manufacturing of capital goods 
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between the 1950s and the 1960s is particularly noteworthy. However, after 1967 this rather 
positive development in manufacturing growth reversed. The production of intermediate 
goods stagnated in the 1970s and capital goods experienced very small increases in its relative 
contribution to value added. Despite this trend towards a higher-productivity economy in the 
1970s, non-durable and intermediate goods remained the main contributors to value added in 
manufacturing with rates of 48.1% and 38.4% respectively. In sum, a big-push industrialization 
strategy that could have transformed the entire production base in Colombia failed to achieve 
its desired outcomes (table 5.3). Similar trends can be observed when looking at the sources of 
demand for manufactured goods. Prior to the introduction of the mixed development model 
import substitution made up for around 57% of total demand for manufacturing goods 
between 1930 and 1967. This changed with the decline in subsidies depicted in table 5.1. This 
demand created from import substitution went down to 6.2% of total demand between 1967 
and 1980. While some of this could be compensated through an increase in internal demand 
for manufacturing goods from 39.5% before 1967 to 85.5% between 1967 and 1980, the target 
of moving towards a successful export promotion failed as external demand only increased 
from around 3% between 1930 and 1967 to 8.3% thereafter (Echavarría and Villamizar, 2006, 
p. 47).  
TABLE 5.3: CONTRIBUTION TO PRODUCTION IN DIFFERENT INDUSTRIAL SECTORS 1940-1979 
 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 
Non-Durable Consumer Goods 58.0  55.7 50.0 48.1 
Food 14.2  12.5 13.4 13.6 
Beverages  13.4  13.0 11.0 11.6 
Tobacco  6.3  5.3  4.4  3.6 
Textiles 16.4  18.1 15.7 14.5 
Shoes  5.6  5.0  4.0 3.4  
Wood processing 2.1  1.8  1.5  1.4 
     
Intermediate Goods 36.8  37.9 38.8 38.4 
Paper 0.6  2.6 3.5 3.7 
Printing (and related)  5.8  3.8  2.8  2.8 
Leather 0.8  1.0 0.9 0.7 
Rubber 0.2  1.0  1.6  2.3 
Petrochemicals and pharmaceutical 19.4  13.6  13.1  14.6 
Petrol, carbon, and derivatives 1.9  6.0  7.1  5.2 
Non-metallic minerals  7.1  6.5  5.5  5.5 
Basic metals  1.0  3.4  4.3  3.6 
2     
Capital Goods 5.2  6.4 11.2 13.5 
Metallic products 1.1  2.0  3.2  4.0 
Non-electric machinery  - 0.6  1.8  2.3  
Electric machinery 3.9  1.9 2.6 2.7 
Transportation material  0.2  1.9  3.6  4.5  
     
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
SOURCE: JUNGUITO (1979)  
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This failure of the Colombian economy to climb up the productivity ladder towards higher 
value-added production was particularly noticeable in the decline of Antioquia’s industry. The 
traditional industries of Medellín suffered most under the new mixed-strategy developmental 
regime after the mid-1970s. Table 5.4 confirms the findings so far and shows that contribution 
to the national aggregated value of Antioquia’s stronghold sectors, namely textiles, wood 
processing, and basic metals were very high in 1953. This decreased drastically with the move 
away from the ISI development model. The gradual expansion of production in processed 
foods, and machinery and equipment was insufficient to halt the deindustrialization process of 
Medellín’s economy. 
 
TABLE 5.4: ANTIOQUIA’S CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL VALUE ADDED PER SECTOR 1953 AND 2000 
 Antioquia 
 1953 2000 
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 12 19 
Textiles and Garment 50 42 
Wood Processing 17 9 
Paper and Printing 13 15 
Chemical Products 13 9 
Non-metallic Minerals 23 24 
Basic Metals 33 18 
Machinery and Equipment 21 28 
Others 16 13 
Total 25 18 
SOURCES: UNITED NATIONS (1957, P. 270); ENCUESTA ANUAL MANUFACTURERA  
  
The failure to achieve a successful transformation can be traced back to low levels of efforts by 
domestic capitalists to acquire new technology and tacit knowledge. Mergers and joint 
ventures with foreign capital did not achieve the desired outcome of technological upgrading. 
Table 5.5 shows changes in industrial production and GDP growth between 1930 and 1999. 
The upper part of the table shows the different factors of production, capital (K) and labour (L), 
which produce output (Q). Until 1979 growth in industrial output was larger than in the rest of 
the economy. Similarly, industrial employment was generally higher until the 1960s. Capital 
stock in Colombia’s industry was on average lower than in the rest of the economy, with the 
exception of the years 1940-59, showing the relative low capital intensity of industrial growth. 
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Changes in (A), the Solow residual8 (see Solow, 1956) and in the ratios between factors of 
production and output are shown in the lower panel. In line with our previous findings this 
panel shows that while labour productivity (Q/L) and the capital productivity (Q/K) increased 
since the 1930s, both dynamics slowed down after the 1970s. Labour and factor productivity in 
the industrial sector have grown at very low rates, indicating that acquisition of technology 
either through upgrading of domestic production or through joint ventures with foreign 
investors had only marginal effects on technological upgrading. 
 
TABLE 5.5 TECHNICAL CHANGE AND GROWTH IN COLOMBIA 1930-1999 
 Industry Total Economy  
 Q L K Q L K 
1930-39 10.7 3.1 0.9 4.3 2.0 1.8 
1940-49 8.6 4.1 5.3 4.3 1.6 3.0 
1950-59 7.0 4.2 7.0 5.3 2.2 4.3 
1960-69 5.8 1.0 3.9 5.1 2.5 5.1 
1970-79 6.5 2.7 5.8 5.7 4.6 6.0 
1980-89 0.3 -0.2 -0.8 3.3 3.1 6.4 
1990-99 0.8 -0.2 -0.3 4.4 2.1 6.4 
       
 A Q/L Q/K A Q/L Q/K 
1930-39 8.6  7.6 9.8 2.3 2.2 2.4 
1940-49 4.0  4.5 3.3 2.1 2.6 1.2 
1950-59 1.6  2.9  0.1  2.2  3.0  1.0  
1960-69 3.4 4.7  1.8  1.5  2.5 0.0 
1970-79 2.4 3.8 0.7 0.5 1.0 -0.3 
1980-89 0.6 0.6 1.2 -0.4 .02 -1.3 
1990-99 0.7 1.0 1.1 0.6 0.9 -0.9 
SOURCES: ECHAVARRÍA AND VILLAMIZAR (2006, P. 31); UNITED NATIONS (1957); SYRQUIN (1987); 
ENCUESTA ANUAL MANUFACTURERA  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 While we are aware of the methodological limitations of the Solow residual, we use is as a rough 
approximation of technological change or the capacity of achieving rates of technological change.  
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The low employment rates and the decreasing capital stocks indicate that Colombia’s economy 
was deindustrializing. The industrial crisis was noticeable in Medellín, where services became 
more dominant and in 1982 for the first time surpassed industrial contribution to GDP growth 
(figure 5.1). This is partially due to external shocks and the aftermath of decreasing demand 
for manufactured textile goods, but also shows a general weakening of the entire 
manufacturing industry in Medellín. While this trend reversed again in 1984, labour and factor 
productivities in Medellín’s industry were stagnating, as the economy failed to upgrade its 
technological and thus productivity base.  
 
FIGURE 5.1: ECONOMIC SHARE OF INDUSTRY AND SERVICES IN MEDELLÍN (IN %) 
  
SOURCE: DANE, CUENTAS DEPARTAMENTAKES, BASE 1975 
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TABLE TABLE 5.6: VALUE ADDED PER WORKER AND NUMBER OF WORKERS PER FACTORY, 1953, 1975, 2000 
  Value added/Worker Worker per factory 
ISIC Sector 1953 1975 2000 1953 1975 2000 
311 Food manufacturing exc. beverages 81  125  91  10  20  23 
312 Food manufacturing exc. beverages 135  209  76  8  21  24 
313 Beverage industries 378  347  182  24  102 93 
314 Tobacco manufactures 102  250  277  8  19  47 
321 Manufacture of textiles 108  71  49  16  38  43 
322 Manufacture of wearing apparel, 
except footwear 
43  39  23  3  30  27 
323 Manufacture of leather and products 
of leather 
88  60  29  5  30  21 
324 Manufacture of footwear, except 
moulded rubber or plastic footwear 
129  54  23  10  21  19 
331 Manufacture of wood and wood and 
cork products, except furniture 
49  38  43  3  18  17 
332 Manufacture of furniture and 
fixtures, except primarily of metal 
46  28  28  3  19  17 
341 Manufacture of paper and paper 
products 
135  133  148  24  39  39 
342 Printing, publishing and allied 
industries 
85  79  54  13  19  19 
351 Manufacture of industrial chemicals 141  170  364  20  37  31 
352 Manufacture of other chemical 
products 
134  161  138  8  32  36 
353 Petroleum refineries 178  141  1,974  227  28  16 
354 Manufacture of miscellaneous 
products of petroleum and coal 
188  150 265  31  29 19 
355 Manufacture of rubber products 352  148  63  26  28 21 
356 Manufacture of plastic products not 
elsewhere classified 
166  70  50  21  33  28 
361 Manufacture of pottery, china and 
earthenware 
63  46  74  7  35  392 
362 Manufacture of glass and glass 
products 
107  78  99  10  67  28 
369 Manufacture of other non-metallic 
mineral products 
88  65  105  10  24 27 
371 Iron and steel basic industries 116  130  167  10  21 25 
372 Non-ferrous metal basic industries 91  102  138  9  18  27 
381 Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, except machinery and 
equipment 
61  68  42 3  24  19 
382 Manufacture of machinery except 
electrical 
58  65  35  2  27  19 
383 Manufacture of electrical machinery 
apparatus, appliances and supplies 
81  90  65  4  34  26 
384 Manufacture of transport equipment 52  58  155  10  28  30 
385 Manufacture of professional and 
scientific goods 
45  51  71  4  32 30 
390 Other Manufacturing Industries 66  51  37  3  24  19 
SOURCE: ECHAVARRÍA AND VILLAMIZAR (2006); UNITED NATIONS (1957); ENCUESTA ANUAL 
MANUFACTURERA 
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Stagnating labour productivity in Medellín’s urban economy is reflected in table 5.6. Value 
added per worker decreased particularly in the city’s stronghold industries of food processing 
(311, 312), textile manufacturing (321), manufactured leather goods and footwear (323, 324), 
and manufacturing of machinery and equipment (382, 383). At the same time, these sectors 
experienced an increase in worker per factory, indicating a deepening of labour intensity and a 
decrease in labour productivity, which is particularly relevant given that the overall 
contribution of these sectors to national value added decreased (see table 5.4). 
Colombia’s industrial decline in the 1970s impacted manufacturing growth and value added of 
Medellín’s economy quite drastically. Overall, value added as well as value added in 
manufacturing stagnated and declined after the 1970s, before these values only slightly 
recuperated in the second half of the 1980s. The conventional economic explanations for 
stagnation of Antioquian and Colombian industry largely focus on macroeconomic imbalances 
from the mid-1970s until 1990. Ocampo and Villar (1992), for example find that these 
developments can be explained through the volatility of coffee prices, the closure of private 
foreign credit due to the debt crisis in other Latin American countries, the rise of international 
interest rates and an increase in external debt service as a result of the Volcker Shock, and the 
Colombian financial crisis of the early 1980s. As the 1984 macroeconomic adjustment 
programme of the IMF focused on restoring macroeconomic equilibrium through fiscal control 
and financing of public investments through FDI, export subsidies were scaled back, as was the 
role of the public PROEXPO and IFInd. The changes in the developmental strategy and the 
institutional adjustments that focused on the establishment of macroeconomic equilibrium 
reflect the emerging dominance of the idea that economic stagnation and crises are the result 
of ‘bad’ institutional environments.  
And indeed, the discussed decline and stagnation of Medellín’s industry reflects several 
weaknesses inherent to Antioquian industrialization. Similar to many other industrialization 
attempts in Latin America, Medellín’s industry remained with a strong emphasis on production 
of non-durable consumer goods. With the removal of some protectionist policies, it was 
particularly Medellín’s stronghold textile sector that suffered from external shocks and 
competitive disadvantages vis-à-vis other emerging industrial economies, such as the South 
East Asian Tigers. Intermediate goods and capital goods production always had little priority in 
Medellín’s industry and could thus not serve as a substitute of the declining traditional non-
durable industry. The linkages of industrial capital to a few families that controlled the 
productive sectors of consumer goods have also been identified as crippling factors for further 
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effective horizontal diversification and vertical integration (see Vellinga and Kruijt, 1983, p. 
114). 
Using theoretical arguments of Bruno and Sachs (1979, 1982) and Corden and Nearly (1982), 
Clavijo et al. (2012) argue that “Dutch Disease” effects following the increased importance of 
oil, gas, and coal for Colombia’s economy in the 1970s were largely responsible for 
deindustrialization trends. Showing that the increase of oil production in Colombia correlated 
not only with a substantial revaluation of the exchange rate of the Colombian Peso but also 
with a decrease of value added in manufacturing as a percentage of GDP, the authors find 
evidence that deindustrialization in Colombia happened as a consequence of “Dutch Disease” 
effects. These arguments are resonated by Echavarría and Villamizar (2006) who find that 
between 1970 and 1979 the importance of oil and coal for Colombia’s economy increased, 
while manufacturing of capital goods decreased in that same period.  
These arguments are also supported by Ortíz (2009). The author finds that in addition to 
“Dutch Disease” effects of a revaluated currency and low wage competitiveness it was 
macroeconomic mismanagement and misplaced microeconomic policies that were responsible 
for “economic deceleration in Colombia”. 
However, the authors arguing that Colombia’s and Medellín’s deindustrialization resulted from 
“Dutch Disease” effects fail to analyse why some manufacturing sectors did not suffer 
decreases and why several devaluations of the Colombian Peso in the 1990s and labour market 
reforms resulting in real wage suppression did not reverse the trends. Further, it remains 
unclear whether or not increased extractive rents were used to increase technological learning 
in order to achieve economic growing up. A closer look at the changing nature of local elite 
interests following these external shocks is also missing from these policy and neoclassical 
explanations.  
Seen through the political settlements lens, the inability of Medellín’s economy to continue to 
climb the technology ladder can be explained by several additional factors that impeded or at 
least slowed down attempts to upgrade Medellín’s economy. Firstly, we argue that the 
distribution of power in Colombia’s political settlement is one important factor in 
understanding these developments. The historically large powers of landed interests vis-à-vis 
industrial interests can partially explain why advanced ISI strategies were not implemented 
that may have set Medellín onto a path of “late industrial development”. During the years of 
the Frente Nacional this relatively stronger weight of the landed elite made the distribution of 
power more and more incompatible with an institutional strategy that could allocate benefits 
to growth-enhancing industries. The need to find compromises between the different elite 
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factions to keep the settlement stable limited the development of state capacities to create 
and distribute the remaining industrial rents in order to decrease growth-constraining costs. 
This impeded efforts for lengthy learning of tacit knowledge and risky investments. 
Secondly, where industrial rents were created they were largely allocated to the oligarchic 
Antioquian industrial elite that had relative low value-added, low technological, and labour-
intensive capabilities. While it did not require very sophisticated coordination and strong 
planning efforts to reduce risks in Medellín’s easy phase of ISI, this changed after the 1950s 
when Antioquia attempted to push large-scale capital-intensive industrial production. The 
relatively short-lived experience of advanced ISI development can thus be explained by the 
limitation of the state to allocate and monitor rents effectively. Hence, the system of 
compulsion in place during and after the Frente Nacional proved to be insufficient for creating 
and distributing rents to successfully advance to more difficult stages of ISI development, 
leading to a failure of attempts to develop internationally competitive exporting sectors. 
This was reinforced by a third factor: the low levels of competition among Medellín’s industrial 
elites in all phases of ISI development. Whereas the large bargaining power and the extensive 
coordination capacities of Medellín’s industrial oligarchy facilitated growth-enhancing rent 
management during the easy stage of ISI development, this turned into a disadvantage after 
1967. The low competition, which “at least in part, (is) explained by the much larger weight of 
landed elites and interests in the Colombian (political) settlement” (Khan and Blankenburg, 
2009, p. 363), hindered successful allocation of rents as well as disciplining mechanisms in 
cases of non-performance of rent recipients. Besides the distributive and allocative 
implications for possible growth-enhancing rents, the very close and tight elite in Antioquia 
also limited entry for outsiders of the ruling coalition. Again, while the exclusive character of 
the ANDI and its direct ties to the state had enhanced productivity growth during the first half 
of the twentieth century, this turned into a disadvantage as it made it almost impossible for 
industrial newcomers to develop political bargaining power to influence government.  
We also identify the relatively low organizational capacity and governance capability of the 
state as a factor. Despite the introduction of the mixed strategy, the state was not able to 
create conditions for successful export promotion and for the attraction of FDI with more 
advanced technology. The lack of governance capability to create conditionalities for MNEs to 
commit to technology transfers through FDI in medium- or high-productivity activities, which 
may have facilitated technology upgrading of domestic firms, had adverse effects for long-
term productivity growth. Backward and forward linkages could hence not be created, 
resulting in a continued dependence of Antioquian industry on technology acquisition through 
FDI.  
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Khan and Blankenburg (2009, p. 364) discuss yet another factor that reinforces the overall 
picture of a lack of elite competition and of low state capabilities: “The absence of populism in 
Colombia and the high degree of exclusion of subaltern and middle classes from the political 
settlement did not mean that the state was not affected by contestation from outside this 
settlement. Instead, political contestation by excluded sectors of society took the form of 
(mostly) rural guerrilla warfare that, while largely confined to remote regions with little 
government presence, increasingly undermined the political stability of the elitist-clientelist 
pacts.” This shift towards an unstable and unsustainable growth-stability trade-off intensified 
and urbanized with the decrease in Medellín’s industrial growth. Hence, while the labour-
intensive character of Medellín’s industry had not only incentivized urbanization as to absorb 
capitalist surpluses through an increased labour supply, it also guaranteed a stabilization of 
Medellín’s political settlement, which changed with the deindustrialization of the city’s 
economy. The next section discusses these trends in further detail and analyses how the 
growth-stability trade-off in Medellín’s political settlement became increasingly unsustainable 
through contestation from a variety of outsiders of Medellín’s elitist pact.  
 
5.3 POLITICAL ECONOMY EXPLANATIONS OF CHANGING ELITE STRUCTURES AND INSTITUTIONAL 
RESPONSES IN A DESTABILIZING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT  
Medellín’s industrial elites held considerable power in the local and national political 
settlements for much of the twentieth century and could influence institutional strategies of 
creating and distributing rents to facilitate industrial development and maintaining the stability 
of the political settlement. Low levels of competition among elites, the relatively stronger 
position of landed interests (particularly of elite factions from Bogotá), a state with limited 
disciplining and incentivizing capacities, and generally low entrepreneurial capabilities of the 
industrial elites impeded the implementation of growth-enhancing institutional strategies for 
advanced industrial development. The consequent economic crisis in Colombia and Medellín’s 
deindustrialization since the late 1970s had several consequences for the interdependency 
between power and institutions and its developmental effects on economic growth and 
political stability.  
This section engages in a political economy analysis of changes in elite interests and power 
structures that followed these developments. The first part of this section focuses on how 
Medellín’s industrial elite changed to become a service-sector based capitalist class that 
developed networks and institutions to maintain economic powers in the changing local and 
national context. In the second part of this section we discuss how the separation of political 
and economic elites, and increasing influence of outsiders of the dominant pacto undermined 
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and challenged the overall stability and sustainability of the political settlement. We focus on 
how policy reforms that decentralized the Colombian political landscape responded to these 
changes. The section will analyse how these decentralization reforms affected the structures 
of power and hence impacted the likelihood of achieving growth-enhancing institutional 
change.  
5.3.1 CHANGING ELITE STRUCTURES IN MEDELLÍN – THE BIRTH OF THE GEA 
With the industrial decline in the 1970s and the deterioration of state-created industrial rents, 
Medellín’s elite and the entire urban economy stood at “the advent of an irreversible crisis in 
the productive sector, which witnessed the beginning of the decline of hegemony and the 
reorganization of the Antioquian industrial faction” (Franco Restrepo, 2005, p. 154). This 
decline started with and is symbolized by the crisis of the textile industry (Escobar and Hoyos, 
1986). The main features of Antioquia’s industrial model clearly were no longer viable in the 
new economic context and Medellín’s industrial elite factions recognized the need to 
restructure their bases of capital accumulation. 
The bargaining power of Medellín’s industrialists, in particular through the business 
association ANDI, declined during that phase, as elite factions with landed interests received 
increasingly favoured treatment in terms of rent allocations. As a result, Medellín’s 
industrialists started to develop informal networks and institutions to protect their interests 
from Bogotá’s landed elite faction as well as from outsiders of Medellín’s local elite pacto. 
Using their financial capacities developed throughout the twentieth century, Medellín’s 
industrialists successfully replaced the importance and weight of industrial businesses with 
economic consortia and organizations that focused on capital accumulation through financial 
speculation, construction, and mergers and acquisition of several service and light-
manufacturing companies.  
It was in 1978 after several rival elite factions engineered a hostile takeover of various core 
paisa industrial businesses, that Medellín’s industrial elites saw themselves forced to push 
their informal institutional strategies further and formed the so-called Sindicato Antioqueño 
also known as Grupo Empresarial Antioqueño (Entrepreneurial Group of Antioquia, GEA).  
The formation of the GEA and the organizational restructuring of Medellín’s most powerful 
capitalist groups can be seen not only as a result of increasing competition between different 
elite faction in the local political settlement (discussed below), but also as a consequence of 
factors that were exogenous to Medellín’s political settlement. Thus, the ending of the Frente 
Nacional and the introduction of several macroeconomic policies at the national level had 
several interlinked effects on the balances of power in Medellín and the interests of the 
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Antioquian elite. The creation of the GEA as an exemplary case for how national level dynamics 
can affect political settlements at the city level is particularly strong when looking at the 
influence of elite factions from other regions of Colombia in the national political settlement. 
Historically, the biggest regional rivals for the Antioquian elite have been the Grupo Santo 
Domingo and the very powerful Organización Ardila Lülle. The implementation of first 
liberalization reforms, coupled with increased revenue flows from oil and coal production in 
the 1970s, had substantially strengthened these two Grupos, both of which had historically 
focused on landed rent extraction. The Grupo Santo Domingo, for example, used the period of 
the 1970s when Medellín’s industrial capital was crisis to acquire the Medellín-based brewery 
Cervunión and to take many parts of beer production to Colombia’s capital Bogotá.  
Similarly, other Antioquian manufacturing plants of non-durable and intermediate goods were 
bought by the Organización Ardila Lülle. The beverage producer Postobón and the textile giant 
Coltejer are but two examples of how rival regional elite factions took over core sectors of 
Medellín’s industry and took production to other parts of the country. The cases of Postobón 
and Coltejer are particularly noteworthy due to their effects on capital goods production in 
Medellín. Both companies had not only been the backbone of Medellín’s growth in non-
durable and intermediate goods manufacturing, but due to their horizontal integration with 
companies producing machinery and equipment, they had also helped to create a considerable 
base of capital goods production in Medellín. When the Organización Ardila Lülle acquired 
Cotejer and Postobón and moved parts of their production to Bogotá and Barranquilla, this 
also impacted output of capital good production in Medellín. Many machine-producing plants 
were moved, while assembly and textile production remained in the Antioquian capital.  
Following this, the GEA integrated several different fractions of Medellín’s dominant business 
elite to compensate for the economic weakening of large traditional corporations following 
the industrial decline of the late 1970s and to maintain political influence following the 
marginalization of the ANDI as a powerful lobbying mechanism (Semana, 1997). This informal 
institutional understanding had several long-lasting impacts, not only in terms of efficiency and 
economic growth, but in particularly with respect to its distributive functions of allocating 
economic benefits and political patronage (Franco Restrepo, 2005, pp. 163–164).  
Various presidents of Medellín’s traditional industrial companies supported the initiative to 
protect their interests through the GEA as a new informal mechanism to decrease transaction 
costs, while maintaining economic and political influence. Nicanor Restrepo Santamaría, one of 
the early leaders of the GEA and arguably the most influential patrón in Medellín’s recent 
history, remembers that the GEA resulted from “a process of creation of local organization as 
131 
 
an autonomous response” (Restrepo Santamaría, 2011, p. 85). He cites Ricado Ángel, co-
founder of the GEA and leader of the regional business elite, who stated that “the centralism 
and the way they (the Bogotano elite), especially the representatives of Colseguros, wanted to 
restructure the management of Antioquian corporations were the reasons that led to the 
promotion of a bank, an insurance company, and other businesses with the participation of 
the largest industries of the region” (Ángel, 2005, cited Restrepo Santamaría, 2011, p. 85).  
Since its initial phase the GEA has been led by the finance and insurance company 
Suramericana de Seguros (Sura), its subsidiary bank Banco Industrial Colombiano (BIC, or 
Bancolombia after the merger with Banco de Colombia in 1997), the cement producer Argos, 
and the food processor Compañía Nacional de Chocolates (since 2011 Nutresa). All of these 
companies remain deeply interconnected through a particular type of a cross-share ownership 
structure: Sura holds around 37% of Argos’ shares and 37% of Nutresa, Argos controls 36% of 
Sura and around 11% of Nutresa, while Nutresa owns 10% of Sura’s shares and 10% of Argos. 
As David Emilio Bojanini, current president of Sura and the head of the GEA told the author: 
“what we are looking for with this particular shareholding structure is to control each other… 
and to protect us from outsiders and hostile takeovers” (Bojanini, 2014). Santiago Pérez 
Moreno, vice-president of Bancolombia and member of various boards of directors of GEA 
companies added, “this crossing of shares was done to preserve regional values… but 
ultimately it was done to preserve the positions and influence of presidents and executives (of 
GEA companies)” (Pérez Moreno, 2014). 
This interconnectivity of the core companies of the GEA is also reflected in the multiple 
representation in the board of directors (figure 5.2). As seen in figure 5.2, during the initial 
phase the financial institutions Sura, Bancolombia, and Corfinsura that secured leading roles 
for themselves in the GEA. The cement producer Argos and the food processing company 
Compañía Nacional de Chocolates completed the principle holding groups of the GEA. 
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FIGURE 5.2: BOARDS OF DIRECTORS OF THE GEA, 1980 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: FRANCO RESTREPO (2005), OWN ELABORATION 
 
Today, the founding companies remain at the head of this cross-shareholding structure. Their 
respective CEOs concentrate influence through simultaneous representation in up to five 
boards of directors. The GEA is thus the main manifestation of a fundamental reorganization of 
Medellín’s business landscape. The adoption of a cross-ownership structure, which replaced 
the pyramid structure led by dominant families, can be seen as a defensive strategy of 
Medellín’s economic elites against hostile takeovers. However, and as Londoño (2004) and 
Franco Restrepo (2005) argue, this quantitative concentration of capital also serves as an 
institutional strategy for maintaining hegemony over capital accumulation, and sustaining and 
deepening the organizational power in Colombia’s political settlement. 
Within this network, and differently from the family-owned industrial companies, the 
depositories of power are managers and CEOs. However, this does not mean that large 
influential owners disappeared and were replaced by a democratic ownership structure. On 
the contrary, the GEA created in the words of the grupo’s very own Nicanor Restrepo 
Santamaría “a managerial class that increasingly concentrated the decision-making processes 
in boards of directors that were nominated behind closed doors” (Restrepo Santamaría, 2011, 
p. 86). Its CEOs are descendants of the industrial families that dominated ownership and 
control throughout the twentieth century. Like their ancestors, the ‘new’ economic capitalist 
elite is largely privileged through education abroad, high incomes, and inherited access and 
entitlements.  
Noel 
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The creation of the GEA does not only mark a change in the ownership structure of the 
majority9 of Medellín’s companies, but also embodies the institutionalized shift of interests 
away from traditional industrial manufacturing towards capitalist service activities. While we 
discuss the concrete transformation of the GEA towards a service-based transnational 
capitalist class in the next chapter, figure 5.3 already indicates that since 1980 economic 
income of the GEA has been dominantly and constantly originating from service activities. This 
is different from the observations made in figure 5.1 for the entire urban economy and shows 
that interests of Medellín’s elite largely shifted towards services after 1980. One could argue 
that this was a mere defensive strategy and the capitalist elite of Antioquia was forced to re-
orientate their business interests towards service provision (Restrepo Santamaría, 2011, p. 
200). However, Betancur et al. (2001) find that with the increased global integration of 
Colombia’s economy the GEA in fact adopted an offensive and even aggressive strategy.  
The change in elite interests and balances of power in Medellín’s political settlement following 
creation of the GEA shows that exogenous factors to the local political settlement, such as 
changes in the dynamics of the national political settlement (i.e. the increased importance of 
rival elite factions) impact how dominant actors in Medellín’s capitalist elite view their 
interests. The shift in interests from an industrial-based economy towards services can thus 
not be explained by merely looking at changes in balances of power in the local political 
settlement, but also by analysing ideational change triggered by factors exogenous to the local 
political settlement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Today, the GEA controls companies in Medellín that make up for around 80% of the city’s GDP and 
contributes around 8% to Colombia’s GDP. Measured by market valorisation, Bancolombia is Colombia’s 
third largest company, while Sura is ranked number four. In this national ranking, Argos follows on rank 
six while Nutresa is ranked ninth. Together, these core companies of the GEA have a market valorisation 
of over 26 billion Pounds Sterling (in 2014 constant GBP). Their combined market valorisation makes up 
for around 25% of the value of all publically traded companies in Colombia (Fradique-Méndez, 2014). 
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FIGURE 5.3: INCOME OF GEA IN INDUSTRY AND SERVICES (IN %) 
 
SOURCE: ACOSTA AND LONDOÑO (2002) 
 
The creation of the GEA and the implied reorganization of Medellín’s industrialists had several 
effects on the overall power structure, capitalist interests, and the capabilities of implementing 
strategies for productivity growth and technological change. Concluding our discussion of the 
GEA, we can summarize that after state-created industrial rents were drying up as a result of 
several factors discussed in the preceding political economy analysis, Medellín’s industrial elite 
saw the need to establish institutional mechanisms that could sustain their economic power 
and maintain bargaining and organizational powers vis-à-vis the state. This institutional shift 
also entailed a reorganization of the paisa economy towards services, and construction 
(cement), and finance, which in turn, affected the existing political settlement. With the 
concentration of ownership Medellín’s capitalists could not only fight off competition through 
the quasi-protectionist GEA, but could also find a replacement for the ANDI as a bargaining 
tool.  
Alongside the reorganization of Medellín’s business elite in the 1980s there were several 
important policy changes to the political landscape of Colombia. In attempts to stabilize the 
increasingly fragile elite bargain in the years following the end of the highly centralized 
administration of the Frente Nacional in the 1960s and 1970s, far-reaching decentralization 
reforms were implemented. In the following we analyse how these reforms functioned as 
institutional responses to contestations of power from leftist urban guerrillas as well as from 
an emerging political class.  
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5.3.2 ELITE FRAGMENTATION, DECENTRALIZATION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN MEDELLÍN’S POLITICAL 
SETTLEMENT  
It was already during the years of the Frente Nacional in the 1960s when outsiders of the ruling 
coalition first contested the traditional industrial elites’ self-prescribed role as Medellín’s 
natural representatives in political matters. The hyper-centralization of political power and the 
quasi one-party rule of the Frente Nacional had three important interrelated impacts on the 
distribution of power in Colombia in general, but more importantly, in Medellín’s society 
(Duque Daza, 2005).  
Firstly, Medellín’s industrial elite faction lost more and more bargaining power in the Frente 
Nacional to the historically strong landed interests, particularly from Bogotá’s elite. This led to 
a change in resource allocation away from efforts to promote industrial development. 
Secondly, the efforts to at least secure some access to state-created industrial rents for 
Medellín’s industrialists were concentrated at the national level. Antioquia has historically 
been the region in Colombia with an elite that subscribed strongly to the idea of regional 
autonomy (Ocampo, 1984). The fragmentation of organizational capacities and power during 
the Frente Nacional did not only result in a power vacuum in Medellín’s society, but also led to 
a vertical interest fragmentation between the centre and the Antioquian elites. With the rise in 
the 1960s of a generation of Antioquian regional leaders (cacicazgos) not linked to Medellín’s 
traditional elites, these predominant power structures were increasingly challenged resulting 
in a fragmentation of the main political interests. Thirdly, the concentration of power in the 
Frente Nacional led to an internal horizontal fragmentation of interests within the two main 
political parties as the organizations failed to manage a distribution of rents to regional 
political actors as well as the lower rank and file within their parties. The Conservative as well 
as in the Liberal Party witnessed an increasing heterogeneity of interests within their own 
organizational structures. These factors left space for alternative actors to challenge 
hegemonic power both from outside as well as within the two organizations (see Archer and 
Shugart, 1997).  
In addition, these dynamics also led to an alienation of economic from political elite interests 
and groups (Franco Restrepo, 2005). This became more and more visible during the 1970s with 
the gradual decline of the Frente Nacional and its decreasing political legitimacy. The resulting 
rise of professional politicians, who articulated their interests independently from the 
traditional landed and industrial elites, started a process of reorganization of power relations 
(Duque Daza, 2007). The shift of organizational power away from these traditional elite 
factions and towards a class of professional political actors is considered by many as the 
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breaking point between the political and economic elites in Medellín (see Dover and Ocampo, 
2006; Gouëset, 1998; Leyva, 2014; Restrepo Santamaría, 2011).  
Dover and Ocampo (2006) provide an interesting contribution to the literature on the 
fragmentation of power in Medellín. They argue that prior to the 1970s and the process of a 
gradual opening up of Colombia’s economy, the industrial elites were able to establish 
themselves as the dominant elite in the political settlement, which was legitimized and 
maintained through different institutional mechanisms of distributing rents and patronage 
compatible with this. However, with the economic weakening of the dominant industrial 
entrepreneurs, this distribution of power was challenged by the rise of “a new elite, the 
political class, which was formed around a regional bureaucratic apparatus” (Dover and 
Ocampo, 2006, pp. 263–264). Leyva (2014, p. 126) finds that this endogenous change in 
economic elites combined with the rise of what he calls clase emergente resulted in “a 
fragmentation of the elite – in singular – into different groups of power”.  
Duncan (2005) and Palacios (2001) also consider the rise of the clase emergente a logical 
consequence of failing economic dynamics, combined with the massive urbanization waves 
Medellín experienced from the 1950s until the early 1980s (see figure 2.3). The industrialists 
had so far been able to accommodate the urban working class through waged employment 
and housing benefits. Institutional mechanisms and state-created rents – designed to serve the 
interests of the industrial elite – incentivized both the industrial expansion of labour-intensive 
industries as well as further rural-urban migration. While the former was largely achieved 
through formal policies, such as subsidies and tariffs, the latter depended on pull factors (i.e. 
secure housing) as well as push factors (rural violence). However, and as discussed in previous 
sections, this positive growth-stability trade-off in the political settlement of Medellín during 
the ISI phase became increasingly fragile.  
Due to the organizational and political factors predominant in the Frente Nacional and the 
economic reforms in 1967, the existing distribution of power became increasingly 
incompatible with institutional mechanisms that could continue to reduce growth-constraining 
transaction costs and minimize transition costs through compensating outsiders of the ruling 
coalition and the urbanized working class. With decreasing political powers of Medellín’s 
industrialists and the slowdown of state-created industrial rent flows, the industrial elite was 
no longer able to manage enough rents and allocate compensation effectively. Resulting 
increases in urban unemployment exacerbated rifts among elite factions and strengthened the 
new political clase emergente.  
137 
 
Increasing urban unemployment, the urbanization of the until-then largely rural Colombian 
conflict, and the decreasing capacity of the state and the elite factions to distribute sufficient 
rents and benefits to keep the settlement stable also resulted in an increase of urban militia 
movements in Medellín’s marginalized comunas. In addition to the growing rifts between the 
economic and the political elites, the 1970s witnessed the rise of leftist urban guerrillas. While 
rural guerrillas had been playing an important role in Colombia’s political landscape through 
the FARC, the Ejército Popular de Liberación (Popular Liberation Army, EPL) and the Ejército de 
Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Arby, ELN), this was a new phenomenon for 
Medellín10. It was in the 1970s that the city’s political settlement started to unsettle as a result 
of persistent insurgencies, fuelled by an increase in youth unemployment and a growing 
marginalization of communities and neighbourhoods. This resulted in an intensified 
contestation of the existing power structures, which was at least in part also a consequence of 
how the Frente Nacional excluded leftist forces from official political representation (Hylton, 
2007, p. 77). However, and as discussed in the next section, it was mostly the rise of the 
political clase emergente with its ties to narco-businessmen and traffickers, and Pablo 
Escobar’s Medellín Cartel that severely shook the existing balance of power and the stability of 
the political settlement.  
In attempts to sustain a positive growth-stability trade-off, decentralization reforms were 
implemented in the hope to provide local political elites that had risen to power in many City 
Councils across the country, with alternative forms of capital income and control. These 
reforms were also ratified with the intention to restructure the political, administrative, and 
fiscal control of the national state, particularly in policy areas of social services, housing and 
real estate, as well as economic development. Decentralization was furthermore a crucial tool 
for President Belisario Betancur (1982-86) in his attempts to successfully implement the peace 
agreements, Acuerdos de la Uribe, between his government and the FARC (Cepeda Castro, 
2006). 
Law 14 of 1983 introduced the first reforms focusing on fiscal decentralization. The emphasis 
of this reform was on the reorganization of sources of fiscal income for Colombian 
municipalities and included changes in tax collection. Specifically, the decentralization of the 
industry and commerce tax, and the urban property tax surplus changed the rules of the game 
for local administrations. Besides a modernization of the tax-collection system, the reform also 
                                                          
10 Besides the most famous left-wing guerrilla movement, the FARC, the ELN, and the EPL, other urban 
militias are also worth mentioning: Milicias Populares del Valle de Aburrá (MPVA), Armados del Pueblo 
(CAP), Milicias Populares del Pueblo y para el Pueblo, Las Milicias Independientes del Valle de Aburrá, 
and Las Milicias Metropolitanas de la Ciudad de Medellín (see Jaramillo, 1994; Medina Franco, 2006). 
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created the Value Added Tax (VAT) and implemented rules of fiscal transfers from the centre 
to the local level, which until today make up 50% of income for municipalities (Ospina et al., 
2007). Subsequently, Law 12 of 1986 provided the legislative foundations for progressive 
increases of the percentage of VAT transferred to municipalities. Law 12 of 1986, Decree 1333 
of 1986 and Decrees 77 and 81 of 1987 implemented far-reaching administrative 
decentralization reforms, which transferred a number of core policy competencies to the 
municipal level, including public construction, water, sanitation, health care, construction and 
maintenance of public school buildings, care centres, and sports facilities, agricultural and 
technical assistance to small producers, food security, investment programmes, construction 
and maintenance of urban infrastructure, urban transportation, the ability of mayors to 
appoint, transfer and remove staff of public educational institutions, and industrial and 
commerce policies. 
Velázquez (1997) sees these reforms as part of a larger trend aiming to redefine the role of the 
state in the economy and to achieve market-led private sector development. For example, 
privatization of the deregulated and decentralized social service sector was facilitated through 
the devolution of administrative control of the sector in the early 1990s. In addition to 
restructuring the administrative and fiscal responsibilities in the municipal system, the 
decentralizing project also introduced changes in the electoral field, entailing far-reaching 
political decentralizations that involved the popular election of Mayors and Governors 
(Legislative Act # 1 of January 9 1986). Together, these three areas of policy reform led to a 
transformation of the structure of state power. These changes were manifest at various levels: 
a) the re-vitalization of relative power of municipalities and departments, b) the re-
legitimization of local authorities, through the adoption of election procedures, and c) the 
expansion of the powers of local governments via decentralization of administrative 
responsibilities. Overall decentralization reforms particularly strengthened the role of the 
mayors of big cities (Iregui et al., 2001; Pening Gavíria, 2003). 
Falleti (2010, p. 3) finds that in Colombia “decentralization of government policies has 
produced the expected effects of increasing the power of subnational governments and 
officials”. The intensification of territorial interests that coincided with the return to pre-nation 
state agglomerations of highly autonomous cities has led to vertical power shifts that 
strengthened local political actors and regional elites, and predominantly amongst these the 
clase emergente.  
The decentralization reforms of 1983 to 1988 thus constitute a political rupture that started a 
new phase of the management of institutional strategies to enhance economic efficiency and 
to distribute rents and patronage. However, decentralization was not only a distributional 
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strategy of allocating rents and benefits in a changed context, but it also heavily affected the 
capability of the state to create and enforce interventionist policies that can enhance 
conditions for higher productivity economic development. Angell et al. (2001) find that 
decentralization in Colombia has had mixed implications for state capabilities to develop 
innovative institutional strategies. Local clientelism and regionalism flourished, which limited 
the effectiveness of the centre and increased room for innovation at the local level. However, 
and fiscal pressures on local governments aside, the lack of a strong national state in Colombia 
that could rationalize and shape the overall direction of long-term innovative institutional 
strategies remained a major source of political and technical obstacles for a successful 
negotiating of potential trade-offs between political stability and productivity growth (Angell 
et al., 2001).  
Decentralization in Colombia has led to increased uncertainty about the institutional 
environment and to a fall of legitimacy for political parties and the central government. The 
increased factionalism has negatively impacted the coordination of government policies and, 
ultimately, for the implementation of successful growth-enhancing institutional strategies. 
Faust (2006) finds that in Colombia this increased heterogeneity has weakened the state in its 
capacity to create, enforce, and revoke institutional mechanisms, as political factors of power 
constellations and governance capacities were no longer compatible with policy strategies for 
productivity growth and sustainable development. The limitation of governance capabilities to 
ensure efforts in investments for tacit knowledge in local sectors or firms with medium or high 
technological capacities had several developmental impacts.  
An important direct developmental impact of these changes in resource distribution is the 
increase in regional and urban inequalities (Restrepo, 2004). In the 1960s and 70s rents were 
distributed from the central government to cities and regions in the form of stimulus packages 
for economic development in order to close of the gap between different regions and cities 
and between rural and urban Colombia. Restrepo (2004, p. 88) finds that “the adaption of 
decentralization process from the 1980s onwards paradoxically buried the regional 
development policies, in exchange for territorial planning of local public social spending 
policies.” This effectively widened the disparities in growth rates and living standards within 
and between cities and regions (Restrepo, 2004). Today Colombia is more unequal than ever, a 
general trend in Latin America to which decentralization policies may have contributed 
significantly (see Di John, 2009, p. 119). As discussed in the next chapter, decentralization can 
also be one of the contributing factors to stagnating productivity growth in the context of 
market liberalization reforms.  
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As mentioned above, changed power structures and institutional underpinnings did not only 
impact the economic viability of Medellín’s political settlement, but also contributed to an 
increased contestation of the dominant elite bargain. The next section will focus on an analysis 
of the emergentes as a powerful elite faction that achieved considerable organizational and 
holding powers, linked to the growing influence of Medellín’s narco capitalists.  
 
5.4 THE RISE OF THE NARCOS, THE EMERGENTES, AND THE PARAMILITARIZATION OF POWER 
The rise of the emergentes did not only establish a political counterweight to challenge the 
traditional elite structures. It also constituted an attempt to increase economic influence. In 
particular, with the powerful GEA controlling over 80% of Medellín’s businesses, the economic 
power of the emergentes had remained marginal. The second generation of emergentes and 
their representatives Fabio Valencia Cossio, Luis Alfredo Ramos, Álvaro Uribe Vélez, amongst 
others were looking for financial resources to enable to strengthen their economic influence 
(Leyva, 2014).  
The clase emergente started to develop their capacities as actors who “represented a new 
economic power and a new societal sector in Medellín” (Dover and Ocampo, 2006, p. 269). 
While the emergentes had originally secured most of their income from landed activities in 
rural Antioquia, they increasingly became active in urban land speculation and real estate 
development, thus contesting one of GEA’s sources of profit (Gouëset, 1998).  
Urban land valuation was modified in Law 14 of 1983, during the presidency of Betancur. The 
reform augmented the tax-collection capacities of Medellín’s City Council, where local actors 
of the emergentes held powerful positions (Franco Restrepo, 2005; Galindo, 2014). These were 
crucial institutional changes that formally underlined the power of this emerging political class 
through access to new sources of state-created rents. The emergentes could now accumulate 
additional resources, which “started to give the emerging political class some independence 
regarding the generation of formal income and capital gains” (Leyva, 2014, p. 127). 
Besides the formal institutional consolidation of access to economic and political sources of 
rent-creation, the clase emergente also understood how to use informal networks and grey 
markets to increase and sustain their position in the changing landscape of Medellín’s power 
distribution. They developed close links with actors that engaged in the smuggling of 
contraband consumption goods, especially of alcohol, tobacco, textiles, and electric 
appliances. Through a wide network of asset laundering the emergentes were able to increase 
their wealth further (Duncan, 2013). These grey networks became a growing threat to the 
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economic dominance of the capitalist elite represented by the GEA, as they further 
undermined tariff protection, jeopardising the economic stability of domestic markets in the 
formal sector. The increase of foreign exchange earnings from illegal drugs exports and 
smuggled goods was one of the main causes of a “Dutch Disease” episode in the 1980s 
(Martin, 2012). This led to a rise of the relative price of non-traded goods and an appreciation 
of the real exchange rate, resulting in a slow growth of exporting sectors (Kamas, 1986).  
The relationship between the capitalist elites of the GEA and the emergentes was hence 
marked by competition (Franco Restrepo, 2005, p. 355). The rising economic power of the 
emergentes in competing with and contesting the ownership of companies that belonged to 
the sphere of influence of the traditional economic elite was only one aspect of contestation in 
the 1980s. Even more crucial was that a rising drug elite started to build political capacities and 
clientelistic networks with political actors of the emergentes. The most prominent mafia that 
established informal ties with the clase emergente was the Medellín Cartel under its infamous 
leader Pablo Escobar. The Medellín Cartel appeared first in the late 1970s and rose to fortune 
and economic influence during the crisis of the traditional paisa economy in the 1980s. Pablo 
Escobar, together with his socios Carlos Lehder, Gonzalo Rodriguez Hacha, and the Ochoa 
brothers Jorge Luis, Fabio and Juan David, filled much of the economic vacuum left behind by 
the industrial decline of Medellín, generated employment and distributed groceries to the 
urban poor, making them particularly popular amongst the working class. 
Until the mid-1980s Escobar and his Cartel had mainly used their economic fortune to 
influence policy making through campaign financing and other means of lobbying (i.e. 
Escobar’s financial contributions to emergentes such as Senator Alberto Santofimio Botero). 
However, Escobar increasingly explored ways how to directly engage in Colombia’s political 
sphere. John Jairo Velásquez, alias Popeye, hitman and bodyguard of Escobar, remembered a 
conversation between Escobar and Senator Santofimio. According to Velásquez, Santofimio 
said: “Pablo… politics does not only bring money but it brings power. Politics is there to have 
power, with this power you can appoint the directors of the Unidad Administrativa Especial de 
Aeronáutica Civil (Special Administrative Unit of Civil Aeronautics, also known as Aeronáutica 
Civil), so your planes can come and leave as they want; with power you can have the director 
of customs not to revise your merchandise; you can have the director of the Departamento 
Administrativo de Seguridad (Administrative Department of Security, DAS), generals of the 
Republic, commanders of the police… This is want politics gives you, Pablo, power” (cited in 
Legarda Martínez, 2010, p. 161). Despite that there had been “an organic relation between 
centres of economic power and networks of political power”, the ambition of people like 
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Escobar to engage directly in the political arena contributed to the “gradual separation of 
political and economic domains” (Franco Restrepo, 2005, p. 29;285). 
In Medellín’s society and especially within the GEA-led capitalist elite, Escobar’s political rise 
was regarded with increasing suspicion. The decedents of the industrialist families rejected 
Escobar’s application to the prestigious Club Campestre and challenged his ambitions of having 
a permanent place in the city’s high society (see García Marquez, cited Labrousse, 1993, p. 
295). Salazar (1990) argues that this did not bother emergentes like Escobar too much. He 
finds that “if the snooty Medellín establishment wouldn’t accept them as members, (while for 
many years turning a blind eye to their illegal activities), men like Escobar and Gonzalo 
Rodriguez Hacha were capable of going ahead and building their own, rival elite” (Salazar, 
1990, p. 8). In the interviews conducted in Medellín, a public figure and social researcher with 
close ties to Medellín’s establishment also confirmed this: “Pablo Escobar had great economic 
power, and the industrialists would not touch him as they were in business with him and they 
tolerated their own separation from politics. But Pablo wanted more, he wanted real power 
and he knew that he had to get involved in politics. This was his first big mistake, the beginning 
of his end. He crossed a line and suddenly became a real threat to the traditional elites” 
(Durán, 2014). 
Escobar’s political engagement in the Liberal Party, which had split into two factions in 1979 
when Luis Carlos Galán founded the Nuevo Liberalismo (New Liberalism), further fragmented 
and polarized the political landscape. Escobar was expelled from Nuevo Liberalismo after 
which he founded his own political movement, Alternativa Liberal (Liberal Alternative). His 
election to congress in 1982, which coincided with the appointment of Álvaro Uribe Vélez11 as 
Mayor of Medellín, was the pinnacle of Escobar’s influence over a large part of the political 
class of emergentes. However, and despite his large influence, he was pressured to resign and 
to give up on the congressional immunity after his involvement in the massacre of Remedios in 
Antioquia became public (Martin, 2012). Escobar went into temporary exile to Panamá. 
Negotiations in May 1984 about his return and an end to Escobar’s drug business in exchange 
                                                          
11 Álvaro Uribe Vélez, President of Colombia from 2002-2010, is the son of Alberto Uribe Sierra (wealthy 
landowner, influential regional politician, and godfather of the Ochoa brothers who was kidnapped and 
killed by the FARC in 1983). Álvaro Uribe Vélez was director of the Aeronáutica Civil from 1980 to 1982 
before he was appointed Mayor of Medellín in 1982. After President Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) 
found out about Uribe Vélez’ ties with drug capital and the paramilitaries of Pablo Escobar, Uribe Vélez 
together with Antioquia’s governor Villegas Moreno were removed only a few months after their 
inauguration. Uribe Vélez’ political career, however, continued as Governor of Antioquia (1995-1997) 
and President of Colombia from 2002 until 2010. While the political figure of Uribe Vélez, alongside the 
numerous scandals he has been involved in, are subject to many academic contributions and don’t need 
closer attention, we can summarise that Uribe Vélez can be seen as a political figure of the classe 
emergente with close ties to drug capital, the paramilitaries and the GEA.  
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for non-extradition and other demands by the Capo, ended without agreement. Upon failure 
of the negotiations Escobar commented: “Well, that means that we will have to kill every 
motherfucker” (Castro Caycedo, 1996, p. 280).  
This statement anticipated Escobar’s confrontational war against local and national state 
apparatuses and the traditional elite that never accepted him as part of their own. The terror 
Escobar subsequently unleashed, including the bombing of one of the country’s largest 
newspapers, El Espectador, several car bomb attacks on public buildings and an airplane, the 
kidnapping and assassination of members of Medellín’s political and economic elites, and 
ultimately the assassination of presidential candidate Luis Galán, are documented in close 
detail elsewhere (see Bowden, 2002; Martin, 2012; Palacios, 2006; Salazar, 2012). In sum, this 
war turned Medellín into the most violent city worldwide, with a total number of 6,359 
documented killings in 1991 alone, and increase of over 440% of homicides between 1980 and 
1991.  
As mentioned above, the contestation of power on all fronts was the beginning of the end for 
Escobar. The clase emergente that had been supported by and supportive of Escobar hastened 
to separate their political interests and economic income from the Capo’s violence. Traditional 
capitalists who had several informal business ties with Escobar also no longer tolerated his 
economic influence and his threat to their hegemonic role in Medellín’s society. Consequently, 
the political and economic elites formed a coalition in order to regain control over Medellín’s 
society. While both dominant elite factions had already co-financed several paramilitary 
groups to suppress left-wing insurgency movements, the main focus of this paramilitarized 
control or “corporate mercenarism” (Franco Restrepo, 2002) in the early 1990s became the 
killing of Pablo Escobar through the so-called Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar (People 
persecuted by Pablo Escobar, PEPES) (O’Donnell, 1998, p. 147).  
The PEPES were established through linkages between paramilitary mercenaries and public 
armed forces. The group was led by three of Escobar’s former hitmen, Diego Murillo Bejarano 
alias Don Berna, Fidel Castaño and Carlos Castaño. The PEPES were recruited and financed by 
the political and economic elite factions, Colombian and U.S. state organizations, and the 
competing Cali Cartel to lead the fight against their former patrón. The PEPES proved a highly 
effective mechanism, achieving the persecution and assassination of Pablo Escobar. Moreover, 
and following the death of Escobar in 1993, this paramilitary group merged into an informal 
patron-client network between elite factions and the paramilitary to create ‘favourable’ 
institutional conditions that could stabilize Medellín’s crisis-ridden local settlement. As 
discussed in subsequent chapters, the Operación Orión in 2002 is a prime example of how the 
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employment of structures of corporate mercenaries served as mechanisms facilitating inter-
elite cooperation (see Romero and Valencia, 2007). 
This paramilitarism, which from the very beginning was organized in close alliance with official 
Public Forces (Reyes, 1996), acted in the interests of all elite factions and of all traditionally 
dominant sectors in Medellín’s society. In addition to its role as a support structure for an 
increasingly crumbling state power, paramilitarism played a key role in securing private 
interests, particularly in the construction and land speculation sectors, infrastructural projects, 
and economic activities in strategic geo-economic areas (Cubides, 2001). It operated as a 
decentralized entity of the state monopoly on violence to establish a compromise between the 
centre of economic power (GEA) and networks of political power (clase emergente). Franco 
Restrepo (2005, pp. 357–358) summarises, “despite being composed of emerging sectors, the 
military and social strengthening of these illegal power structures, it did not question the 
establishment”. Rather, the mercenaries contributed to the restitution of hegemonic power of 
the “useful society, the society of owners”, and the revival of dominance by the “forces of 
good” (Franco Restrepo, 2005, p. 358). 
However, the competition over economic and political sources of power between the GEA and 
the emergentes remained an inherent feature throughout the 1990s, posing a threat to the 
stability of Medellín’s political settlement. While the paramilitary forces continued to play a 
central role in maintaining relatively stable power relations in Medellín and the entire region 
(see Romero and Valencia, 2007), the gradual separation between the economic and political 
sectors of Medellín’s society is an important aspect of the development of Medellín’s political 
settlement until today.  
 
5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has provided a detailed historical analysis of the development of the distribution 
of power, governance and coordination capacities of the state, and entrepreneurial and 
technological capabilities of the industrial elites. The discussion of these factors is crucial to a 
full understanding of the evolution of Medellín’s political settlements. We discussed how 
economic transformations and shifts towards the development of higher productivity 
industrial sectors can be explained by analysing the interdependencies between power and 
institutions. The chapter argued that governance capabilities and broader political factors 
linked to the distribution of power in Medellín and Colombia were compatible with 
institutional mechanisms that created and enforced rent structures to facilitate growth in light 
manufacturing industries. We also argued that the same power structures, through which 
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industrialists with low technological capabilities gained large organizational control, became 
incompatible with strategies for advanced and late industrialization.  
The failure of Medellín’s economy to ‘grow up’, first signs of deindustrialization, and an 
increasing fragmentation of organizational power following the end of the Frente Nacional 
challenged the sustainability of Medellín’s growth-stability trade-off, as economic and political 
viability decreased. While the formation of the GEA and decentralization reforms were 
institutional attempts of stabilizing the political settlement, the success of these formal and 
informal institutions was limited. Decentralization reforms actually increased organizational 
fragmentation and decreased state capabilities for rent creation and the enforcement of 
growth-enhancing policies. Hence, and despite the economic strength of the GEA, the 
dominance of this elite faction in Medellín’s political settlement was challenged by outsiders of 
the elite bargain. An urbanization of insurgency, and the rise of the political clase emergente 
and Pablo Escobar’s Medellín Cartel brought great instability to Medellín’s settlement.  
While the paramilitarization of social control could bring partial stability to Medellín’s political 
settlement, the ongoing separation between political and economic elites remains an 
important feature of power structures in Medellín. This historical analysis of the evolution of 
elite factions, power structures, and institutional strategies is useful to understand more 
recent developments. As Leyva (2014, p. 133) rightly concludes, “[t]he rupture that emerged 
between the political and the economic classes has fundamental implications for thinking 
about current urban politics in Medellín”.  
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CHAPTER SIX: MEDELLÍN’S POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN A DECENTRALIZED AND 
TRANSNATIONALIZED CONTEXT: DECONSTRUCTING THE TALE OF THE “URBAN MIRACLE” 
The increasing incompatibility of power constellations in Colombia’s political settlement with 
institutional mechanisms for advanced industrial growth resulted in a relative failure of the 
state-led development model. This impeded economic growing up to higher levels of 
technology-driven productivity growth and ultimately led to a variety of political and economic 
crises in the 1980s. Following these crises, Colombia experienced several changes in its 
economic and institutional structures. Besides the discussed policies of political, 
administrative, and fiscal decentralization of government, this also included economic and 
financial liberalization, market deregulation, and privatization reforms. 
Distinct from most contributions to the literature on Medellín’s recent institutional, economic 
and political changes, the analysis put forward in this chapter is embedded in a discussion of 
how political decentralization and economic liberalization affected the different political and 
economic factors of the political settlements framework. Using an analysis of Colombia’s 
radical shift to neoliberalism and its return to static comparative advantages in low 
productivity activities as entry point, we argue that much of Medellín’s transformation can be 
understood and explained by exploring the wider effects of state restructuring on regional 
power structures, governance capacities of the local state, institutional mechanisms for 
productive rent creation, and the technological capabilities and interests of local firms and 
sectors.  
The first section of this chapter argues that the Colombian Constitution of 1991 and 
comprehensive policy changes in the form of liberalization, deregulation and privatization 
ultimately led to Colombia’s return to a static comparative advantage in low productivity 
sectors. This can be linked to the relatively low technological capabilities of Colombia’s firms 
prior to the liberalization reforms and the increasing specialization on sectoral development in 
services, agriculture and extractive industries after the 1980s. Furthermore, the state reforms 
substantially affected the distribution of power. Following the neoliberal logic of limiting 
market distortions, the state was increasingly rolled back by minimizing discretionary and 
interventionist powers. At the same time, neoliberal policies and rent opportunities through 
privatization reforms substantially increased the power of decentralized private actors and 
local organized business groups. In the course of the 1990s local elites developed capacities as 
transnational capitalist elites, who are interested in advancing global capitalist processes 
rather than in the development of domestic markets.  
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Section 6.2 analyses how these developments changed the character of Medellín’s political 
settlement. We show how the empowered capitalist elite in the form of the GEA 
transnationalized their assets and started to develop capacities as political actors. By adopting 
an anti-corruption and political ‘good governance’ discourse, Medellín’s transnational 
capitalists questioned the political legitimacy and the role of the clase emergente by 
challenging the strategies with which they managed the rents created through the public 
utility provider EPM. The dispute between the elite factions developed largely over the 
understanding of EPM’s role: while the political elite of emergentes, led by Mayor Luis Pérez 
Gutiérrez, used resources to stimulate local economic and social development, the 
transnational capitalist elites around the GEA wanted to use EPM as an institutional 
mechanism and driver for economic transnationalization. 
Section 6.3 discusses the particular governance agenda and institutional strategies that 
followed the election of Mayor Sergio Fajardo in 2003. The section engages in a detailed 
analysis of how the GEA, which had a powerful position in the Fajardo coalition, substantially 
increased its organizational powers to influence institutional strategies and local economic 
policies. Using qualitative evidence, this section explores the ‘Medellín Model of Good 
Governance’ and argues that the GEA used this particular political discourse not only to 
increase its organizational power in the local political settlement, but also to advance 
Medellín’s integration into global capitalist structures. The particular changes in Medellín’s 
political settlement as well as the way in which the capitalist elite transnationalized their 
assets and developed political capacities can thus explain recent developmental outcomes. 
The section also engages in an analysis of the effects of implemented rent-management 
strategies in general, and in particular the implications of changes in the management of rents 
created through EPM. Section 6.4 summarizes our findings on Medellín’s developments and 
concludes that the city by no means experienced a miracle.  
 
6.1 THE 1991 CONSTITUTION AS INSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNING FOR CHANGE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
COLOMBIA’S NEOLIBERAL SHIFT ON STATE CAPACITY AND GOVERNANCE IN MEDELLÍN  
As discussed in chapter five, decentralization reforms had several important implications for 
the distribution of power, institutions, and governance capabilities of the local state. Political, 
administrative and fiscal decentralization policies of the 1980s substantially strengthened the 
role of municipal Mayors, particularly of medium and large cities. The increase in coordination 
capabilities of local government, however, coincided with an overall decrease of discretionary 
and interventionist state capacity, as vertical and horizontal fragmentations of organizational 
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structures decreased the likelihood of achieving a growth-enhancing rent management. In this 
sense, it is crucial to analyse the impacts of Colombia’s economic liberalization processes on 
Medellín’s political settlement. 
While the liberalization reforms central to our analysis were largely implemented between 
1990 and 1991, the origins of Colombia’s economic and financial liberalization were in the 
1980s. The decrease of internal demand caused by the crises of Colombia’s inward-oriented 
developmental model, and the decline in foreign demand caused by the massive debt crises of 
many Latin American countries in the early 1980s had detrimental effects on Colombia’s 
current account. The large increase in deficit forced the Betancur government (1982-1986) to 
ask the IMF for a loan. The conditionalities of the IMF agreement included a devaluation of the 
Colombian Peso (COP) to incentivize private loans from domestic and international banks. This, 
however, did little to revive growth rates. Ultimately, Colombia “started a process of structural 
adjustment, which did not only include an orthodox macroeconomic programme, overlooked 
by the IMF, but also an interference of the World Bank, particularly in sectoral politics” 
(Ocampo, 1986, p. 230). This interference of the World Bank in form of several adjustment and 
restructuring projects included loan payments of over 2.7 billion US Dollar between 1985 and 
1991 (World Bank, 2016). Consequently, this led to the reversal of many of Colombia’s 
protectionist measures (López Restrepo, 1995). 
The main policy reforms that fundamentally restructured Colombia’s economy were 
implemented after the election of President César Gaviria in 1990. With the introduction of the 
programa de modernización de la economía colombiana (Colombian economic modernization 
programme) Gaviria diminished the average tariffs (Documento Conpes 2465 of 1990, see 
Garay, 1998). This first tariff reform, which for many observers was Colombia’s first step 
towards a globalized economy (see Dinero, 2013), was followed by an extensive trade reform 
implemented in December 1990 with Decree 3095, reducing the average tariff from 16.5% in 
1991 to 7% in 1994 (López Restrepo, 1995). Complete economic and financial liberalization 
was implemented with the ratification of the 1991 Colombian Constitution (Ocampo, 2007). 
Better known today as apertura (opening), this entailed a sweeping privatization of public 
assets and services, extensive deregulation of state control over productive sectors, the 
introduction of a new foreign investment regime, and the flexibilization of labour markets 
(Garay, 1998).  
The reforms meant a radical transformation of macroeconomic and fiscal policy framework. 
The Central Bank became independent, the Colombian Peso was further devaluated, and a 
contractionary fiscal policy regime was introduced to limit government borrowing (Garay, 
1998). The apertura was thus implemented along the lines of the orthodox and neoliberal 
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reform package of the Washington Consensus (see Williamson, 1990a) and can be seen as part 
of a tendency to adopt structural adjustment policies that aimed at a redirection of political 
and economic processes and at a restructuring of the institutional and legal framework of 
Colombia. The idea behind the restructuring efforts was to minimize the role of the state and 
its capacity to intervene in economic policy in order to secure and guarantee free market 
competition (see Constitución Política de Colombia, 1991, articles 333 and 334). The state 
reduced its role from being a direct employer, service provider, and landlord to become an 
entity for minimalist regulation.  
Colombia’s fairly radical liberalization shock had several direct consequences on the country’s 
productive structure and economic development. The relatively low technological capabilities 
of Colombia’s economic sectors prior to the economic liberalization and the specialization on 
service sector development and on extractive and resource-processing industries after the 
implementation of the apertura reforms led to Colombia’s return to static comparative 
advantages in low productivity activities. While additional resources were freed up through the 
tariff reduction and the liberalization of Colombia’s capital account, the availability of cheaper 
capital goods through increased import competition led to hardly any increases in productivity 
growth. Instead, the (premature) integration into global capitalist structures and exposure to 
increased competition resulted in a decrease of manufacturing in all of the main industrial 
sectors in the Colombian economy (see Cimoli and Katz, 2004). 
Colombia’s radical shift to neoliberalism also entailed the strengthening of particular business 
groups with traditionally large bargaining powers. While the apertura diminished possibilities 
of state rent creation by cutting off many of the capitalist rent recipients from access to 
traditional sources of rent (i.e. through subsidized credits), the liberalization reforms also 
created new rent opportunities (i.e. through privatization and deregulation of specific sectors). 
The apertura thus created room for business groups and firms to gain privileged and 
guaranteed access to a variety of sources of rent creation, making capitalists with large 
organizational power “the most consistent beneficiaries of some of the reforms’ central 
programs, especially privatization” (Rettberg, 2005, p. 33). While these capitalists in Colombia 
are linked to traditional capital and have developed their powerful position since before the ISI 
period, they consolidated their current leading market positions after the liberalization reforms 
(see Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2004, p. 154). Consequently, pro-liberalization 
coalitions, in which the dominant capitalist groups had a powerful position, used the apertura 
to become the local faction of the transnational capitalist elite (see Reyes, 2003; Robinson, 
2010). Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom (2004) and Rettberg (2005) argue that this 
transnationalization mainly happened through mergers between foreign and domestic capital, 
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acquisitions of and by Colombian companies, and generally the linking of foreign investors to 
local capitalist producers through a massive penetration of FDI in the 1990s. 
The transnationalization of Colombia’s capitalist elite is marked by a restructuring of their 
business interests in accordance with the neoliberal logic of comparative advantage. 
Colombia’s transnationalized capitalist business groups, such as the Bogotá-based 
Organización Ardilla Lulle, Grupo Santo Domingo, and Grupo Luis Carlos Sarmiento Angulo and 
the Medellín-based GEA, have thus focused on the development of capacities in sectors where 
Colombia has comparative and competitive advantages, such as extractive industries, 
agriculture and low-wage services. The interests of these business groups hence reside in the 
development of the global capitalist system in which they participate and extract most of their 
incomes from. The focus of this elite on low-skilled activities makes Colombia an attractive 
destination for low productivity FDI. In turn, this presents limited opportunities for spillovers 
through technology transfers, curtailing the development of high technology sectors and 
ultimately perpetuating Colombia’s position at the lower end of the global value chain. 
Besides the implications on elite interests, the apertura reforms also affected other factors 
that are crucial to the analysis of the evolvement of the local political settlement. Most 
importantly, the apertura reforms changed state capabilities to implement and enforce 
economic policies as they intensified the “hollowing out” of the Colombian nation state. 
Hence, and following the same logic of decreasing state capacities applied during the 
decentralization reforms, economic liberalization policies were promoted to reduce sources of 
market failures that were seen to be part of the legacy of the interventionist state. Weakening 
state powers and allowing (decentralized) private agents to take control of the productive and 
social coordination of the economy were seen as solutions to economic stagnation. Colombia 
thus subscribed to the neoliberal axiom that a minimized state has positive effects on private 
investments and can make public spending more effective and efficient (see World Bank, 
1997). 
This resonates with the argument put forward by Angell et al. (2001, pp. 5–6), that 
decentralization may stimulate local productive activity in Colombia as it increases interurban 
competition that can incentivize local entrepreneurs to invest in higher technology sectors and 
create employment. However, and as pointed out in chapter four, in the context of Colombia’s 
decentralized institutional structure, which became highly fragmented and organizationally 
weakened following the political impasse that led to the end of the Frente Nacional, 
liberalization reforms further challenged the state’s organizational capacity and economic 
viability to create and effectively enforce growth-enhancing institutions. Strict regulation on 
public expenditure implemented with the apertura reforms pressured urban governments to 
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enforce fiscal austerity measures, which often intensified power imbalances as they weakened 
rent management capacities of local states and increased the power of decentralized capitalist 
groups even further. This did not lead to an intensified competition between different elite 
factions, but rather to an increase in organizational power of decentralized business groups 
with little interests in the development of high-productivity sectors. 
The implications of Colombia’s shift to neoliberalism need to be included in an analysis of 
power, institutions and local governance capabilities in Medellín. Franco Restrepo (2005, p. 
130) argues that in Medellín the state reforms were part of an institutional project to 
overcome the political and economic impasse on the local level, “in other words, to limit the 
state’s role as a guarantor of public interest, at a time when it was questioned”. The author 
analyses the 1991 Constitution to argue that besides the neoliberalization of local economies, 
the constitutional reforms affected state capacities through the implementation of a wide 
range of “democratization” measures. These included increased opportunities for popular 
participation and political pluralization reforms, which formally put an end to the traditional 
two-party system (see Barreto and Sarmiento, 1997). Franco Restrepo (2005, p. 130) concludes 
that the constitutional processes upset the institutional arrangements of municipal political 
and economic systems. In Medellín, this altered existing elite bargains, as it increased 
competition between the clase emergente and the GEA over access to new sources of rent 
creation and intensified the vertical and organizational fragmentation of the local power 
structures. 
Besides impacting Medellín’s power structure, the economic liberalization and political 
decentralization reforms also had important implications for coordination and governance 
capabilities – particularly in the context of the transnationalization of the local capitalist elites. 
While the protected and largely closed economy of Colombia had guaranteed a relative stable 
elite bargain between dominant groups, the neoliberal shift challenged traditional forms of 
rent management and hence altered the rules of the game for possible creation and 
enforcement of growth-enhancing policies. Hence, the increased power of local organized 
businesses and private actors, the decreased power of the decentralized state, and transition 
costs through increased bargaining between local and national actors can slow down attempts 
to create and enforce growth-enhancing institutional strategies.  
In turn, local investors and newcomers are deterred from investing in “discovering-by-doing” 
strategies for higher-valued comparative advantages, also due to a decrease in governance 
capabilities of the local state to ensure high levels of efforts in learning. Furthermore, and 
following the insertion into the lower end of global value chains, MNEs will most likely decide 
to invest in sectors marked by low productivity and low-skilled labour, which are perceived to 
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be part of Medellín’s comparative advantage. With the discussed distribution of power in 
Medellín’s society, the rolled-back state has limited coordination and governance capabilities 
for effective selection and coordination of FDI with advanced technology. The urban 
government has thus become more vulnerable to the locational decisions of foreign 
companies to bring in high technology industries. The lack of capabilities to invoke domestic 
content from foreign investors can have detrimental effects on productivity growth and 
development, which may well outweigh potentially positive incentivizing effects of 
decentralization and increased interurban competition.  
However, in addition to the changed dynamic within the local political settlement in Medellín 
following the apertura reforms, other factors external to Medellín’s political settlement played 
an important role in shaping elite interests and power constellations. Besides the discussed 
impacts of external factors, such as the increased influence of other regional business elites, 
the apertura reforms themselves play a crucial role as “exogenous” factors influencing 
Medellín’s political settlement. Trade and financial liberalization and changes to the loaning 
structure of national development finance (see below) substantially affected the dynamic of 
the national political settlement in Colombia. Landed business elites and conglomerates with 
assets in tertiary sectors became the primary ally of governance agencies and state 
bureaucrats.  
These changes greatly influenced elite interests in Medellín’s political settlement. Thus, 
changes within Medellín’s local political settlement can not only be explained by looking at the 
the balances of power of competing elite faction within a local political settlement as drivers 
for developmental change, but also at external factors. National policy switches through the 
apertura reforms contributed to the changing elite interests, organizational capacities, and 
power balances at the city level. In our specific case, Rodrik’s (2014) theoretical arguments 
regarding elite interests and ideas as drivers of political and economic results are fitting and 
add additional value to the standard political settlement considerations.  
In sum, and particularly in a politically decentralized and economically liberalized context 
where a) state capabilities are limited and political power structures fragmented, b) regional 
capitalist elites with low technological capabilities have strengthened their economic powers 
benefitting from deregulation and privatization reforms, and c) the local economy has 
returned to static comparative advantages in low productivity sectors, formal and informal 
efforts to create and enforce institutions are less likely to achieve positive productivity growth 
outcomes. While section 6.3 engages in a political economy discussion on what this ‘new 
urban neoliberalism’ means in terms of policy, institutions, and development, we can 
summarize that Colombian cities have transformed to become spaces of economic and 
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institutional restructuring to facilitate market-enhancing growth in accordance with the 
country’s return to static comparative advantages in low productivity and low technology 
sectors. This has substantially changed the rules of the game and radically affected elite 
bargains. The next section discusses the development of the elite structure in Medellín’s 
decentralized and neoliberalized political settlement and their compatibility with a particular 
set of institutional strategies.  
 
6.2 THE CHANGING STRUCTURES OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS IN MEDELLÍN: MAPPING SHIFTS IN POWER, 
ELITE INTERESTS, AND INSTITUTIONAL STRATEGIES  
The main variable of the political settlements approach that helps to understand institutional 
effectiveness and resulting developmental outcomes is the distribution of power in a particular 
society. In the context of Colombia’s liberalized economy and decentralized polity, we need to 
reassess the changes in power structure of Medellín’s political settlement. The mechanisms of 
rent creation, which had secured the holding and organizational powers of the industrial elite 
and facilitated institutional strategies for Medellín’s industrialization, had disappeared. The 
initial responses to these changes with regard to elite structures, and the division between the 
capitalist faction of the GEA and the political clase emergente, have already been discussed in 
the preceding chapter.  
This section is concerned with the evolvement of this fragmentation in the changed neoliberal 
decentralized context. It will analyse formal and informal institutional mechanisms adopted by 
both elite factions to gain organizational powers and to secure access to rent management 
mechanisms. We discuss the distributional functions of these institutions for maintaining or 
reshaping the distribution of power, as well as their efficiency impacts.  
The first part of the section analyses the restructuring of the GEA with a particular focus on the 
transnationalization of their assets. We discuss how the transnationalization of Medellín’s 
capitalists implied a shift in elite interests. Drawing on several interviews with GEA executives, 
we show how the GEA accepted and promoted Colombia’s return to comparative advantages 
at the low productivity end of the value chain by focusing on the development of 
entrepreneurial capabilities in low technological sectors. The section also analyses how the 
transnationalization of Medellín’s capitalist elite helped this elite faction to regain hegemonic 
power in the city’s decentralized and neoliberalized environment.  
The second part of the section analyses the role of Medellín’s public utility provider EPM and 
its rent management capacities in the changed institutional setting. The section argues that 
while EPM was a formal mechanism which could stabilize the elite bargain in Medellín until the 
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late 1990s, it was also the main reason for renewed tensions between elite factions. The 
section concludes with the analysis of how the rise of particular actors within the political 
elites had severe repercussions on the capitalist elites’ access to sources and instruments of 
rent creation.  
6.2.1 THE TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF THE GEA 
The pressures to integrate Medellín into global capitalist markets did not only impact the 
discretionary control of the state, but also affected accumulation strategies and 
entrepreneurial and technological capabilities of the regional capitalist elite. While the 
creation of the GEA had already implied a shift of elite interests to services and sectors marked 
by low productivity and low wages, this was a largely defensive strategy to secure the 
traditional elites’ economic power that was threatened by Bogotá’s elite as well as the rising 
emergentes. However, with the apertura reforms and the gradual disappearance of industrial 
state-created rents, the GEA used the neoliberal turn of Colombia to deepen capital 
concentration in its core sectors of finance, services, construction, and food processing. Hence, 
and in spite of the economic downturn of the late 1990s, the maturity of the domestic markets 
in some of the GEA’s key sectors and the limitation of returns to investments through the high 
price elasticity in income and demand for some of the GEA’s products, the grupo was able to 
benefit largely from liberalization reforms (see Fernández Riva, 1995; Rettberg, 2001a).  
The scaling back of horizontal diversification, a focus on financial concentration in services, 
finance, and construction, and an orientation towards international markets were important 
strategies for the GEA to face the challenges of economic and financial liberalization and to 
gain global competitiveness in their core sectors. In interviews with several CEOs of GEA 
companies, it was repeatedly stressed that in order to be competitive in the global markets the 
GEA needed to concentrate on economic activities in sectors where Medellín has comparative 
advantages over other cities with similar factor endowments. A leading figure of the GEA 
confirmed that “with the apertura all of the companies started to have different problems… 
than in the closed economy of the 1970s. Foreign investors were interested in the GEA… so we 
needed to specialize to be more efficient and resilient… The grupo understood that the world 
had changed and that it needed to concentrate on three businesses, which were Sura in 
insurance and banking… Nutresa for food processing and for cement it was Argos” (Sierra, 
2014). As another business leader of the GEA confirmed, “in a globalized economy, for a grupo 
like ours, diversification means dispersion… This is why we have chosen to reduce the number 
of sectors in which we operate… We want to disinvest in textiles, steel, reforestation, wood” 
(cited Betancur et al., 2001, p. 140). David Emilio Bojanini, CEO of Sura also emphasized that 
the grupo in the liberalized context “needed to focus and disinvest in traditional businesses to 
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be able to invest in finance, cement, and light manufacturing because we knew we had to go 
out and compete not only in Colombia but also outside” (Bojanini, 2014). In particular, the 
grupo concentrated on financial activities, as they “do not require high levels of capital 
investment but generate capital gains” (Sierra, 2014).  
Figure 6.1 shows well how this strategy of disinvestment and financial concentration in the 
core businesses changed the organizational structure of the GEA compared to its original 
format organization (see figure 5.3). The core companies Argos, Nutresa and Sura thus have 
most representatives in other strategic GEA businesses. The weight of financial intermediation 
in the form of banking and insurance through Sura’s subsidiaries Bancolombia and Confisura is 
particularly noteworthy. The cross-shareholding structure has remained, which secures the 
continuation of distribution of rents and benefits through intra-organizational synergies. This 
has reduced transaction costs, as it vertically and horizontally integrated firms in key sectors of 
Medellín’s economy, making the realization of input spillovers more likely through potential 
cooperation in research and development strategies. Through this new organizational 
structure, the GEA has furthermore gained control over larger parts of the supply chain, 
stabilizing demand for the grupo’s key goods and services. Additionally, the maturity of capital 
assets held by the GEA firms (particularly in relation to other Colombian conglomerates) made 
the grupo sufficiently resilient against potential threats of hostile takeover following increased 
competition in a liberalized market.  
 
FIGURE 6.1: BOARDS OF DIRECTORS OF THE GEA, 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: FRANCO RESTREPO (2005), OWN ELABORATION  
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Concentration on these three main businesses after the liberalization reforms did not only 
involve disinvestment and financial deepening strategies, but implied an outward orientation 
towards other Latin American markets. The CEO of Argos confirmed this to the author, stating 
that “we had to diversify geographically and each company should concentrate on a single 
sector… With this strategy we gained increased capacity to indebt our companies and to go out 
and look for opportunities outside of Colombia” (Vélez, 2014). This increased capacity to raise 
external funding stems from a change in the organization of the GEA in Colombia’s financially 
liberalized economy. Holding companies12 were formed in order to secure access to new 
financial resources through increased participation in international credit markets. The 
integration of the GEA into global financial markets through these holding companies 
increased its capacity to debt finance, and shows the GEA’s transformation strategy from 
domestic and industrial capital to a transnational group with major assets in finance and 
services.  
In interviews with the CEOs of the GEA, this ‘reinvention’ was stressed repeatedly. The CEO of 
Argos “believe(s) that Medellín does not have its vocation in big industry, but rather in light 
industries and services” (Vélez, 2014). A leader of ProAntioquia confirmed that, “Medellín and 
Antioquia are in a process of transformation that is led by global dynamics. And the big 
companies (of Medellín) are in the process of reformation towards services…to search for 
comparative advantages… We have always defended the fact that globalization, the search for 
comparative advantages, has implied the reinvention of companies” (Tobón, 2014). The 
former head of the GEA, Ricardo Sierra stated that Sura, Argos and Nutresa play a central role 
in Medellín’s economic reinvention in a globalized market: “The three companies redefine 
their businesses within (the context of) globalization; and with globalization they needed to 
become Multilatinas” (Sierra, 2014). The transition towards this transnational capitalist elite is 
noticeable in the increased amount of foreign investors in core GEA sectors, particularly in 
finance and low-cost services. However, the GEA has also integrated its holdings and 
                                                          
12 For example, the largest GEA holding company Suramericana de Inversiones S.A emerged from the 
split of Suramericana de Seguros S.A. The company was also founded in order to have full control over 
the construction investor Compañía Suramericana de Construcciones S.A., the insurance and investment 
company Administradora Suramericana de Inversiones S.A., the insurer Servicio de Reparación Integral 
Automotriz Ltda, the investment and capitalization firms Compañía Suramericana de Capitalización S.A., 
Suleasing Panamá S.A., Corporación Financiera Nacional and Suramericana S.A., Suleasing, the pension 
funds Administradora de Fondos de Pensiones and Cesantías Protección S.A, the insurers Compañía de 
Investigaciones Económicas Prospección S.A., Compañía Suramericana de Seguros de Vida S.A., inter alia. 
Nutresa and Argos followed similar financialization strategies of their asset portfolios.  
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operations into the dynamics of global capitalism. All companies have subsidiaries in several 
Latin American countries and beyond13. 
Thus, unlike in the ISI phase of relatively closed domestic markets, the GEA currently has less 
interest in developing the productive domestic market than in engaging in activities that 
promote the advancement of the financialized global capitalist system in which they 
participate. Globalized financial circuits have dictated the strategy of the GEA since the 
apertura reforms, making activities linked to sectors such as finance, real estate, and 
construction the primary sources of profit. As the head of the GEA proudly declared in the 
interview: “Today, Bancolombia is the number one bank in Colombia, the Sura is the number 
one in insurance and asset management of pension in all of Latin America, Argos is the number 
one producer of cement in Colombia and number two in Latin America, Nutresa is the number 
one in Colombia when it comes to food processing” (Bojanini, 2014). 
In an interview with the author, Gabriel Piraquive, director of economic research at the 
Departamento Nacional de Planeación (National Planning Department, DNP) sums up this 
trend rather well: “the traditional Antioquian economic elite changed from an industrial class 
to a financial capitalist elite… with interests in the insurance sector and finances… to engage in 
global capital accumulation” (Piraquive, 2014). Thus, liberalization of trade and finance was the 
underpinning for this elite faction to expand their stock capital. This made Medellín’s capitalist 
elite more resilient after the apertura reforms, and differentiates it at least to some extent 
from other top business groups in Latin America (see Ross Schneider and Doner, 2010). 
These changes in elite interest had important implications for firm-level entrepreneurial and 
technological capabilities. Hence, with capital concentration in low technology services and 
speculative sectors, GEA companies are focusing on creating competitive advantages in sectors 
that are marked by low productivity and low-skilled labour. The shift to sectors that have low 
returns to scale is likely to result in an unwillingness of private investors to invest in efforts in 
tacit learning of technologically advanced activities. Furthermore, entrepreneurs are 
discouraged to dedicate time and financial resources to the discovering of new comparative 
advantages in medium or high productivity sectors. 
While we can conclude that the GEA was, for the most part, able to benefit from integrating its 
activities into transnational financial markets, the remainder of this chapter and chapter seven 
                                                          
13 Besides Colombia, Sura operates in Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Panama, The Dominican Republic 
and El Salvador; Nutresa has international subsidiaries in Chile, Mexico, Nicaragua, Venezuela, 
Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru, Costa Rica, Panama, El Salvador, Malaysia and the United States. Outside of 
Colombia Argos owns cement factories or has market participation in Panama, Haiti, Honduras, The 
Dominican Republic and the United States (Vélez, 2014). 
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discuss the impact of these processes for Medellín’s ability to achieve sustainable levels of 
economic and political viability. 
6.2.2 INSTITUTIONAL STRATEGIES AND THE ROLE OF EPM  
After the apertura reforms and during the political aftermath of decentralization, the elite 
factions of Medellín were on a way towards achieving a stable elite bargain. While the killing of 
Pablo Escobar in 1993 and the paramilitarization of governance structures played an important 
role in this process, other formal and informal institutional mechanisms of rent management 
also helped in (re-)establishing a stable relationship between the political clase emergente and 
the capitalist elites of the GEA (see Franco Restrepo, 2005, p. 285). This put the local political 
settlement temporarily back onto a stable growth-stability trade-off curve. However, and due 
to Colombia’s economic crisis of 1998/99 and the discussed transnationalization of the 
capitalist elite, the rift between the factions became more noticeable by the turn of the 
millennium, as economic stagnation and political instability began to affect Medellín’s 
settlement once again. 
In the preceding chapter we identified the clase emergente as a non-traditional elite that 
obtained much of its income from drug trafficking, real estate development, and landed 
activities, which made them powerful political and economic agents (see Ambos, 1994, p. 30). 
Through financing political campaigns and paramilitary activities to fend-off insurgency 
movements, these “cocaine capitalists” increased their political strength in the 1980s and 
1990s (Meschkat et al., 1983; Schulte-Bockholt, 2006). Many senators, governors and mayors 
that held office in that time have been directly linked with narco capitalists (see Semana, 1994, 
1989). After the killing of Pablo Escobar, paramilitarization of governance structures through 
the PEPES and subsequently through the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (The United Self-
Defence Forces of Colombia, AUC) became an important informal mafia-like institution keeping 
the settlement relatively stable. While both elite factions continue to have ties with 
paramilitary groups (see Durán Núñez and Molano Jimeno, 2015 for the case of Argos), it was 
mainly the second generation of political leaders from the clase emergente that formalized the 
privatization of security (Schulte-Bockholt, 2006). 
In order to understand Medellín’s return to a relative stable and sustainable growth-stability 
trade-off during the 1990s, we need to analyse other institutional mechanisms in the city’s 
decentralized and liberalized settlement. As discussed before, under the ISI model Medellín’s 
leading economic companies depended heavily on state-created rents through subsidized 
credits, contracts, and regulations. During the ISI process Medellín’s industrial elite had 
depended on tangible and intangible state resources and had great incentives to form a close 
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relationship with government and to capture the state apparatus. With market reforms and 
the fragmentation of elite interests this dependence did not disappear, but changed.  
Schamis (2002, 1999) as well as Rettberg (2001b) find that Colombia’s transition towards 
neoliberalism did not entail the immediate disappearance of state-created elite-accessed rent 
mechanisms. Even though the elimination of import licences and the independence of the 
central bank limited access to rents (see Revéiz, 1997), the entire conglomerate and 
particularly GEA’s financial institutions Bancolombia, Conavi and Confisura, continued to 
receive financial subsidies from IFInd14 (Rettberg, 2001b). These national policy changes to the 
loan structure of development finance again demonstrate that within the context of a 
decentralized political settlement discussion, we need to include the analysis of external 
factors influencing local level political settlement dynamics. The partial privatization and the 
decreased possibility for elite factions to access state-created rent substantially impacted 
economic interests, the organizational capacities, as well as the political understanding of the 
business elite in Medellín.  
The interdependencies between the rolled-back (local) state and the GEA created a 
relationship of mutual constraints. The GEA benefited from guaranteed access to state-created 
rents, such as the privatization of public assets and contracts. The local as well as the national 
governments, in turn, depended on the accumulated experiences of the GEA and their 
“superior endowments of managerial and capital resources… (The grupo) became the state's 
natural partner in the privatization process, consolidating the state's role as a source of 
contracts and licenses” (Rettberg, 2001b, p. 56). Schamis (1999, p. 238) concludes, that this 
compromise between the elite factions helped to secure that "the influence of winners and 
their capacity for collective action… set off that of the losers”. 
The decentralization, deregulation and partial privatization of social service provision through 
Law 100 of 1993 is only one example of how the GEA was guaranteed advantages. Following 
this law, the GEA entered the sector of social security with the creation of insurance and social 
security companies Susalud, Suratep, and Protección as part of the increased presence of 
private capital in that sector. The introduction of Law 50 of 1990 that flexibilized local-level 
labour market regimes led to a decrease in the cost of labour, thereby facilitating capital 
accumulation for the GEA through cheap wage activities. Furthermore, the local state shifted 
coordinating and controlling capacities to decentralized private actors of the GEA. So-called 
                                                          
14 As discussed in chapter five, the IFInd was a financial institution to promote Colombia’s ISI process 
(see Garay, 1998). Despite that IFInd divested public equity holdings and was privatized following a 
US$ 450 million World Bank “divestiture privatization program” between 1992 and 1997, it continued to 
provide credit as a market-oriented financial intermediary until the early 2000s (World Bank, 2016). 
160 
 
family compensation funds that provide small credits and micro-subsidies, but also health, 
education, and recreation services were privatized and are now controlled by the GEA affiliates 
COMFAMA and COMFENALCO. 
Decentralization, deregulation and privatization reforms hence created new sources of rent for 
both elite factions. On the one hand, the clase emergente could extract rents and distribute 
political patronage through decentralized tax-collection capacities and through budgetary 
transfers from the national level. On the other hand, the GEA was the natural partner of 
central and local governments in efforts to privatize public assets and deregulate state control 
over production (for example through the creation of zonas francas east of Medellín).  
Medellín’s public utility provider EPM was another important player that could stabilize the 
settlement politically and advance it economically in the context of the changed environment 
of elite rent management following liberalization and decentralization reforms. With Luis 
Alfredo Ramos (1992-94), Sergio Gabriel Naranjo Pérez (1994-96) and Luis Pérez Gutiérrez 
(2000-2003) as Mayors and Álvaro Uribe Vélez (1995-97) and Alberto Builes Ortega (1998-
2000) as Governors, the emergentes gained considerable organizational power during the 
1990s. Initially, after the neoliberal shift of Colombia’s economy there were disputes between 
the emergentes and the capitalists of the GEA over the role of public services. The different 
elite factions debated whether rents generated by EPM “were to be understood, operated, 
and owned publically or privately” (López, 2003, p. 53).  
Following Law 142 of 1994 EPM became a for-profit organization to increase budgetary 
transfers to Medellín’s political leadership under the Mayor Alfredo Ramos. Subsequently, Law 
489 of 1998 converted EPM from an Empresa de Servicios Públicos (Public Utilities Company, 
ESP) to an Empresa Industrial y Comercial del Estado (Public Industrial and Commercial 
Company, EICE), which entailed a definite rupture of EPM’s role as a public utility provider. 
While ownership of the company remains fully public, EPM is now governed by private as 
opposed to public law (known as privatismo organizacional, see Varela Barrios, 2011, 2010 for 
a detailed discussion). This duality can be seen as a compromise between the contesting elite 
factions. On the one hand, the GEA could push through a continuation of EPM’s role as a for-
profit public entity, while the political power of the emergentes, on the other hand, secured 
increased representation on EPM’s governing board (Botero and Villegas, 2005; López, 2005). 
Hence, the dual public-private character of EPM enhanced its role as an institutional 
mechanism for maintaining a relatively stable elite bargain throughout the 1990s. EPM 
continued to transfer 30% of its dividends to the municipal budget, making the company an 
important mechanism for additional rent creation. The capacity of the local, state-controlled 
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EPM to access the international credit market and debt finance its operations furthermore 
provided opportunities for public administrations to circumvent constitutional limitations on 
debt finance for municipalities (see Cabrera and Naranjo, 2003). This control of the local state 
and thus EPM through the political class of the emergentes provided large benefits for that 
elite faction.  
While the access to state-created rents through EPM had always been attractive for local elite 
factions, the control of EPM became increasingly attractive following dramatic increases of the 
company’s budget subsequent to the discussed reform changes. Furthermore, and particularly 
with the increased profits, EPM became an important source of state contracting for 
infrastructural projects. These institutional capacities have made EPM a central mechanism for 
rent creation and distribution, particularly due to EPM’s function as a channel to obtain debt 
financing. Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show how the increase in internal and external debt of EPM in 
the 1990s corresponded to a drastic increase in transfers to the public budget. 
FIGURE 6.2: TRANSFERS FROM EPM TO THE MUNICIPAL BUDGET IN CURRENT COP 
 
SOURCES: BONILLA ET AL. (2013); BONILLA AND AMADO (2013); CARRANZA AND BONILLA (2013) 
 
FIGURE 6.3: ACCUMULATED DEBT OF EPM IN CURRENT COP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCES: BONILLA ET AL. (2013); BONILLA AND AMADO (2013); CARRANZA AND BONILLA (2013) 
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The capacity of EPM to create large amounts of additional rents has made the public utility 
company an important asset for the local state. According to Dover and Ocampo (2006, p. 286) 
EPM has become increasingly “politically attractive, due to its symbolic capital… as well as due 
to its transferred financial resources to the Mayor’s office”. However, securing access to EPM’s 
increased profits started to become a source of new tensions between the elite factions. After 
the election of Mayor Luis Pérez Gutiérrez in 2000 (another important representative of the 
emergentes) and coinciding with a national economic crisis resulting in a decrease of centrally 
allocated rents, the political settlement of Medellín was yet again at the brink of collapse with 
Pérez Gutiérrez fundamentally challenging the leading position of the GEA and the overall 
configuration of power in Medellín. Self-declared as “the real representative of the people” 
who was against the “exclusionary tradition of the economic elites”, Pérez Gutiérrez adopted a 
confrontational discourse that departed from the implicit guarantees which originally secured 
a stable compromise between the transnational capitalists of GEA and the city’s political elites 
(see Dover and Ocampo, 2006, pp. 268–270). 
In his first year in office Mayor Pérez Gutiérrez also changed the legal and fiscal structure of 
EPM. It became a conglomerate with investments and projects in a variety of sectors beyond 
the core utilities of water, electricity and gas. The Mayor saw EPM as the “Grupo Económico 
del Municipio de Medellín”, acting as a counterweight to the GEA. According to Pérez 
Gutiérrez, “EPM and the municipality of Medellín are the entities that arguably control more 
business in Colombia… (making) the Grupo Ecónomico [del Municipio] de Medellín (known as 
EPM) the largest grupo in Colombia… The GEA is pennyworth compared to the Grupo 
Medellín… and this is what makes it attractive for the people of the GEA who want to take over 
EPM” (Pérez Gutiérrez cited in Dover and Ocampo, 2006, p. 267). At the same time the 
administration of Pérez Gutiérrez created the Fundación EPM that provides several social 
services and gives scholarships to students from economically marginalized neighbourhoods.  
The Pérez Gutiérrez administration also used public funds to create the Banco de los Pobres 
(Bank of the Poor), a public microfinance institution that provided public loans at cheap rates 
for the poor. Another policy causing conflict between the different elite factions was Pérez 
Gutiérrez’ introduction of so-called tarifas justas, fair tariff that aimed to freeze energy and 
water prices (Pérez Gutiérrez, 2003). These radical shifts in the management of EPM were 
viewed with suspicion by the capitalist elites, who claimed that Pérez Gutiérrez’ was corrupt 
and his policy reforms stemmed from populist interests to distribute resources to his 
electorate. The economic elites of the GEA saw this socialization and politicization of EPM and 
the increased presence of the public service provider in GEA-controlled sectors as a frontal 
attack on their interests. Relationships between the GEA and Pérez Gutiérrez remain sour to 
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this day, demonstrated by Ricardo Sierra’s (the longstanding CEO of the GEA) view on this: “I 
hate Luis Pérez, because we know that he is a rat and that he is a thief” (Sierra, 2014).  
The GEA-owned media outlets soon accused Pérez Gutiérrez of “diversion of public funds” to 
secure electoral support (Dinero, 2003). The local capitalist elite faction broadened their 
strategies of de-legitimization of the administration, which Pérez Gutiérrez in turn regarded as 
an attack on the political sovereignty of his government: “…they used their international 
connections to say that all international credits will be cancelled; in Washington they debated 
with me… and I started to speak, very content, with the illusions of changing this society. The 
(electricity) rates had been increasing by over 38% annually and I wanted to lower them in line 
with inflation and introduce tarifas justas. As I say this… they accused me that I was going to 
bankrupt EPM, and that they would close down international loans” (Pérez Gutiérrez cited in 
Dover and Ocampo, 2006, p. 280). The downgrading of EPM’s creditworthiness by the New 
York-based rating agency and corporate finance advisor Duff & Phelps is evidence of the 
influence and pressure of the transnationalized capitalist factions on Pérez Gutiérrez (Dinero, 
2003). As the rhetoric and tactics between different elite factions over EPM turned into open 
battles, President Álvaro Uribe Vélez (who had been a core mediator between the economic 
and political elite interests during his time as Senator, Mayor, and Governor) had to intervene 
to try and resolve the situation by mediating between the conflicting parties (El Tiempo, 2003; 
Franco Restrepo, 2005). 
Dover and Ocampo (2006, p. 268) conclude that the inter-elite disputes over EPM that caused 
political fragility are “consequences from the way Pérez Gutiérrez rejected the economic 
leadership of the city and favoured the political management of the company”. The 
marginalization of the GEA in the ruling coalition and the exclusion from access to locally 
created rents destabilized the polity that had been marked throughout the 1990s by an 
“organic relation” between economic and political powers (see Franco Restrepo, 2005, p. 29). 
Based on interviews with members of the political and the economic elites, Betancur et al. 
(2001) confirm this divide between the two elite factions after the turn of the millennium. 
Thus, despite the GEA representatives stressing that “we need to work together to help each 
other”, the interviews the authors conducted with GEA leaders show growing gaps between 
the factions. One CEO of a GEA company mentions that “the political class is considered as 
corrupt” and “the economic class is more representative of the region”. The economic elite 
saw itself to be “on a different side”, as it supposedly “integrates more social sectors of 
society” than the political elite (Betancur et al., 2001, p. 236)  
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This idea that the political elite was inherently corrupt and an obstacle to development is not 
only central in considerations regarding the divide between different powerful elite factions 
and the destabilization of the political settlement in Medellín. It also served as theoretical 
advocacy for neoliberal governance policies more generally. Furthermore, the rhetoric used by 
the GEA representative shows that, in Medellín’s context of political decentralization and 
economic liberalization, the transnational capitalist elite was mobilizing to more actively take 
control over organizational and distributional powers in the urban political settlement. Much 
of this ‘corruption discourse’ is hence also reflected in proposals of an alternative 
decentralized ‘good governance’ model, which will be discussed in the next section. 
While the GEA had been rather passive and less visible in politics and public affairs during 
much of the 1990s, this changed at the end of the decade with the resurging dispute between 
the elite factions. Betancur et al. (2001) find that the GEA showed aspirations to permanently 
occupy public positions. Such aspirations to direct political influence had not previously been 
part of the GEA’s strategy, which separated the grupo from most other economic 
conglomerates in the rest of the country that had been active in taking on a more direct 
political role since the implementation of the 1991 Constitution (Rettberg, 2001b). Betancur et 
al. (2001, p. 151) rightly conclude that the shift in the GEA’s strategy, “could be hinting at an 
interest of the grupo for more direct involvement in policy decisions in the region”. The next 
section discusses how the GEA developed capacities of direct political involvement and shows 
that Betancur et al.’s (2001) analysis of the situation at the turn of the millennium was borne 
out in subsequent years.  
 
6.3 THE GEA AND THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AFTER 2003: TOWARDS THE ‘MEDELLÍN MODEL OF 
GOOD GOVERNANCE’ 
As discussed, the descendants of the historically dominant elite factions, now represented by 
the transnationalized capitalist elite of the GEA, were increasingly being excluded from the 
political realm of organizational and political influence. Consequently, and confronted with 
these changing power structures in a political settlement that was marked by high competition 
between different elites, low economic growth, and political instability, the GEA became 
increasingly interested in establishing a more direct influence in the political sphere. The 
transnational capitalist elite, according to GEA affiliate Sergio Fajardo hence “realized that 
politicians are the ones who make important decisions in society whether we like it or not, so 
we said to ourselves that we have to get into politics. Instead of saying how things should be, 
we said this is the way it is done” (Fajardo cited in Fukuyama and Colby, 2011).  
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In contrast to much of the “miracle” literature that attributes Medellín’s “turnaround” to 
Sergio Fajardo and his unconventional style of politics (see Fajardo and Andrews, 2014; Martin, 
2012), this section argues that these recent developments are not a miraculous change but 
rather a logical consequence of an evolving interdependency between the distribution of 
power in Medellín and the (formal and informal) institutional mechanisms that sustain or 
challenge these structures. We analyse the rise of Fajardo as part of larger long-term changes 
linked to Colombia’s neoliberalization, and the implementation of Medellín’s ‘good 
governance’ agenda as an institutional framework that sustains and advances a neoliberal 
model and favours market-driven development and private capital accumulation. 
Central to our analysis is the resurging conflict between the different elite factions and the 
impact of the transnationalization of the GEA on Medellín’s elite bargain, on power 
configurations in the city, and consequently on the effectiveness of institutional and 
governance structures in achieving inclusive and sustainable developments. We analyse how 
the transnational capitalist faction of Medellín’s elite created new institutional bases from 
which they developed capacities as political actors. In this context the section also analyses 
how Medellín’s ‘good governance’ policy agenda favoured a shift of subsidies away from 
actors that engage in domestic production towards transnational capital and services. This 
shift did not occur without distributional conflicts between domestically oriented emergentes 
and the GEA that subscribes to global capital accumulation. We also return to discuss EPM, 
particularly its role for the transnationalization of state-led rent management.  
6.3.1 THE GEA AS POLITICAL ACTOR TO PROMOTE A TRANSNATIONAL AGENDA  
As mentioned above, the transnationalization strategy of the capitalist elite was evident in 
their efforts to concentrate resources in service sector activities, and in the territorial 
expansions of GEA firms. One of GEA’s CEOs confirmed, “globalization requires offensive and 
aggressive attitudes as one must influence the new rules of the game” (Betancur et al., 2001, 
p. 210). In the context of changing bargaining power and increased divisions between powerful 
elite factions these attitudes did not only translate into a transnationalization of the GEA but 
also resulted in the development of capacities as political actors. Similar to other Latin 
American grupos or large industrial enterprises, the GEA received beneficial treatment during 
privatization of state-owned enterprises in various sectors (see Baer, 1994; Baer and Maloney, 
1997; Peres, 1998). However, during the course of the 1990s these nationally created rents 
dried up. With the Colombian financial and economic crisis of 1998/99, centrally created and 
allocated rents further diminished, making the public utility provider EPM the primary source 
of state-created rents and benefits for the regional elite factions. As Pérez Gutiérrez excluded 
the GEA from access to these rents, the need to develop political capacities and to (re-)gain 
166 
 
control over EPM’s rents became a matter of even greater urgency for the grupo (see Dover 
and Ocampo, 2006, p. 256).  
The Medellín Chamber of Commerce has been an important arena for the GEA’s development 
of political capacities in the liberalized economy vis-à-vis the local political elites. Throughout 
the 1990s the GEA used the Chamber as an indirect forum of influence to express concerns 
about the need for policies to facilitate Medellín’s insertion into global value and production 
chains. The Chamber’s 1995 Reporte Monitor: La ventaja competitiva de Antioquia hacia el 
siglo XXI (Monitor Report: The competitive advantage of Antioquia towards the 21st century) 
was crucial for the capitalist elite’s advocacy of a transnational and neoliberal market policy for 
Medellín (Cámara de Comercio, 1995). The report proposed “strategies such as the change of 
the productive profile of the region from its traditional industrial setting towards promoting 
financial, touristic, and medical services” (Betancur et al., 2001, p. 138). The Chamber thus 
served as an organizational form of public engagement by the GEA that echoed the grupo’s 
economic interests of developing a service-based economy.  
In its 1999 report entitled Plan Estratégico de Medellín y el Área Metropolitana 2015 (Strategic 
Plan of Medellín and the Metropolitan Area 2015) the Chamber advocated further local 
economic reforms and promoted the development of sectors that were seen as most likely to 
compete globally with other similarly endowed cities. Furthermore, the 1999 report stressed 
that in order to implement these reforms a new form of politics was required that departed 
from the clase emergente and its “political-clientelist” way of governance (Cámara de 
Comercio, 1999). Hence, similar to the GEA representative quoted above, this second report 
saw the need for a much more offensive strategy that proposed local political change and 
more proactive strategies to address the “globalization” of Medellín’s economy. The report 
can be interpreted as part of the GEA’s institutional strategy for reclaiming organizational 
power and control. This more direct form of attaining political influence is unsurprising, given 
the discussed conflict over EPM, and the intensifying Colombian economic crisis of 1998/99 
(Franco Restrepo, 2005).  
The GEA’s strategy also included organizational mechanisms that aimed at further 
delegitimizing Luis Pérez Gutiérrez and to create informal institutional networks of controlling 
the Mayor’s management of EPM. The so-called Comité Cívico de Seguimiento de EPM (The 
Civil Committee of Monitoring EPM, henceforth Comité), a parallel governing board of EPM is 
particularly noteworthy in this regard. The Comité was created and controlled by the GEA 
“with the end to guarantee the continuity of institutional policies and particularly to measure 
the now absolute power of the Mayor” (El Colombiano, 2003). One of the main rationales 
behind the creation of the Comité was to ensure EPM’s profit-driven character and a close 
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surveillance of how EPM’s state-created rents were allocated. The failure of Pérez Gutiérrez to 
use EPM to generate further transnationalization of Medellín’s economy through an 
international expansion of EPM (particularly to Ecuador and Panama) was only one source of 
tensions (see Dinero, 2003). Besides criticizing Pérez Gutiérrez for neglecting the 
internationalization of EPM’s assets, and thus of Medellín’s economy, the Comité focused on 
monitoring operational and investment decisions by EPM’s board of directors. Despite 
information asymmetries and the limited enforcement capabilities of the Comité as an 
informal institution, it exercised considerable influence over the public discourse and opinion 
on EPM’s development, especially through the GEA-controlled media. 
EPM’s decision to invest in the domestic telecommunication sector was a particularly 
contentious issue between the Comité and Pérez Gutiérrez, as it was seen as a threat to 
private capital accumulation through transnational capitalist operations in that very same 
sector. The entire editorial board of Medellín’s largest newspaper, the GEA-owned El 
Colombiano, published an opinion piece in which it warned that EPM would be susceptible to 
polarization by acquiring assets in telecommunication. It warned that the Mayor would have 
too much executive power and an even larger public budget, which would have adverse effects 
on private sector activity (Comité Cívico, 2009). Furthermore, and as mentioned in a 
contribution to the newspaper El Tiempo by Diario Valencia Restrepo, a former member of the 
Comité: “The creation of a telecommunication company under the umbrella of EPM… (entails) 
high risks that could adversely affect the assets in the two traditional service sectors, water 
and energy” (Valencia Restrepo, 2005). The adversity to a publically controlled 
telecommunication sector was reflected in what Juan Felipe Gavíria, former GEA executive and 
president of EPM under Fajardo told the author: “In the telecommunication sector the risks 
are much bigger… and public capital is not supposed to be in sectors that have a higher risk 
than the average risk of economic development. Public capital has to be much more 
conservative and… has to stay in the low-risk sectors” (Gaviria, 2014). 
This political understanding is driven by the conviction that a minimally interventionist state 
achieves optimal developmental outcomes. The governance framework advocated by local 
actors in Medellín is thus based on the idea that non-state organizations should have larger 
influence in shaping and influencing local public policy. A key role in this process, both in 
regard to financial as well as ideological support, has been played by the GEA-founded 
business association ProAntioquia that for many replaced ANDI’s functions as a lobbying 
instrument (Betancur et al., 2001). ProAntioquia serves as GEA’s lobbying mechanism that 
maximises the political influence of the Antioquian capitalist elite (see Semana, 2015). As a 
policy advisor working for ProAntioquia told the author, the association’s goal has been to 
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achieve a “greater mobilization and increased public advocacy of the business sector… 
Companies come to ProAntioquia, so that we mobilize, discuss, argue… and move our channels 
of influence (Tobón, 2014).  
While the particularities of this governance model and of the resulting coordination capacities 
will be discussed in the next subsection, we conclude that Pérez Gutiérrez’ attempts to 
restructure the main source of rent creation – the public utility company EPM – resulted in 
increased tensions between different elite factions. The separation of the locally-oriented 
political class of emergentes from the transnationally-focused GEA destabilized the local 
political settlement. Following Colombia’s radical shift to neoliberalism, the transnational 
capitalist faction that had relatively low organizational and rent-management capacities 
throughout much of the 1990s, set up various institutional and organizational mechanisms to 
influence the political agenda. 
The next subsection will analyse how the political interests of the GEA have shaped the 
political settlement of Medellín. We particularly discuss how the governance agenda 
implemented after 2003 reflects and reinforces the wider shift to transnationalization and 
neoliberalization in Medellín. The section discusses the political economy effects of these 
developments on interdependencies between the changing power constellation and 
institutional reforms and their likely implications for developmental outcomes.  
6.3.2 THE ‘MEDELLÍN MODEL OF GOOD GOVERNANCE’ AND THE SHIFTING POLITICAL DISCOURSE AFTER 
2003 
As discussed in chapter two, recent changes in Medellín’s political landscape and its 
governance model have been described as “metropolitan miracle” (see Gutiérrez et al., 2013). 
This section will use the discussion of Medellín’s political settlement to provide an alternative 
explanation of the city’s development since 2003 as well as an analysis of the local governance 
agenda. 
The GEA was determined to influence Medellín’s Mayoral race in 2003 in order to gain more 
direct control over the municipal budget and over the rent management strategies (of EPM). 
While in the 1990s the GEA had tentatively begun to develop political capacities to influence 
municipal political decision making (i.e. with the Plan Estratégico), it was Sergio Fajardo’s 
Compromiso Ciudadano and the GEA’s strong position in this coalition that cemented the 
leading role of Medellín’s transnational capitalist elite in the local political arena. Fajardo, 
former director of ProAntioquia and member of a leading ‘GEA family’ investing in the 
construction sector, had helped this new political movement to emerge amidst the political 
and economic reorganization of the GEA during the years of the Pérez Gutiérrez 
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administration. Sergio Fajardo, an academic and regular contributor to the GEA-owned Dinero 
and El Colombiano, thus embodied a wider change of strategy based on a new political and 
strategic understanding that aimed to increase the GEA’s influence over organizational 
governance capacities.  
Once in power the Fajardo coalition implemented an ambitious reform agenda. In the first 
development plan titled Medellín: Compromiso de Toda la Ciudadanía 2004-2007 (Medellín: 
Commitment of All Citizens 2004-2007) the coalition emphasized the need for a reform of 
public institutions to achieve “transparency and good governance” (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2004, 
p. 41). The plan focused on “fighting corruption and politicking… to achieve confidence… 
through transparency and institutional developments… that attract and congregates 
investments and economic activities (for development)” (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2004, pp. 
15;99). This would also have the effect of reducing violence, bringing Medellín “from fear to 
hope” (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007a, p. 1). The agenda was based on the idea that efficient 
public management needs as little state intervention as possible to avoid any market 
distortions and restrictions on private capital movements (see Ramírez Brouchoud, 2012). In 
interviews with Fajardo’s cabinet members the importance of a ‘good governance’ agenda, led 
by the IFIs, was repeatedly stressed: “The fact that Sergio (Fajardo) and Alonso (Salazar) 
implemented ‘good governance’ reforms using the World Bank’s Results Based Monitoring and 
Evaluation System as a tool to draft and implement the Development Plans was a key factor in 
achieving an improved institutionality in Medellín” (Jaramillo, 2014).  
Another key factor that shaped the governance structure of the Fajardo coalition was the large 
presence of GEA actors in the cabinet itself as well as in many public-private partnerships that 
were created during the first months of the Fajardo government. Fajardo’s Private Secretary 
and campaign manager David Escobar Arango mentioned that “the interesting part of our 
‘good governance’ formula is the public-private spirit. We created new public-private 
partnerships organizations and institutions after I took office” (Escobar Arango, 2014). Carlos 
H. Jaramillo, Secretary of Planning confirmed that the increase “of the public-private 
management (of the city) was a very targeted and planned action,… which is now one of the 
main pillars of transformation” (Jaramillo, 2014).  
Hence, much of Medellín’s new institutional framework is dominated by various public-private 
alliances. While such public-private partnerships can be of high importance for productive 
economic transformation (i.e. South Korean chaebols), the success in achieving growth-
enhancing developmental outcomes depends on the wider politico-economic environment, 
including governance capabilities, and the entrepreneurial and technological abilities of the 
capitalist elite.  
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Following the election of Fajardo, the transnational elites gained substantial organizational 
power through the increased presence of public-private partnerships. A prime example of the 
strengthened influence of the GEA in questions of economic governance is the Agencia para la 
Cooperación Internacional de Medellín (Agency for Cooperation and Investment of Medellín, 
ACI). The ACI is a public-private entity, in which the GEA has a large presence, and it serves to 
promote Medellín as an attractive destination for FDI. According to its former director, Juan 
David Valderrama, the ACI acts as official organization “in all public policy areas concerned 
with social and economic issues. We look for international companies that want to cooperate 
with local firms and the Mayor’s Office. Simultaneously, we want to incentivize and motivate 
foreign companies to invest in sectors… that focus on services” (Valderrama, 2014).  
The increased influence of private interests in the management of public policy areas is also 
well reflected in the interviews the author conducted with CEOs of GEA companies. David 
Emilio Bojanini, current head of the GEA and president of its largest company Sura mentioned 
the increased power of the GEA: “the beauty of this created institutionality has been that the 
government has invited the private actors so we can help in the public management. We are in 
governing boards, and we hold patronage in many institutions… But if in the future a Mayor 
will be elected who is against all this, we will put great pressure on him through all the 
institutions that the city has, first so he won’t steal money, and conductus transparent public 
management, and then apply all the regulatory measures we have set up” (Bojanini, 2014). 
José Alberto Vélez, CEO of Argos added: “the boards of directors (of public institutions) are 
very much dominated by the GEA. This makes it possible to keep political partisan clientelism 
out” (Vélez, 2014). The vice-president of GEA’s Bancolombia also stressed that “the GEA can 
act within the margins of the law…and we have been concerned with supporting who we think 
would govern best… for example Fajardo… Between us, I tell you, when there will be a mayor 
who tries to undermine that… we will not let him. Our aim is to guarantee continuity and to 
shield everything against that” (Pérez Moreno, 2014). Pérez Moreno (2014) continued, stating 
that the “creation of public-private alliances and other public institutional penetration from 
the private sector have secured the continuity of our interests regardless who will come to 
power. We will not accept a Mayor that de-links us from our political interests again”. 
The capitalist elites’ almost absolute sense of entitlement to govern is also reflected in what 
the current Mayor of Medellín, Federico Gutiérrez told the author in a conversation prior to his 
victory in the 2015 elections: “I know how things work in this city, and if the GEA is against you 
there is no way you will be elected Mayor” (Gutiérrez Zuluaga, 2014). Thus, by acquiring 
detailed legislative and executive capacities the GEA has great influence on the creation and 
enforcement of institutional mechanisms and a governance framework, which for some 
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observers has resulted in a shift away from direct intervention of government and state power 
towards a ‘good governance’ framework that facilitates market-driven rent management 
(Brand, 2013; Hylton, 2010). An analysis of interview material, alongside other official public 
documentation and policy suggestions, also provides evidence that the particular 
interdependency of power and institutions in Medellín has resulted in a governance model 
that concentrates on the promotion of Medellín’s comparative advantage in low productivity 
service sectors. 
Analysing the second Development Plan of the Fajardo coalition, entitled Medellín ES Solidaria 
y Competetiva 2008-2011 (Medellín IS Solidary and Competitive 2008-2011) shows that the 
policies proposed largely focused on strengthening economic sectors with low technological 
and low productivity capabilities (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2008). Besides further promoting the 
Cultura E and the social urbanism policies discussed in chapter two, the plan established so-
called strategic economic clusters. The cluster strategy is a set of reforms channelling a large 
majority of public economic institutional energy towards the strengthening of Medellín’s 
perceived comparative advantages. The clusters are focused on communication services, 
finance, construction, medical and ontological services, tourism, textile and fashion, and 
energy (EPM). This Medellín Ciudad Cluster programme further perpetuates the low 
productivity character of Medellín’s economy to “achieve a better insertion into global 
dynamics” (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2008, p. 119). This cluster programme focuses on Medellín’s 
“local-level competition with other cities and regions for the deployment of economic 
activities to have the capacity to act in a context of increasing globalization, creating locational 
advantages to increase the business climate” (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2008, p. 82). The emphasis 
on achieving a better “business climate” is thus seen as necessary to “improve the attraction of 
capital” (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2008, p. 85) and to make Medellín “the best corner in the 
Americas”. 
The main rationale behind these policy reforms was thus to focus on low productivity 
“strategic clusters” in which limited direct public intervention will achieve market efficiency 
through the insertion of local capital accumulation into global value chains. Suspicion of the 
state’s role in economic development was highlighted by Jaime Echeverri, long standing 
member of the GEA and head of Medellín’s Chamber of Commerce: “We know that politics are 
politics, and if there is the presence of the private sector… this helps with the efficiency of the 
public entities which are sometimes too much politicized. Private actors understand that 
thinking about long-term strategy, transparency, sustainability and so on are necessary… and 
there was a qualitative change in the period of Sergio Fajardo, where a policy of co-
responsibility opened a much wider space for collaboration between the public and the 
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private” (Echeverri, 2014). Medellín’s ‘good governance’ agenda fully embraces wider 
economic ideas and ideals according to which economic growth is based on the city’s 
comparative advantages in service sectors, finance, and construction. The ‘good governance’ 
strategy is hence a result of the embeddedness of neoliberal ideology into the urban context of 
Medellín. 
Further interviews and the analysis of other official documents provide additional evidence 
supporting the claim that the ‘Medellín Model of Good Governance’ is largely based on the 
promotion of economic growth in service sectors that are marked by low productivity. This 
promotion focuses on what many public officials and former members of the Fajardo 
administration see to be part of the naturally given comparative advantages of the city. Ex-
Mayor, former president of EPM, and long-standing member of the GEA Juan Felipe Gaviria 
highlights that Medellín’s geographical location is a “natural handicap to promote industrial 
growth”, which leaves no alternative to the “promotion of economic development based on 
services that can drive GDP growth” (Gaviria, 2014). Fajardo’s successor as Mayor and his close 
ally Alonso Salazar also stressed that “Medellín is no longer an industrial city and is developing 
as a city of services” (Salazar, 2014). Iván Mauricio Pérez Salazar, who was Fajardo’s Secretary 
of Social Development, and Secretary of Finance in the second cabinet, reaffirms that “services 
are, without a doubt, Medellín’s vocation. We have very strong and competitive service 
sectors, such as retail, hotels, finance, which for me are the drivers of Medellín’s economy” 
(Pérez Salazar, 2014). Secretary of Economic Development, Felipe Hoyos Viera takes Medellín’s 
natural comparative advantage in services to make clear that “the strategy of the Mayor’s 
Office is to internationalize the city, which will not happen through the attraction of industrial 
FDI, but rather through an increased focus on services” (Hoyos Vieira, 2014). Fajardo’s Private 
Secretary and campaign manager highlighted that “for Medellín there is no other way (to 
develop) than through services and this becomes more evident when you look at what is 
happening in other cities; all the industries are concentrating in Bogotá, Cartagena and 
Barranquilla… it is not that we don’t want diversification… but I believe what Ricardo 
Hausmann says is true: ‘Rich countries produce rich-country goods’. It sounds silly, but it is 
true. Here (in Medellín), there will be no exports in steel or cars” (Escobar Arango, 2014).  
This policy focus – to outcompete other similarly endowed cities through the development of 
comparative advantages in services, low wages and low-skilled labour – has driven an 
institutional agenda that aims to promote Medellín’s insertion into the lower end global value 
chains. A manual by the public-private organization ACI, discussed on page 145, clearly 
indicates this: “The minimum wage in Colombia is one of the lowest in Latin America… 
Colombia has one of the most flexible labour regimes in Latin America… A day shift [in 
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Medellín] is long, from 6am to 10pm, and the employer can sign on two shifts without 
overtime pay or night surcharges; in the recruitment and employment of apprentices… the 
employer has no obligation to pay social benefits,… and the amount of compensation for 
unreasonable dismissal is very low (ACI et al., 2006: 65-66 cited in Betancur, 2008, p. 1). In an 
interview the director of the ACI confirmed that “a company arrives in Medellín…and seeks to 
reduce costs… If there is more supply of labour than demand this will lower the price (of 
labour)… Globalization, in which all of us are embedded, makes companies such as Kimberly 
Clark or Hewlett Packard come in search for optimizing their resources…and what we do is 
promote public policies that incentivize and motivate development that makes companies 
come to Medellín… This is why Medellín focuses on services” (Valderrama, 2014).  
A statement by Fajardo’s Secretary of Social Development in an interview with the author also 
reflects this: “To strengthen the service sectors the city was given the task of selling itself 
abroad as a competitive, innovative, affordable city for foreign investment” (Mejía Martínez, 
2014). The Secretary of Economic Development confirmed that “the topic of 
internationalization of the city and to make it attractive for foreign investors’ needs implies 
that we have to be focused on the service sector and especially on the issue of tourism… a 
tourism that is oriented towards business meetings and conventions. This is part of the 
internationalization strategy that seeks to generate economic development through visitors 
that invest in the city and in the end create employment… in commerce, restaurants, hotels, 
transportation, etc.” (Hoyos Vieira, 2014).  
We thus see the implementation of the ‘good governance’ model following Fajardo’s election 
as an institutional mechanism for market-driven development. The GEA, who had failed to 
develop economic capabilities in technologically advanced sectors as they concentrated on 
investments in services following the apertura reforms, gained considerable organizational 
power following the 2003 municipal elections. Medellín’s transnationalizing capitalist elite 
adopted the neoliberal ‘good governance’ discourse as an opportunity to restore and deepen 
hegemonic power in the local settlement. The combination of these political and economic 
factors of Medellín’s political settlement enhanced conditions in which rent-management 
strategies are inherently targeting sectors that are unlikely to be sustainable and inclusive 
growth escalators for the urban economy in the long run. Ineffective coordination of 
investments and insufficient governance capabilities can lead to a failure of efforts to ensure 
the attraction of FDI that can have positive forward and backward linkages for domestic 
medium or high technology sectors and firms. The GEA’s interests in implementing ‘good 
governance’ reforms that further push an economic transnationalization agenda is thus an 
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opportunistic institutional mechanism adopted in a larger neoliberal context of Colombia’s 
polity and economic policy agenda.  
The composition of this settlement can further slow down the creation of institutions for 
disciplining of rent recipients and can make entry for outsiders or newcomers into high-rent 
markets difficult through their low bargaining power vis-à-vis the Fajardo coalition. Capitalists 
with higher entrepreneurial capabilities, who in contrast to older members of the GEA do not 
have established ties with the Fajardo coalition, are deterred by such institutional strategies, 
as their interests are incompatible with the constellation of power. 
As we shall see in the following chapter, Medellín’s political settlement and ‘good governance’ 
agenda have achieved neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the creation of 
institutional mechanisms to achieve productivity growth in medium or high technology 
sectors. This is largely explained by the incompatibilities of such rent management strategies 
with the power configuration of Medellín’s political settlement, in which transnational 
capitalists with low technological capabilities are now dominant. Medellín’s political 
settlement and Fajardo’s ‘good governance’ reforms have thus complemented economic shifts 
in the city that effectively meant an increase in activities in the service sector. The expansion 
of the service sector has been part of a broader characteristic of global capitalism that has 
implied a trend for cities in Latin American countries to expand service-based accumulation 
(see Robinson, 2010, p. 126). The extent to which this strategy has driven the development of 
economic activities in low productivity sectors will be quantitatively analysed in the following 
chapter. Furthermore, the next chapter analyses that while the governance model might have 
had adverse effects on productivity growth it was able to stabilize the polity by gathering the 
dominant elite faction around the shared interests and ideology of neoliberal development. 
 
6.4 CONCLUSIONS  
In the 1990s Colombia went through comprehensive policy changes in the form of 
liberalization, deregulation and privatization reforms that marked the country’s radical shift to 
neoliberalism and its return to static comparative advantages in low productivity sectors. 
While the elite bargain in Medellín was stabilized through formal and informal institutional 
mechanisms during this period, this changed around the turn of the millennium when the 
conflict between the political elite faction and the transnationalizing capitalists resurfaced over 
the management of locally created rents through EPM. Much of the distributive conflict 
between these factions arose out of disagreements about the use of EPM’s rents: while the 
political elite of emergentes, led by Mayor Luis Pérez Gutiérrez, used resources to stimulate 
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local economic and social development, the transnational capitalist elites of the GEA, who 
became more and more excluded from access to locally as well as centrally created rents, 
wanted to use EPM as a tool for economic transnationalization. 
However, economic liberalization, privatization, and deregulation policies had strengthened 
the economic position of the GEA in Medellín. After the GEA gained capacities as the 
transnational faction of Medellín’s capitalist elite and coinciding with this inter-elite dispute 
over public rent management and the role of EPM in promoting developmental outcomes, the 
GEA increasingly developed political capacities. The ‘good governance’ agenda as a blueprint 
model for development resonated well with the GEA’s rejection of a ‘politicized’ interference 
with rent management (of EPM) and the anti-corruption discourse they had developed during 
the Pérez Gutiérrez years.  
With the victory of the Fajardo coalition, in which the GEA had a strong position, the 
administration started to promote ‘good governance’ reforms as drivers for alternative 
development and as counterbalance to the political elites. These governance reforms, 
however, can be seen as an opportunistic agenda to promote Medellín’s static comparative 
advantages in service-based and low-wage economic activities. The transnational capitalist 
elite in the form of the GEA used the acquired discretionary control and organizational power 
to facilitate the insertion of the city into global value chains, a strategy which was highly 
aligned with the interests of the GEA in promoting global capitalist growth, from which this 
transnational capitalist elite generates most of its income. 
In this chapter we argued that in order to understand developmental outcomes it is necessary 
to engage in a political economy analysis of the compatibility of rent management strategies 
with configurations of power balances in Medellín’s political settlements. Applying the political 
economy framework, we found that the specific characteristics of Medellín’s political 
settlement, such as the distribution of power and entrepreneurial and technological 
capabilities of capitalist firms, were hindering or at least slowing down the creation of 
governance capabilities necessary for the implementation of growth-enhancing policies. The 
large organizational powers of the transnational capitalist elite, a less independent local 
bureaucracy, and low technological capabilities of the GEA companies, are likely to result in 
insufficient allocation of rents to sectors that may serve as productivity growth escalators. The 
lack of coordination of investment and the failure to attract technologically advanced FDI is 
likely to result in further growth of low productivity activities. This is reinforced by the ‘good 
governance’ model and the structure of the ruling coalition, in which the GEA has a dominant 
position. This political settlement not only disincentivizes investors from engaging in efforts to 
acquire tacit knowledge and to climb up the technology ladder, but it also results in insufficient 
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governance capabilities for effective targeting and disciplining of rent-receiving firms or 
sectors. Such market-enhancing conditions limit the potential of achieving positive linkages for 
the development of domestic firms in medium and high technology sectors.  
Using qualitative evidence this chapter has shown that the ‘Medellín Model of Good 
Governance’ is unlikely to provide the growth-enhancing institutional framework needed for 
productivity growth, and sustainable and inclusive development of the city. The next chapter 
provides quantitative evidence for these claims.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
177 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF DEVELOPMENTAL OUTCOMES OF 
MEDELLÍN’S POLITICAL SETTLEMENT  
In the preceding chapters we have argued that the distribution of actual organizational power 
is a central analytical variable for understanding different paths of institutional change. We 
argued that the interdependency between power and institutions affect the implementation 
of policies in ways that have implications for political and economic development outcomes. In 
chapter six we found that the increase in organizational power of the transnational capitalist 
elite in the form of the GEA in Medellín’s decentralized and liberalized political settlement has 
driven a particular ‘good governance’ agenda. We argued that the particular power 
constellation in Medellín’s political settlement can impede or at least slow down attempts to 
create mechanisms that incentivize investment into acquiring tacit knowledge of medium or 
high technological activities. The strong position of the GEA in the ruling coalition furthermore 
creates a situation in which disciplining of rent-receiving firms can be difficult. We also argued 
that due to the changing economic interests and technological capabilities of the GEA, the 
policy agenda is likely to result in market-conform changes that enhance Medellín’s insertion 
into the lower end of the global value chain.  
This chapter uses the findings on the characteristics of Medellín’s political settlement made so 
far to quantitatively evaluate the implemented ‘good governance’ policy agenda and assess 
the developmental outcomes in terms of productivity growth and economic development, as 
well as with regard to violence indicators. Using different quantitative methods, this evaluation 
helps to provide statistical evidence that underline our claim that Medellín has by no means 
experienced a miracle.  
In the first section of this chapter, we look at the development of Medellín’s public finances 
over time. The section analyses how the implementation of a particular public policy agenda 
following Fajardo’s election in 2003 affected rent creation and the allocation of public finances 
in general and of EPM’s profits in particular. The analysis of the evolution of public revenues 
through tax collection and EPM’s transfers on the one hand, and of public expenditures and 
investments on the other, can help in assessing broader governance capabilities of public rent 
management following the implementation of the ‘Medellín Model of Good Governance’. The 
section also analyses private investment strategies. We particularly look at disaggregated 
investment data and changes in market capitalization of local companies to identify capitalist 
interests and capabilities of Medellín’s private sector. The section concludes with an analysis of 
disaggregated growth data, evaluating the impacts of public rent management and private 
investment strategies on sectoral growth performance.  
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Section 7.2 focuses on the evaluation of Medellín-based companies. Using firm-level data, we 
analyse the concentration of employment in different non-agricultural sectors and evaluate 
productivity capacities of firms based in Medellín. This helps us discover which non-agricultural 
economic activities are concentrated in Medellín, their respective labour intensity and their 
impacts on employment creation, as well as the productivity capacities of specific sectors. The 
section compares companies based in Medellín with economies of other Colombian cities. We 
find that Medellín’s economy is dominated by companies with low productivity capabilities. 
Furthermore, most employment is created in sectors that are marked by low productivity. 
Section 7.3 evaluates the export capacities of the regional economy. We find that while 
exports per capita have increased dramatically since the early 2000s, exports are dominated by 
low technology goods. Medium and high technology exports have decreased. We furthermore 
assess the performance of Medellín’s strategic cluster sectors. We analyse the productivity 
capacities of these sectors as well as the level of international competitiveness. By looking at 
the export capacities of these sectors, we find that the textile and fashion cluster contributes 
to the largest share of industrial exports. However, the sector only contributes to very low GDP 
growth rates and is marked by high labour intensity and low labour productivity, indicating the 
low capacities of exports to result in positive backward linkages. This is reflected by the fact 
that the general growth of exports has not directly contributed to GDP growth rates. 
Section 7.4 analyses the impacts of Medellín’s economic and productivity development on the 
city’s labour market and income inequality. The section looks at general trends of how labour 
market variables have developed since the Fajardo coalition came to power. We also take a 
comparative look at the development of Medellín’s labour productivity and the gross 
employment elasticities of the city’s labour market. We find that besides the low productivity 
characteristics of Medellín’s economy, the city’s labour market has high levels of gross 
employment elasticities, indicating that changes in the economy prompt rapid adjustment in 
gross employment. This indicates that Medellín has a highly flexible labour market dominated 
by low wage services. The cheap labour supply of Medellín does not only reinforce income 
inequalities, but is also unlikely to be a source for sustainable productivity growth that can 
help the local economy in climbing up the technology ladder. 
Section 7.5 engages in a detailed analysis of violence indicators. Firstly, we explain the 
decrease in homicidal violence using the political settlements framework. We argue that the 
fluctuations in Medellín’s murder rate can be explained by looking at the different inter-elite 
contestations and the role of the paramilitary in these disputes. Recent falls in the homicide 
rate can be explained by the extensive organizational power of the current ruling coalition and 
particular paramilitary interests that closely align with the interests of the Fajardo coalition. 
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Furthermore, the section extends beyond the common approach of exclusive focus on 
homicide rates. We find that despite the decrease in homicidal violence, there has been an 
increase in other forms of violence. 
The quantitative analysis in this chapter largely concentrates on the period between 2004 and 
2012. However, due to limited data availability, we sometimes use different time series. In 
general, data availability is very scattered for local level indicators, which is also due to the fact 
that DANE only started to publish disaggregated data for municipalities after 2005. Where 
appropriate we used regional level data to make general observations about Antioquia’s 
growth performances, which can be a valid proxy for Medellín.  
 
7.1 PUBLIC POLICY AGENDA, PRIVATE INVESTMENT AND GROWTH 
As pointed out in the preceding chapter, the political discourse of the GEA prior to Fajardo’s 
election in 2003 was rooted in the idea that the political class of emergentes is inherently 
corrupt. This anti-corruption discourse, which resonated with a wider neoliberal policy agenda 
of opposing direct state intervention in market mechanisms, was picked up by the Fajardo 
collation and their ‘Medellín Model of Good Governance’. Central to the ‘good governance’ 
framework is the transparent and accountable management of public finances in order to 
avoid the embezzlement of public funds and increase revenue through the decrease in 
corruption. Furthermore, this policy agenda hopes to achieve better private property rights 
structures and to increase confidence in the public administration, which, according to the 
standard view, not only increases citizen’s willingness to pay taxes but also makes companies 
more inclined to invest.  
The first part of this section engages in a quantitative analysis of the evolvement of the 
management of public resources. We particularly analyse the development of public revenues 
and expenditures after the election of Mayor Sergio Fajardo and the implementation of the 
‘Medellín Model of Good Governance’. We furthermore look at the changes in tax collection as 
well as the management of EPM’s profits. The section engages in an analysis of how public 
policies and an increase in the municipal budget affected public investments. The second part 
of this section focuses on the investment of private companies. We look at disaggregate 
changes in net private investments as well as changes in the market capitalization of 
Medellín’s companies at the national stock exchange. The section concludes by analysing 
Medellín’s disaggregated growth performance. 
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7.1.1 PUBLIC POLICY AGENDA, TAXES AND THE MANAGEMENT OF EPM 
A closer look at the development of public finances can help identify patterns in Medellín’s 
changing policy agenda for achieving economic growth and political stability. One of the main 
rationales of the ‘good governance’ agenda is to achieve a more accountable public 
administration through the reduction of corruption. Proponents of the agenda argue that 
more transparent governance will not only decrease the likelihood of a misuse of public 
revenues, but will also generate general confidence into the authorities, which in turn has 
positive effects on tax collection and creates incentives for foreign companies and local 
capitalist actors to invest (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007; UNCTAD, 2004). 
A central aspect of the economic policy agenda implemented in Medellín was a change in the 
public rent-management strategy in two areas: firstly, improved tax-collection capacities and 
secondly a reform of EPM and in particular the management of the resources transferred from 
it to the municipal budget. 
In regard to tax collection, the coalition intended to increase Medellín’s tax income not 
through an increase of the local tax rates, but rather by improving tax collection. This entailed 
enforcement of correct charging and payment of tax bills, and ensuring that correct amounts 
were collected by the local state. Furthermore, limiting corruption practices more generally 
and increasing transparency and accountability of public finance are seen as an important 
factor that resulted in an increase of citizen’s willingness to pay taxes. In a strategy to increase 
confidence and to create “a culture of paying taxes” (see Alcaldía de Medellín, 2009), the 
Fajardo administration put up large billboards at every public construction site stating that 
¡Aquí están invertidos sus impuestos! (Your taxes are invested here!) (figure 7.1). 
 
FIGURE 7.1: PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT PAJARITO, CUMUNA 7  
 
SOURCE: IDB (2011, P. 183) 
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Iván Mauricio Pérez Salazar, Secretary of Social Development under Fajardo and later 
Secretary of Finance, confirmed to the author that “[through] the prevention of tax evasion, 
charging what was owed […], the proper assessment of housing taxes, and the fight of all levels 
of corruption […] tax income increased threefold” (Pérez Salazar, 2014). One of the primary 
concerns of the coalition’s ‘good governance’ agenda was to establish and increase business 
confidence (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2004, p. 35). This need to establish confidence in the public 
institutions by the business sector was repeatedly stressed in interviews with current and 
former public officials. Fajardo’s Secretary of Planning and former president of EPM Federico 
Restrepo Posada stressed that due to transparent development policies based on clear 
statistical evidence and analysis, “the level of subjectivity, which is usually associated with 
political negotiations, went down drastically” (cited in Devlin and Chaskel, 2010, p. 6). This 
decrease of ‘subjectivity’, Restrepo Posada (2014) argues, helped to increase public revenue, 
thereby allowing also for a considerable increase in public expenditure. Several interviewees 
argued that these changes, in turn, helped to increase private investments, from other parts of 
Colombia as well as from abroad (see Valderrama, 2014). 
And indeed, as can be seen in figure 7.2, public revenue as well as public expenditure grew 
substantially from 2000 until 2012. Despite the fact that public revenue per capita as well as 
total public expenditure per capita had already increased during the Pérez Gutiérrez 
administration, figure 7.2 shows that there were substantial further increases in both variables 
after 2003. In particular, the period between 2004 and 2006 saw a relatively larger increase in 
public revenue per capita. This is also clearly reflected in figure 7.3 that provides an aggregate 
overview of the sources of the increasing public revenue. Despite there not being any changes 
to Medellín’s tax rates, tax revenue increased. For members of the Fajardo coalition this is the 
result of increasing efforts in formalizing micro and small enterprises that had until then 
operated informally, particularly in the more marginalized areas of the city.  
While some claim that the national law 1258 of 2008 helped to increase local tax revenues per 
capita, the tax revenue per capita of Medellín only increased up until 2006 and then remained 
stagnant (figure 7.3). While for members of the Fajardo administration the increase of tax 
revenue is an indicator of decrease in corruption (see Pérez Salazar, 2014), this can certainly be 
seen as efficiency improvements of the new ruling coalition. Furthermore, the increase of tax 
collection in the first years of government can be attributed to the coalition’s commitment to 
formalize businesses as part of the Cultura E and the social urbanism policies. Hence, besides 
the construction of the Metrocable and the creation of public spaces, the policy entailed the 
facilitation of business formalization through the creation of the CEDEZOs in the affected 
neighbourhoods, as discussed in chapter two. Furthermore, we can see that there was a 
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substantial increase in transferred revenue per capita from the central government after 2002. 
This preceded the Fajardo coalition. In interviews, public officials claimed that the election of 
Álvaro Uribe Vélez as president played a major role in achieving increase in overall revenues, 
as he gave Medellín’s political actors a beneficial access to centrally created rents (Piraquive, 
2014). 
 
FIGURE 7.2: MEDELLÍN: TOTAL REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA 
 
SOURCE: DATA FROM BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA, OWN CALCULATIONS 
 
FIGURE 7.3: MEDELLÍN: SOURCES OF PUBLIC REVENUE  
 
SOURCE: DATA FROM BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA, OWN CALCULATIONS 
 
There are several important implications of increased local tax collection in Medellín. The first 
concerns the fact that liberalization and deindustrialization have changed the forms of rent 
deployment and thus affected the actual organizational power of the dominant elites. As 
mentioned, the conventional mechanisms of rent management and patronage distribution in a 
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protected economy (through tariff and non-tariff measures) had fallen away with economic 
liberalization (see Di John, 2010). Through their strengthened organizational power, the GEA 
and the Fajardo coalition were able to use urban tax collection as a rent-creating instrument. 
With the social urbanism reforms that largely focused on construction of public spaces, 
transportation infrastructure and housing, the Fajardo coalition, first, incentivized economic 
growth through increased activity in the construction sector. Moreover, an increasingly 
dynamic urban real estate market also helped to increase tax revenues. Increased collection of 
taxation on property has further strengthened synergies between taxation and Fajardo’s urban 
planning and social urbanism policies through the creation of transparent and comprehensive 
property databases (Pérez Salazar, 2014). Social urbanism, however, was not focused on 
productivity-enhancing infrastructure, but rather on megaprojects, such as the construction of 
library parks and convention centres to stimulate tourism (see Brand, 2013).  
Property taxes are furthermore easy to collect for public authorities, as the visibility of 
property makes it difficult for property owners to evade this tax. Furthermore, these taxes 
generally do not have a direct adverse effect on economic growth due to their marginal impact 
on investment decisions by economic agents. Di John (2010, p. 14) argues that this links to the 
fact that urban property taxes “do not affect the decisions of economic agents to supply 
labour, to invest in human capital, to produce, invest and innovate to the same extent as some 
other taxes”.  
The second aspect of Medellín’s changed rent-management strategy focused on EPM’s profits 
in general and the public company’s transfers to the municipal budget more specifically. Since 
the early 2000s the total amount of EPM’s transfers to the municipality of Medellín grew 
significantly as a result of EPM’s changed investment strategy and the territorial expansion of 
the company following Fajardo’s victory. The primary objective of EPM was to increase 
Medellín’s presence in transnational markets, especially in Central America. A crucial part of 
this internationalization strategy has been the investment fund EPM Inversiones S.A., set up in 
2004, as a limited liability corporation. The principal objective of this company is “investing 
capital in domestic or foreign companies, including utility providers of energy, water, sewage, 
combustibles, gas,… and telecommunications services” (EPM, 2016). In an interview with the 
author, the president of EPM under Fajardo and former CEO of several GEA companies, Juan 
Felipe Gaviria, confirmed that the larger presence of EPM in international markets and the 
privatization of the company’s investment strategy are crucial drivers of Medellín’s economic 
development (Gaviria, 2014).  
EPM’s internationalization strategy was officially finalized with the Meta Estratégica Grande y 
Ambiciosa (Strategy for a Large and Ambitious Goal, La Mega) in 2005. Dover and Ocampo 
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(2006) find that with the implementation of La Mega EPM has become truly transnationalized. 
The core target of La Mega was to internationalize 40% of EPM’s activities by 2015 (Furlong, 
2015). And indeed, of EPM’s annual profits of 1.5 billion COP generated in 2015, 36% were 
earned in foreign markets (El Colombiano, 2015).  
EPM’s growth strategy also included the re-privatization of its assets in telecommunication in 
2014 (Semana, 2014). However, the company has been increasingly active in participating in 
the domestic and international credit market, which led to a significant rise of total debt and 
deposit liabilities between 2005 and 201015 (see figure 7.4; Bonilla et al., 2013). Since EPM’s 
transfers make up around 40% of the entire municipal budget (Maya Muñoz, 2013). This was 
part of the institutional strategy of the Fajardo coalition to increase the rent-management 
capabilities of the local state, also in order to circumvent fiscal restrictions on local 
governments in Colombia (Pérez Salazar, 2014). Between 2003 and 2010 transfers of EPM to 
the municipal budget of Medellín increased by over 1000% (see figure 7.5). This has 
particularly been the result of a massive increase in so-called “extraordinary transfers” in 
recent years. While these extraordinary transfers have been operational since the mid-1990s, 
making up for around 45% of total transfers between 1994 and 2008, they only became 
legalized in 2007 (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007b). In the latest available data for 2009 and 2010, 
these transfers have drastically increased. For Furlong (2015, p. 202) the increase in 
extraordinary transfers is an indicator that “capitalist production is enmeshed with public 
dividends and social reproduction”. As figure 7.5 indicates, EPM’s indebtedness has certainly 
served as an institutional strategy to expand Medellín’s public budget. Following this logic, Iván 
Mauricio Pérez Salazar who served as finance secretary in the Fajardo administration told the 
author: “EPM is a massive cashbox for Medellín” (Pérez Salazar, 2014).  
 
 
 
                                                          
15 These developments of EPM closely correspond to general trends of increased corporate debt in less 
developed countries since 2008. Some observers find links between these developments and the 
Quantitative Easing (QE) policy of the US Federal Reserve, implemented between 2008 and 2014. QE 
provided longer-term private sector credits at low interest rates, which aimed at incentivizing private 
investment for the recovery of post-crisis developed economies. However, the majority of the funds – 
after being leveraged by hedge funds – resulted in an expansion of debt on corporate balance sheets in 
less developed countries. Analysing the links between this policy and dollar credit, McCauley et al. 
(2015) find that between 2009 and 2014 bonds and bank loans to non-bank borrowers outside of the US 
increased from US$6 trillion to US$9 trillion. Palma (2015) finds that for Latin America, this flood of 
cheap US dollar credits had negative impacts for the balance sheets of non-bank corporations. 
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FIGURE 7.4: DEBT AND LIABILITIES OF EPM 2003-2010 
  
SOURCES: BONILLA ET AL. (2013); BONILLA AND AMADO (2013); CARRANZA AND BONILLA (2013) 
 
 
FIGURE 7.5: EPM’S TRANSFERS TO MEDELLÍN’S BUDGET 
  
SOURCES: BONILLA ET AL. (2013); BONILLA AND AMADO (2013); CARRANZA AND BONILLA (2013) 
 
With EPM as a public utility company which now operates transnationally as a private 
corporation, the Fajardo administration was able to include transnational capitalist interests in 
the publically managed strategy of resource creation and allocation. This agenda substantially 
increased the influence of the GEA in matters regarding Medellín’s transnationalization 
strategies, particularly through the control of EPM’s capacity in managing rents and 
distributing patronage through state employment. With the power distribution in Medellín’s 
political settlement and the prominent and very powerful positions of the GEA, a large 
majority of rent is allocated to sectors in which the GEA has vested interests (see Veeduría, 
2014). Furthermore, former CEOs of the GEA have consistently occupied the post of the 
President of EPM (Zuluaga, 2004), a position in which in mayoral elections is considered to be 
as important as the actual candidate (Restrepo Posada, 2014). In an interview a public official 
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from the national government also reaffirmed the beneficial treatment of the GEA in receiving 
rents and benefits, particularly due to the grupo’s control over EPM’s budget: “they (the GEA) 
can use the public balance sheets as a driver of private investments” (Piraquive, 2014). 
The “cashbox” EPM has become of crucial importance for rent distribution to potential growth 
sectors. EPM is the primary source for state-created rents through local government hiring and 
contracting procedures. However, and despite the emphasis of the Fajardo coalition and the 
GEA on the importance of transparency and ‘good governance’ style public resource 
management, the vast majority of EPM’s projects are contracted out without formal bidding 
procedures (Veeduría, 2014). Analysing all of EPM’s contracting procedures revealed that 67% 
of all of EPM-financed and publically procured projects were contracted out without fulfilling 
formally required procedures (see El Tiempo, 2015). A recent report on the public 
procurement processes of Medellín’s public institutions finds similar results. It claims “that 
both the municipality of Medellín and its decentralized entities may be abusing their public 
mandate generating undesirable situations politically, legally and socially” (Veeduría, 2014, p. 
22). In an interview Luis Pérez Gutiérrez, former Mayor and long-standing arch enemy of 
Medellín’s transnational capitalist elite faction, mentioned that this is particularly due to the 
style of public resource management the GEA-led Fajardo coalition perceives to be efficient: 
“the GEA has large interests in EPM due to its capacity to contract out. The power of the GEA 
disrupts democracy as it converts EPM into an institution that serves for particular interests of 
the GEA” (Pérez Gutiérrez, 2016).  
While a larger municipal budget through both the increases in tax revenue and in transfers (of 
EPM) can have positive implications for state capacity building, the particular structure of 
Medellín’s political settlement is likely to impede the development of growth-enhancing rent 
management. The GEA’s dominant organizational position in the ruling coalition is more likely 
to result in the development of a policy agenda that a) further increases the holding power of 
the transnational capitalist elite; b) is unable to create incentives and compulsions for 
investment in medium- to high technology sectors; and c) is ineffective in enforcing effective 
disciplining measures. The developmental outcomes of Medellín’s governance structures on 
private investments, productivity growth, labour markets and political stability will be 
discussed in the subsequent sections of this chapter. 
7.1.2 PRIVATE INVESTMENTS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
The characteristics of Medellín’s political settlement do not only have implications for the 
policy agenda and hence the management of public finances. They also affect the investment 
strategies of private actors and capitalist organizations. To analyse this we return to some 
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considerations raised in chapters three and four. There, we argued that the dominant position 
and entrepreneurial capabilities of capitalists in a political settlement are important factors 
determining the capacities of a state to create and enforce a growth-enhancing institutional 
framework, which again affects growth outcomes. In chapter six, we showed that the power of 
the GEA increased with the inauguration of Sergio Fajardo. The capture of political 
organizations through public-private alliances gave the transnational capitalist elites a 
considerable degree of certainty over the long-term access to economic rents.  
In conventional theory, certainty over long-term access to rents should encourage private 
investment into potential high-risk sectors. Analysing net private investments16 of Medellín’s 
entrepreneurs, at first sight such theoretical claims seem to hold. We find that there has been 
an impressive growth of net private investments between 2003 and 2013. However, the 
private investment dynamics only significantly increased after 2008. Figure 7.6 shows an 
increase of over 10% annually between 2005 and 2013, with large increases of net investments 
in 2009, 2011 and 2012, showing that private investment patterns are rather volatile17. Looking 
exclusively at the aggregated data for net private investment underlines the claims of the 
‘good governance’ agenda that an improved management of public resources increases private 
investment.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 Local level net private investments were calculated by subtracting the adjustment of capital 
consumption from gross private investment of Medellín’s companies. Net private investments measure 
changes in the capital stock resulting from investment and is thus the amount of depreciated capital 
used for productive activities in Medellín. 
17 The rather unusual composition of investment in 2009 can be explained by the capital stock reforms 
and extraordinary investment of the transportation company Imbocar S.A., as well as the change of 
EPM’s financial structure with establishing a private company EPM Inversiones S.A. while at the same 
time investing into the construction of the dam project Hidroeléctrica Ituango S.A. E.S.P. This partial 
privatization of EPM’s assets was net worth 1.5 trillion COP, which explains the 2009 increase. The large 
increase in 2011 is due to the foundation of the limited company EPM Ituango S.A. This partial 
privatization of EPM’s assets over 235 billion Pesos and capital stock changes of EPM’s Aguas Nacionales 
that included an extraordinary investment into water and electricity of 350 billion Pesos. The massive 
increase of financial sector investment in 2012 is due to a further financialization of EPM. The EPM 
subsidiaries EPM Ituango S.A. and Aguas Nacionales EPM S.A. increased investments into construction 
and financial services by 806 billion Pesos (all values in 2005 constant COP) (Cámara de Comercio, 2014, 
2011). 
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FIGURE 7.6: NET PRIVATE INVESTMENTS, MEDELLÍN 2003-2013 
 
SOURCE: DATA FROM CAMARA DE COMERCIO, OWN CALCULATIONS 
 
The aggregated data, however, do not explain which economic sectors were the primary 
recipients of the net private investments, and thus have only limited analytical value for the 
discussion of capabilities for investment in medium or high productivity activities. Looking at 
the disaggregated data we find that the increases in net private investment were particularly 
strong in the construction, finance and insurance sectors (figure 7.7). While net private 
investment in manufacturing industries still represented around 34% of total net investments 
in 2005, this decreased to only 7% in 2014 (figure 7.8).  
 
FIGURE 7.7: COMPOSITION OF NET PRIVATE INVESTMENT, BY SECTOR18 
 
SOURCE: DATA FROM CAMARA DE COMERCIO, OWN CALCULATION 
 
 
                                                          
18 While gross capital investment usually exceeds depreciation, the negative net investment in the 
sector of electricity, gas and water in 2007 means that depreciation exceeded gross private investment. 
0
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2500000
3000000
3500000
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
IN
 2
0
0
5
 C
O
N
ST
A
N
T 
C
O
P
 (
M
IL
LI
O
N
S)
Private Net Investments
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
200520062007200820092010201120122013
Social and personal services
Finance and insurances
Transport and
communication
Commerce, restaurants,
hotels
Construction
Electricity, gas, water
Manufacturing industries
Mining
Agriculture
189 
 
FIGURE 7.8: NET PRIVATE INVESTMENT PER SECTOR, 2014 
 
SOURCE: CAMARA DE COMERCIO (2015) 
 
Similarly, the core features of Medellín’s political settlement demonstrate that Medellín’s 
capitalists are not competing with each other in the market and are, therefore, not disciplined 
to make investments into technologically advanced sectors that are marked by high 
productivity. Instead, most investments have gone into the financialization of Medellín’s 
companies. As shown in table 7.1, the market capitalization of Medellín-based companies 
traded on Colombia’s stock exchange has increased by 1568% between 2000 and 2015, which 
is substantially higher than GDP growth during that period (see BVC, 2015; Superintendencia 
Financiera, 2015). The ratio of the stock of financial assets to GDP thus jumped from around 
150% in 2000 to over 300% in 2015.  
Table 7.1 shows that this financialization was largely driven by the increase in the market 
capitalization of financial institutions as well as of construction companies. The massive 
increase of the market capitalization of electricity, water and gas companies can be explained 
by EPM’s investment strategy. As noted in footnote 17, the public company has invested large 
amounts of public assets into its private subsidiary companies EPM Inversiones S.A, EPM 
Ituango S.A. and Aguas Nacionales EPM S.A. This high financialization of local companies has 
provided liquidity for local capitalist actors. While this can be positive for incentivizing 
investments, the characteristics of Medellín’s political settlement are likely to lead to a 
situation where additional liquidity is invested in economic activities which do not enhance 
productive capacities.  
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TABLE 7.1: MARKET CAPITALIZATION OF MEDELLÍN’S PUBLICALLY TRADED COMPANIESBY SECTOR (2000-2015) 
Economic Sector Market capitalization 2000-2015 (in %) 
Financial institutions 
and insurances 
2035.03% 
Manufacturing 787.68% 
Construction 2322.05% 
Commerce 901.77% 
Electricity, water, 
gas 
2306.68% 
Transport and 
communication 
7.97% 
SOURCES: BVC (2015); SUPERINTENDENCIA FINANCIERA (2015); OWN CALCULATIONS 
 
Another important variable for the assessment of Medellín’s political settlement and its ‘good 
governance’ agenda is the ratio of net private investments to the income share of the top 10% 
of income receivers. Thus, despite the huge share of income of Medellín’s top earners19 and 
the supposedly well-defined property right structures implemented through ‘good 
governance’ reforms, the share of private investment as a percentage of the income share of 
the top 10% income receivers remains very low. On average, the ratio between private net 
investments and the income of the top 10% over the period between 2005 and 2014 was only 
around 8.9% annually20, which is extremely low, even compared to other less developed 
regions or other Latin American countries (see Palma, 2011, pp. 19–20). That Medellín’s elite 
can appropriate large amounts of income, while investments into medium or high technology 
sectors and high productivity activities remain low (see figure 7.7), places a serious question 
mark over the legitimacy of the neoliberal settlement that encourages such patterns.  
Our results are in line with Palma’s (2011) findings on Latin American elites. We find that the 
hegemonic power and the low technological capacities of the transnational capitalist elites 
have hindered or slowed down resource allocation strategies that create compulsions and 
incentives for private investments in medium or high technology and productivity sectors. 
Furthermore, the local state has increasingly become incapable of disciplining the capitalist 
elites to reinvest a large bulk of their income into productive activities. The evolution of 
                                                          
19 Due to lack of data for local-level income shares we took the average income share of Colombia’s top 
earners (which is around 50% of all income, measured by tax returns) as a proxy for Medellín’s top ten 
percent. Given the larger degree of inequality of Medellín’s society, the income share of the city’s 
capitalist elites is likely to be even higher.  
20 Due to lack of local data, we calculated this ratio using data for total private income in Colombia, the 
national share of the top 10% of Colombia and the private net investment in Medellín’s economy. We 
adjusted the total national private income to Medellín’s top 10% by dividing the average national 
private income between 2005 and 2014 with the average ratio of local GDP/national GDP. This has 
obvious limitation but is still a valid proxy that informs the empirical analysis. 
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Medellín’s elites has shaped policy making in the city through embracing a neoliberal ideology 
that reinforces Medellín’s ‘new urban neoliberalism’. These trends confirm our assumption 
that the local state, captured by a transnational capitalist elite with low entrepreneurial 
capabilities, has been unable to create and enforce an institutional environment that 
incentivizes high productivity investments due to the incompatibility between such rent 
management strategies and the structures of power in Medellín’s settlement.  
The question we need to ask, however, is how Medellín’s policy agenda, the increased fiscal 
capacity of the municipal government as well as the changes in net private investments, 
affected economic growth. As discussed in chapter two and depicted in figure 2.4 Medellín’s 
economy has grown exceptionally fast. Since the first year of the Fajardo administration and 
the implementation of the local market-driven policy reforms, the urban economy of Medellín 
grew rapidly, at almost double the growth rate of the rest of the country in 2004. Some 
academic observers, NGOs and particularly public officials and business actors in Medellín see 
this large increase in economic activity as a result of an increase in public expenditure and net 
private investment over the same period. Various public and private organizations stress the 
importance of the ‘good governance’ agenda for achieving this increased dynamic of private 
sector involvement, which is seen to underpin the “metropolitan miracle” (see Cámara de 
Comercio, 2011). Hence, the aggregated growth data of Medellín shows that the institutional 
changes and the implementation of ‘good governance’ reforms might have had positive 
developmental outcomes. 
However, a closer look at the disaggregated data reveals that Medellín’s growth data very 
much correlates with the findings regarding disaggregated investment. Thus, the composition 
of political, institutional and economic factors in Medellín’s political settlement has 
incentivized economic growth driven by a large expansion of activities in sectors that are 
marked by low productivity. The financial sector of Medellín’s economy has been one of the 
main drivers of economic growth, despite a small contraction in its dynamism following the 
global financial crisis (table 7.2). Furthermore, the urban economy has experienced large 
growth rates in real estate, (residential) construction, tourism, and business services. While 
these sectors have experienced stable growth rates at around 5-8% annually, in general we can 
identify a tendency for fluctuations in activity. The steep contraction of the construction sector 
in 2007 and 2011 for example, says much about the lack of commitment to the continuity of 
private and public investments. It further underlines the unsustainable nature of Medellín’s 
economic boom (see table 7.12).  
 
192 
 
TABLE 7.2: GDP GROWTH IN MEDELLÍN BY SECTOR (IN %) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Agriculture 13.2% 11.6% 8.8% -0.4% 3.3% 14.2% 9.9% 5.1% 
Mining and 
quarrying 
25.3% 17.0% -6.6% -9.2% 1.9% 20.0% -33.3% 21.7% 
Manufacturing 
Industries 
6.7% 4.4% 0.8% 6.2% 5.1% 4.3% 5.9% 1.5% 
Electricity, gas 
and water 
1.8% 5.5% 0.8% 1.5% 3.1% 1.3% 1.5% 3.2% 
Construction 11.8% 17.9% -17.5% -4.0% -3.4% 19.9% -20.4% -2.0% 
Retail 10.8% 11.3% 3.1% 4.4% 8.0% 10.0% 6.4% 2.0% 
Hotels and 
Restaurants 
5.6% 6.2% 5.7% 4.5% 3.3% 6.1% 7.9% 4.1% 
Transport and 
Communication 
12.8% 15.2% 11.8% 2.7% 4.6% 9.8% 3.9% 1.8% 
Financial 
intermediation 
8.2% 12.2% 11.6% -5.9% 9.6% 17.3% 9.7% 8.8% 
Real estate and 
rental  
6.0% 6.1% 5.3% 2.8% 4.9% 5.1% 4.7% 3.2% 
Activities of 
business 
services 
9.9% 7.0% 7.1% 7.5% 3.8% 7.7% 8.2% 4.5% 
Social and 
Communal 
Services 
6.2% 4.6% 5.6% 6.3% 4.5% 2.7% 6.2% 5.0% 
Total 6.6% 7.8% 8.4% 4.7% 0.5% 4% 4.8% 4.3% 
SOURCE: SISTEMA DE INDICADORES ESTRATÉGICOS DE MEDELLÍN – SIEM, OWN CALCULATIONS21 
 
The speculative, finance-driven, and low productivity type of growth that we halve already 
observed when disaggregating net private investments is further illustrated in figures 7.9 and 
7.10. While the value-added share of manufacturing industries has consistently decreased 
since 2005, the financial sector as well as hospitality services (tourism) and construction 
increased by large margins. In fact, in 2014 these three economic sectors were responsible for 
over 50% of value added and GDP growth (figure 7.10). Hence, the gap between 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing growth of GDP is widening. With valued-added growth 
of over 53% between 2005 and 2014 the non-manufacturing sectors have become the leading 
drivers of economic growth. While the manufacturing sector has experienced growth rates of 
up to 6% (see table 7.2), the sector has become increasingly marginalized as it now only 
contributes 11% to GDP growth (figure 7.10). Furthermore, and as discussed below, the 
                                                          
21 Data availability for Medellín is limited. Disaggregated data for the municipal level is only available 
after 2005. The growth rates of each sector was calculated using the available data for sectoral GDP 
values, in 2005 constant COP. 
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manufacturing activities remaining in Medellín are marked by low productivity and high labour 
intensity. The combination of remarkably low rates of investments into medium and high 
productivity sectors with the lack of upward diversification of economic growth patterns 
seems to be at the core of the city’s productivity problem, which will be analysed further in the 
following sections.  
 
FIGURE 7.9: VALUE ADDED BY ECONOMIC SECTORS, 2005 AND 2014 
 
SOURCES: CAMARA DE COMERCIO (2015), WITH DATA FROM DANE 
 
 
FIGURE 7.10: CONTRIBUTION TO GDP GROWTH BY ECONOMIC SECTOR, 2014 
 
SOURCES: CAMARA DE COMERCIO (2015), WITH DATA FROM DANE 
 
Another driver of economic growth in the analysed period was tourism, reflected in the growth 
rates of commerce, restaurants, and hotels (table 7.2, figures 7.9 and 7.10). The focus on 
developing a tourist industry is compatible with broader global economic transformation 
patterns elsewhere in Latin America (Robinson, 2010). However, tourism depends on highly 
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price- and income-elastic and unstable demand. In Medellín, despite authorities seeking “to 
sell the city” in a very aggressive manner, as a host locality the local government has very little 
control over this demand and thus over possible labour market impacts. Tourist infrastructure 
has played a particular role in Medellín’s development strategy, consisting mainly of increased 
investment in megaprojects. The cable car system Metrocable, for example, has served as a 
platform for Medellín to market itself to domestic and foreign investors. In an interview the 
former Territorial Secretary of Fajardo underlined the importance of the cable car system in 
attracting FDI. However, his comments also indicate that there are problems in creating 
sufficient backward linkages for technology growth in local productive sectors: “The French, 
who sold us the technology (for the Metrocable) consider us as their strategic ally to sell their 
products… the cable was not a means of public transportation but of tourist transportation… 
and they sold us the technology… Today they (the French) say that the way in which to sell it is 
through Medellín. France is not able to go to Peru to sell this on their own… and we help them 
indirectly to do so… When we talk about innovation (in Medellín) we don’t mean that we 
invented I don’t know what, but that we plan very specific ways to solve urban problems that 
have nothing to do with the technology itself” (Lopera Pérez, 2014). 
 
7.2 ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY  
In chapter three we established that particular combinations of power structures and 
institutional mechanisms can lead to different types of appropriability problems. Many of 
these problems are linked to insufficient investment in efforts for tacit learning. In a political 
settlement where capitalists with relatively low entrepreneurial and low technological 
capabilities and with an interest in labour-intensive industries and services have considerable 
organizational power, investment in learning-by-doing is likely to remain insignificant. This can 
lead to adverse productivity outcomes and can slow down technology acquisition. 
Recalling the findings regarding the sectorial data in table 7.2 and figures 7.9 and 7.10 one 
might be tempted to argue that these assumptions do not hold for Medellín, as the city 
experienced industrial growth and the manufacturing industry contributes around 11% of GDP 
growth. This, however, would be misleading, not only due to the drastic decline of the 
industrial share of GDP growth since 2005. A more rounded discussion of Medellín’s industrial 
performance requires scrutiny of how Medellín’s public policy agenda and private investment 
strategy translated into productivity growth and technological development.  
A comparative analysis of growth data of Colombian cities helps us identify several 
characteristics of Medellín’s productivity performance. Furthermore, and analysing firm-level 
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data, this analysis allows us to compare the potential of regional companies to develop 
capacities for growth in medium and high technology sectors. For this analysis, we first look at 
several factors contributing to GDP growth in different Colombian cities. In particular, we 
analyse how growth rates in GDP per capita were influenced by changes in labour productivity, 
changes in labour intensity (measured in hours worked per worker), changes in the 
employment rate, and labour supply. Secondly, and in order to measure the potential of 
regionally agglomerated firms, we look at the concentration of traded industries in Medellín 
and their relative productivity.  
The disaggregated analysis of regional growth data shows that Medellín has experienced high 
growth rates between 2004 and 2012 (table 7.3). The high growth rate of Medellín’s economy 
is in line with our findings presented so far. However, the analysis of the characteristics of 
Medellín’s economy shows that the city has experienced a very small increase in labour 
productivity rates, indicating that the high GDP per capita growth has not been accompanied 
by increases in activities of high productivity sectors (table 7.3). Rather, we see that the strong 
economic performance of Medellín is a result of an increase in labour intensity as well as an 
overall growth in the employment rate. This underlines the findings that large parts of 
Medellín’s economic activities are located in low productivity and labour-intensive sectors that 
respond to economic growth with increases in employment rather than in labour productivity. 
Overall Medellín has shown a relative weak performance in labour productivity growth and is 
one of the cities with the smallest increase in value added per worker. This is depicted in figure 
7.11, where we calculated value added per worker based on output in all productive sectors in 
the 13 largest Colombian cities. We used 2000 Colombian Pesos (COP) as our base currency to 
calculate the changes from 2002 until 2013. 
 
FIGURE 7.11: LARGEST COLOMBIAN CITIES: VALUE ADDED PER WORKER  
 
SOURCE: DATA FROM DANE, OWN CALCULATIONS  
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TABLE 7.3: GDP, PRODUCTIVITY, LABOUR INTENSITY, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR SUPPLY: COLOMBIAN CITIES22 
 GDP per 
capita 1 
Labour 
productivity2  
Hours worked 
per worker3 
Employment 
rate4 
Labour 
supply5 
Bucaramanga 4.97% 2.38% 0.16% 1.97% 0.46% 
Pereira 4.91% 3.11% 0.80% -0.34% 0.44% 
Bogotá 4.07% 0.40% 0.80% 1.38% 0.49% 
Medellín 3.56% 0.84% 0.78% 1.48% 0.49% 
Cartagena 3.41% 1.51% 0.30% 1.23% 0.37% 
Cali 3.01% 2.19% 0% 0.46% 0.36% 
Manizales 2.87% 1.95% 0.99% -0.46% 0.34% 
Pasto 2.87% 1.98% 0.18% 0.18% 0.52% 
Barranquilla 2.84% 1.03% 0.47% 1.20% 0.33% 
Ibagué 2.26% 0.50% 1.22% 0.16% 0.38% 
Montería 2.21% -0.54% 2.22% 0.12% 0.41% 
Cúcuta 1.97% 1.07% 0.86% -0.40% 0.50% 
Villavicencio  -1.24% -2.68% 0.96% 0.06% 0.42% 
Total 3% 1% 0.61% 0.94% 0.44% 
SOURCE: DATA FROM DANE, OWN CALCULATIONS FOLLOWING RAMÍREZ ET AL. (2014). 1GDP OVER TOTAL 
POPULATION; 2GDP GROWTH PER HOUR OF LABOUR; 3HOURS WORKED DIVIDED BY NUMBER OF TOTAL 
EMPLOYED; 4NUMBER OF TOTAL EMPLOYED DIVIDED BY WORKING-AGE POPULATION; 5WORKING-AGE 
POPULATION DIVIDED BY TOTAL POPULATION.  
 
While the differences between Medellín’s relatively high GDP per capita growth and the city’s 
low labour productivity is striking, table 7.3 also shows a significant gap between output and 
productivity growth performances of different regions in Colombia (see differences between 
Bogotá’s and Medellín’s productivity growth). The table further confirms claims that Latin 
American economies have failed to achieve structural change that contributes to increased 
labour productivity growth.  
As such, the findings depicted in table 7.3 regarding the relative failure of economic growth to 
translate into higher productivity output to some extend contrast with the microeconomic 
studies of Eslava et al. (2009) and Fernandes (2007). The authors argue that intensified import 
competition has led to an increase in manufacturing productivity on the plant level in 
Colombia, since it has forced firms to rationalize their operations (see Eslava et al., 2009; 
Fernandes, 2007). However, and using the theoretical model and empirical findings of 
McMillan and Rodrik (2011), we argue that the lack of labour productivity growth across the 
entire economy as well as the economy-wide gaps in labour productivity can be explained by 
looking at the effects of workers’ displacement from firms that achieved technological growing 
up.  
                                                          
22 For Medellín we calculated the variables using data from DANE’s Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares 
(Large Integrated Household Survey, GEIH) between 2004 and 2012. The results for other Colombian 
cities is taken from Ramírez et al. (2014), for the years 2002-2010.  
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The productivity-reducing structural change in Colombia and the productivity gaps between 
different regions are the costs and consequences of the country’s premature 
deindustrialization. Thus, and following Colombia’s apertura reforms, increased import 
competition and productivity growth in top tier firms that managed to close the gap with the 
technology frontier have led to a displacement of many workers from manufacturing 
industries to less productive activities. For the regional context in Colombia this means that 
while some plants (many of them located in Bogotá) managed to catch up technologically, 
workers that were released from these plants were displaced to a majority of low-productive 
sectors in labour intensive industries or services. This explains the low gains in labour 
productivity growth in Bogotá (see table 7.3). For Medellín, and despite the historical 
importance of mining and manufacturing for the region al economy, the majority of jobs in the 
Antioquian capital are now provided by companies in non-tradable services – a direct 
consequence of the region’s premature deindustrialization. 
In conclusion, we argue that the low increases in labour productivity growth and the regional 
and inter-economy gaps in labour productivity depicted in table 7.3 are largely an outcome of 
the way in which local governments as well as the national government in Colombia responded 
to the country’s integration into global capitalist dynamics. The local circumstances before the 
apertura reforms, as well as the choices made and growth strategies implemented by local and 
national policy makers largely impacted the way in which Colombian regions benefited or not 
from trends of globalization. 
Following Porter (2003) and Ramírez et al. (2014), who argue that regional productivity 
potential is determined by the presence of traded industries as well as the relative productivity 
of these industries, we analyse employment concentration and productivity growth of non-
agricultural firms based in Medellín. This provides empirical grounds for a broader analysis of 
productivity growth in Medellín. The data we use are from different years of the Encuesta 
Anual Manufacturera (Annual Manufacturing Survey, EAM) of the Departamento 
Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica (DANE), as well as the Planilla Integrada de Liquidación 
de Aportes para Seguridad Social (Integrated Liquidation Accounts for Social Security, PILA)23.  
More specifically, we look at two factors that determine the entrepreneurial capacities of firms 
in Medellín to achieve growth high productivity sectors. Firstly, we look at the concentration of 
employment in non-agricultural sectors of Medellín relative to other cities. This Employment 
Concentration Factor (ECF) provides insight into the concentration of employment in each 
sector in Medellín relative to similar activities in other parts of the country. It is calculated as 
                                                          
23 The access to PILA data is restricted. Available data was taken from Ramírez et al. (2014).  
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the relation of local employment in a specific sector in Medellín (esM) with the total 
employment of Medellín (eM), divided by the relationship between national employment in 
that sector (EsT) and total employment nationally (ET).  
𝐸𝐶𝐹𝑠𝑀 =
(
𝑒𝑠𝑀
𝑒𝑀
)
(
𝐸𝑠𝑇
𝐸𝑇
)
 
An ECFsM>1 means that a specific industry is concentrated in Medellín, relative to the rest of 
the country. This can indicate that this sector does not only have employment capacities but 
also trading capacities (at least compared to other regions of Colombia), as it is not only 
limited to the local market. Following the rationale of Porter (2003) and Ramírez et al. (2014), 
the relative employment concentration of a local sector can indicate the traded capacities of 
that sector. An ECFsM = 1 or <1 shows that economic activities of the analysed sector are 
geared towards the local market needs and can be described as ‘local sectors’ (see Ramírez et 
al., 2014).  
The second variable we use in the analysis of Medellín’s non-agricultural firms is the Labour 
Productivity Factor (LPF), which serves as a proxy for Medellín’s productivity performance. For 
the calculation of the LPF and in order to determine this proxy for relative productivity of local 
and tradable industries we take the model proposed by Ramírez et al. (2014, p. 25). This model 
estimates the LPF variable by comparing the salaries of workers in a particular sector of 
Medellín’s industry with the average salary that is paid across Medellín’s economy (LPF1). With 
the assumption that workers that have higher skills in higher productivity sectors are better 
remunerated than low-skilled workers in sectors with lower productivity, this variable can help 
us determine relative regional productivity of a particular sector.  
𝐿𝑃𝐹1 =  
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑠𝑀
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑀
 
Depending on data availability, we calculated LPF comparing the salaries of a particular 
industrial sector in Medellín with the average salary paid in that sector nationally (LPF2).  
𝐿𝑃𝐹2 =  
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑠𝑀
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑠𝑇
 
Due to limited availability of data on salaries in the EAM data, we also calculated the LPF using 
the relationship between value added per worker in a particular industrial sector of Medellín 
with value added per worker in the entire local economy (LPF3), or value added per worker in a 
specific local industry over value added per worker in that industry on the national level (LPF4).  
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ECF 
𝐿𝑃𝐹3 =  
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑠𝑀
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑀
 
𝐿𝑃𝐹4 =  
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑠𝑀
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑠𝑇
 
We recognize that there are several problems with equating average salary or average value 
added per worker in a particular industrial sector with the productivity performance of that 
sector. For example, price distortions caused by particular market power of a firm in a 
particular sector can affect wages in ways that have little relation to changes in productivity. 
However, the variable LFP reflects the most accurate and valid proxy for local productivity 
performance available, also given the limited availability of data for our case study. 
Using ECF to examine the concentration of employment in a particular sector in Medellín 
relative to total employment in that sector and LPF as a proxy for productivity of Medellín’s 
industries, Ramírez et al. (2014) construct a matrix of four quadrants that helps to classify the 
degree of productivity of different economic activities (see figure 7.12). The matrix shows four 
different types of sectors classified as 1) tradable high productivity industries; 2) local non-
tradable industries with high productivity; 3) local low productivity industries; and 4) low 
productivity tradable industries.  
 
FIGURE 7.12: PRODUCTIVITY MATRIX  
  
 
 
 
SOURCE: RAMÍREZ ET AL. (2014, P. 26) 
 
For Bogotá, Ramírez et al. (2014) find that the most tradable sectors that show high 
productivity potential generate very little employment. The only high productivity tradable 
sector in Bogotá that serves as a generator for high employment rates is the capital’s financial 
sector, including insurances and pensions. Most of Bogotá’s employment is concentrated in 
sectors that are characterized by relative low productivity and their non-tradable character 
such as retail and services (see Ramírez et al., 2014, p. 29). However, when looking at Bogotá’s 
manufacturing sector using the information of the EAM, Ramírez et al. (2014) observe a 
concentration of industrial sectors marked by high productivity rates, including aircraft 
manufacturing and manufacturing of electrical cables and wires.  
2) Local high productivity sectors  1) High productivity tradable sectors  
3) Local low productivity sectors 4) Low productivity tradable sectors 
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While the situation in Medellín is similar in some sectors (i.e. finance), an analysis of the 
Antioquian capital also reveals differences, especially in relation to medium and high 
productivity industrial sectors. The findings for Medellín show that there is a large absence of 
tradable and high productivity economic activities. The companies that have concentrated in 
Medellín largely engage in services and low productivity industries. The only tradable sector 
that shows high productivity potential and concentrates more than 10,000 employees is 
Medellín’s financial sector. This underlines the trend of the finance-driven and possibly 
speculative development of the city’s economy. The PILA data also reveals that the tradable 
industries of textile, metal and plastic show low productivity capabilities in relation to other 
economic activities, while at the same time these sectors concentrate a large proportion of 
local employment (see figure 7.13). The relatively high productivity of the electricity, gas and 
water sector can be explained by the presence of EPM and its role as one of Colombia’s largest 
utility providers. However, most economic activities are concentrated in quadrant three (see 
figure 7.13). The low productivity and the lack of trading capacities of these sectors clearly 
indicates that economic growth in Medellín over the past decade or so is largely built on weak 
foundations. 
 
FIGURE 7.13: EMPLOYMENT CONCENTRATION AND PRODUCTIVITY OF SECTORS IN MEDELLÍN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: RAMÍREZ ET AL. (2014), WITH DATA FROM PILA 
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Looking exclusively at the EAM data for an analysis of Medellín’s manufacturing industry we 
find that Medellín’s industry is dominated by the manufacturing of non-durable goods, such as 
textile and furniture (see figure 7.14). Hence, most employment is concentrated in these 
sectors, where ECF is relatively high. However, and as already established, these sectors have 
low productivity capabilities.  
This becomes further visible in figure 7.14, where the low productivity of these sectors is 
measured by the generation of value added per worker in comparison to general economic 
activities in industrial sectors in Medellín’s economy. The only non-agricultural sector that 
shows high productivity capabilities is the beverage industry, which at the same time seems to 
be concentrated on domestic markets. The inward relationship between ECF and LPF depicted 
in figure 7.14 clearly shows that sectors marked by high productivity in Medellín are limited to 
the domestic economy and do not concentrate large parts of the labour force. In turn, this 
means that Medellín’s industry is dominated by labour-intensive activities in sectors marked 
by low productivity. 
 
FIGURE 7.14: EMPLOYMENT CONCENTRATION AND PRODUCTIVITY OF MEDELLÍN’S MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
 
SOURCE: DATA FROM EAM24, OWN CALCULATION 
 
                                                          
24 Classification codes: 151: Production and procession of meat and fish; 158: Other foodstuff; 159: 
Beverages; 172: Weaving of textiles; 173: Finishing of textiles; 174: Other textile products; 175: Textile 
and knitwear; 181: Wearing apparel, except fur; 191: Leather; 202: Veneer sheets; 243: Millwood, 
Veneer, Plywood, and Structural Wood Members; 252: Rubber products; 271: Basic iron and steel; 289: 
Fabricated metal products and service activities related to metalworking; 292: Machinery of special 
purpose; 293: Household appliances; 331: Medical appliances; 341: Manufacture of paper and paper 
products; 342: Printing, publishing and allied industries; 359: Other transportation equipment; 361: 
Furniture; 369: Other manufacturing industries. 
181
151
172
252
269
289
158
159
173
174 175
243292
293
331
341
359
361
369
191
202
271
342-0,5
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
3,0
3,5
4,0
4,5
5,0
5,5
6,0
6,5
7,0
0 1 2 3 4 5
La
b
o
u
r 
P
ro
d
u
ct
iv
it
y 
Fa
ct
o
r 
(L
P
F)
Concentration of Employment (ECF)
202 
 
 
In sum, a very large part of Medellín’s economic development is based on growth in service 
sectors, particularly in financial services. Industrial employment is concentrated in low 
productivity sectors that focus on the manufacturing of non-durable consumer goods. The low 
capacity of sectors marked by higher productivity to generate employment is limited. These 
local developments resemble the overall trends of labour productivity growth in post-1991 
Colombia, where Washington Consensus-style financial and trade liberalization of Colombia 
have not resulted in high productivity growth.  
 
7.3 EXPORTS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS 
Similar to the trends in Medellín’s GDP growth, export rates have increased substantially since 
2004. Per capita rates of Antioquia’s exports have experienced very positive developments. 
Exports per capita reached over 1,000 US$ per capita in 2012, after having grown by over 
200% between 2002 and 2012 (figure 7.15). This makes Antioquia the strongest exporting 
region of Colombia, contributing to 9.3% of total exports. This figure is even higher and rises 
above 20% if we only look at industrial exports, excluding Colombia’s largest exporting sector 
petroleum and its derivatives (figure 7.16).  
 
FIGURE 7.15: ANTIOQUIAN EXPORTS PER CAPITA 
 
 SOURCE: CAMARA DE COMMERCIO (2014) 
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FIGURE 7.16: TOTAL EXPORTS AND CONTRIBUTION OF ANTIOQUIA, EXCLUDING PETROLEUM  
  
SOURCE: DATA FROM DANE, OWN CALCULATIONS 
 
However, despite these positive trends, the export growth rates and the large contribution to 
Colombia’s exports have failed to significantly impact productivity growth and technology 
transfer in the local economy. This is mainly due to the fact that the region mostly exports 
primary commodities, reflecting the deindustrialization of Antioquia as discussed in chapter 
five. Analysing industrial exports, we find that in the past 15 years there has been a constant 
fall in the share of medium and high technology goods as a percentage of overall exports. We 
analysed export data looking at the share of exports of medium and high technology goods, 
such as aircraft materials, office machinery and computers, radio and television equipment, 
pharmaceuticals, medical and optical instruments, motor vehicles, chemicals, mechanical 
equipment, electrical appliances, and railway material and other transport equipment. Recent 
figures indicate that only around 8% of Medellín’s total exports fall into this category of 
medium and high technology goods, which is a significant drop from almost 20% in 2000 
(figure 7.17). The very low contribution to the region’s exports of these higher value-added 
industrial products underlines that medium and high productivity sectors have insufficient 
export capacities. Hence, exports from Antioquia and Medellín have failed to translate into 
backward linkages for technologically advanced sector development and high productivity 
employment.  
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FIGURE 7.17: EXPORTS OF MEDIUM AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORTS 
 
SOURCE: DANE, OWN CALCULATIONS 
 
The relatively low productivity nature of Medellín’s export sector is also reflected in figure 
7.18, where we can see that exports have not been effective in serving as an engine of growth 
for Medellín’s economy. Despite that the remarkable export expansion of the regional 
economy has generated increasing incomes for Medellín (see figures 7.15 and 7.16), the local 
economy has been unable to harness that power generated through the increased exports 
(figure 7.18). As seen in figure 7.18, Antioquia’s share of exports in GDP has decreased from 
18.3% in 2003 to 11.25% in 2014, while Colombia’s share of exports as a percentage of GDP 
increased slightly.  
Despite of the increase in Medellín’s total exports since 2003, this did not result in a similarly 
positive trend for GDP growth, which may explain the sharp decline of the share of exports in 
GDP (figure 7.18). Another explanation for the fall in the export share can be traced back to 
the domination of Medellín’s and Antioquia’s exports by goods from sectors marked by low 
productivity. The large share of natural resources (gold) and low-value added content of the 
exported industrial goods (see figure 7.17) explains much of the trend depicted in figure 7.18. 
Additionally, the focus on a market-enhancing policy environment that does not actively create 
incentives and compulsions for an export-led model of goods from medium and high 
technology sectors further slows down attempts to climb up the value ladder.  
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FIGURE 7.18: EXPORTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP 
 
SOURCES: CAMARA DE COMMERCIO (2014); DANE 
 
In sum, alongside Medellín’s deindustrialization trends and Colombia’s shift towards 
neoliberalism, the institutional changes in Medellín facilitated the city’s return to static 
comparative advantages in industrial and service sectors that are marked by labour intensity 
and low wages, and have insufficient exporting capacities.  
The low productivity growth of Medellín’s economy becomes further evident in the analysis of 
the growth performances of Antioquia’s strategic clusters discussed in chapter six. Put forward 
by the Fajardo coalition as a promotion of sectors in which the regional economy was 
perceived to have comparative advantages, the cluster sectors received a considerable amount 
of institutional attention and public investment. This incentivized the creation of many new 
businesses in these sectors, leading to increases in overall numbers of companies as well as in 
their share of GDP growth (table 7.4).  
However, as shown in table 7.4, the cluster sectors have low productivity outputs, and more 
importantly they fail to serve as an engine of growth for the regional economy. Technology 
transfers and sustainable productivity growth are unlikely to result from these trends. Of the 
strategic sectors identified by the Fajardo coalition, the labour-intensive textile sector still 
contributes most to industrial exports, despite it being the smallest contributor to GDP growth. 
Construction (including cement) is by far the largest industrial contributor to GDP growth 
(19.5%), but it only contributes around 8.8% to the city’s exports. The overall contribution of 
the tourist cluster to GDP growth of only 3.4% confirms our earlier findings that the sector is 
unlikely to serve as growth escalator for productivity growth and development of medium or 
high technology sectors. The inability of the local economy to climb up the technology ladder 
becomes further visible in the analysis of the IT and communication sector. Being one of the 
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few sectors with potential to generate productivity growth in medium or high technology 
activities, this sector contributes only a very small proportion of overall exports. 
 
TABLE 7.4: ECONOMIC CLUSTERS: GROWTH AND EXPORT CAPACITIES OF THE STRATEGIC SECTORS  
Cluster Number of 
companies 
in 20131 
Share of 
total 
companies 
in 2013 
(in %)2 
Exports in 
2014 (in 
2005 
constant 
US$, 
thousand)3 
Share of 
total 
industrial 
exports in 
2014 
(in %) 
Contribution 
to GDP in 
20134 
Energy 2311 1.7% 238.9 10.6 3.9% 
Textile 16104 11.5% 517.4 22.9% 2.4% 
Construction 17241 12.3% 199.3 8.8% 19.5% 
Tourism 14750 10.5% N/A N/A 3.4% 
Medical goods 
and services 
5447 3.9% 31.4 1.4% 2.4% 
Information 
technology and 
communication 
4151 3.0% 4.7 0.2% 3.1% 
Total 59959 42.8% 991.7 43.9% 34.7% 
SOURCES: DATA FROM: 1REGISTRO PÚBLICO MERCANTIL – CAMARA DE COMERCIO (2013); 2ESTIMATIONS, 
BASED ON CALCULATIONS OF REGISTRO PÚBLICO MERCANTIL DATA; 3DANE, CÁLCULOS INVESTIGACIONES 
ECONÓMICAS, CCMA; 4DANE – CUENTAS DEPARTAMENTALES 2012 
 
The analysis has shown that from a developmental perspective Medellín has clearly 
experienced negative trends with regard to productivity growth and technological capabilities. 
The findings of this section indicate that despite the relatively high growth rates and the 
comparatively high employment rates in Medellín, these have failed to translate into 
productivity growth in medium or high technology sectors with the potential of ensuring a 
sustainable growth path in the longer term. 
 
7.4 THE LABOUR MARKET AND INCOME INEQUALITY 
The lack of competitiveness of Medellín’s medium to high technological industries and the 
inability of the city’s economy to harness the power generated by the expansion of regional 
exports has hindered local companies from climbing up the value and technology ladder. This 
trend of low productivity growth and the failure to translate economic growth into technology 
acquisitions and transfers is also reflected in urban labour market developments. In figure 7.19 
negative or at least questionable trends of Medellín’s labour market become visible. 
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Compared to the rest of the country, the overall number of established companies increased, 
while value added and gross production of Medellín’s economy decreased. Figure 7.19 
furthermore shows that the increase in employment was largely absorbed by an increase in 
temporal employees, while real wages (income) and permanent employment stagnated or 
even decreased. This provides initial evidence that the labour market in Medellín is highly 
flexible and experiences high gross employment elasticities. 
 
FIGURE 7.19: RELATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDELLÍN’S LABOUR MARKET VARIABLES 
 
SOURCE: DANE, OWN CALCULATIONS  
 
To gain further insights into the characteristics of Medellín’s economy and its capacities to 
serve as a generator of growth in sectors marked by high productivity and high-skilled labour, 
we need to take a closer look at the relationship between the local gross employment 
elasticities and the development of labour productivity. Gross employment elasticity is defined 
as the ratio between employment growth and GDP growth. The degree of employment 
elasticity of a country (or in our case a city) is indicative of the degree of flexibility of the 
national (or local) labour market. A higher elasticity indicates a higher degree of labour market 
flexibility.  
General trends in Latin America show that employment elasticities are much higher than in the 
rest of the world. Palma (2011) finds explanations for this in the region’s focus on economic 
growth based on services. The labour market of Colombia in general and Medellín in particular 
is not an exception to this. Quite the contrary: the particularities of Medellín’s labour market, 
characterized by its structurally low productivity and high gross employment elasticities, often 
limit the amount of productivity growth and high-wage employment that can be generated 
with additional GDP growth. Cano and Ochoa (2008) as well as Vélez Cardona (2001) find that 
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Medellín has comparably higher gross employment elasticities than the rest of the country, 
which results from the relatively higher sensitivity of Medellín’s employment to output 
growth.  
The highly flexible labour market regime in Medellín undermines potential productivity growth 
in periods of high economic growth. In such periods, additional growth is absorbed by an 
increase in employment. Using the findings of Palma (2011), figure 7.20 shows the relationship 
between gross employment elasticity and productivity growth in Latin America (including 
Medellín) compared to the rest of the world. The negative relationship between the two 
variables indicates that the high gross employment elasticities may very well affect GDP and 
investment growth negatively.  
The analysis of Medellín in comparison to these general trends shows that the local 
developments are fairly negative. The liberalization of the country’s economy, and the 
implementation of market-enhancing institutional structures have in many ways affected the 
productivity potential of industrial and service activities negatively, a trend local ‘good 
governance’ reforms did not challenge (see figures 7.13 and 7.14). Medellín’s growth strategy 
and particularly the labour market reforms that were adopted in this context have increased 
gross employment elasticities and have resulted in the concentration of growth in low 
productivity sectors. The flexibilization of the labour market has thus impeded a positive 
impact of Medellín’s GDP growth on the city’s productivity performance (see figure 7.20). 
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FIGURE 7.20: PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT ELASTICITY: MEDELLÍN LABOUR MARKET 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: PALMA (2011, P. 29), OWN ELABORATION FOR MEDELLÍN25 
 
 
Figure 7.20 indicates that while Medellín’s productivity growth of 0.84% is below the national 
average, the city’s gross employment elasticity of 0.79 is above Colombia’s average. Combining 
these findings with those presented in sections 7.2 and 7.3, we see that the labour-intensive 
manufacturing sectors as well as the tourist sector might generate employment for Medellín’s 
labour force. However, the low capacities of these activities to generate high productivity 
growth translate to insufficient pressure on the large elasticity of labour supply. This has also 
resulted in very little upward effects on wages (see figure 7.19), which stands in contrast to the 
development of income indicators in other Colombian cities (see Ramírez et al., 2014).  
Overall, these trends have had little impact on productivity growth, which explains why much 
of the formal sector of Medellín’s economy remains in such activities that require low 
technology and low-skilled labour. Palma’s (2011, p. 30) conclusion for Latin America aligns 
closely with our findings for Medellín: “In other words, this bulk of the economy can operate 
with few compulsions for productivity growth thanks to ‘flexible’ labour markets,… and a 
(typically) high degree of oligopolistic concentration”. The modern sector of ‘the most 
innovative city in the world’ is thus based on low productivity manufacturing of non-durable 
                                                          
25 Due to limited data availability, the arc elasticity of Medellín’s labour market was calculated using the 
time period between 2004 and 2012, while the rest of the data is taken from Palma (2011) whose time 
series calculations are for the period 1990-2008. For the calculation of arc elasticity of employment in 
Medellín we use: ε =  
∆𝐿/𝐿
∆𝑌𝑌
 , where L denotes employment and Y stands for GDP for the local economy as 
a whole. The numerator is the percentage change of employment; the denominator refers to the growth 
rate of GDP. The arc elasticity ε describes the per cent change of employment for every per cent change 
of GDP between 2004 and 2012.  
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commodities, a low technology service sector that has low productivity growth rates, and the 
abundance of cheap (informal) labour supply. It is therefore not surprising that Medellín 
remains the most unequal city in one of the most unequal countries worldwide (see figure 
7.21) 
 
FIGURE 7.21: INEQUALITY IN MAJOR COLOMBIAN CITIES, GINI LEVELS FOR 2010 
 
SOURCE: DANE, OWN ELABORATION  
 
The incorporation of the neoliberal paradigm in Medellín has not only hindered the creation of 
opportunities for high productivity growth, but has also crippled possibilities of creating 
market compulsions in which these opportunities can be taken up. Again, using the analysis of 
Latin America by Palma (2011, p. 50) we can conclude that the neoliberal brand of Medellín’s 
capitalism “is characterised as much by its capacity to generate market opportunities as by its 
ability to waste them”. Furthermore, the very particularity of Medellín’s economy is that it has 
served as a very effective tool for the transnationalized capitalist elite to perpetuate structural 
tendencies of unequal distributional outcomes in the city’s society. The hegemonic nature of 
the organizational power of actors that promote market-driven development – reinforced and 
perpetuated through ‘good governance’ reforms – makes it close to impossible for outsiders of 
the ruling coalition to challenge this strategy.  
The institutional and governance reforms that were compatible with the power structures in 
Medellín’s transnationalized local political settlement promoted developmental outcomes that 
underline Medellín’s return to static comparative advantages in labour-intensive industries 
and low technology services. Medellín’s ‘good governance’ model does not challenge the city’s 
insertion into the low productivity end of global production. Rather these reforms are 
perpetuating Medellín’s situation.  
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Besides providing explanations of these findings regarding the low productivity character of 
Medellín’s economic development, the political settlements approach can help us in 
understanding outcomes regarding political stability and violence. The next section discusses 
how the ruling coalition was an important factor in stabilizing Medellín’s political settlement. 
While most contributions have attributed the stabilization of Medellín’s polity and the 
decrease in violence to ‘good governance’ reforms, the next section engages in a political 
economy analysis of the factors behind these changes.  
 
7.5 POLITICAL STABILITY, VIOLENCE AND DEVELOPMENT  
Besides Medellín’s economic turnaround, the main argument in favour of a “miracle” having 
taken place in Medellín is the city’s success in reducing violence (see figure 2.8). Indeed, since 
the homicide rate peaked at 375 per 100,000 in 1991, the city has experienced a dramatic 
reduction of murders to 177 per 100,000 in 2002, before Fajardo came to power, and a further 
steep reduction to 52 per 100,000 in 2012, the year the second tenure of the Fajardo coalition 
government ended. This development is undoubtedly remarkable. However, to claim a 
“miracle” effectuated by the Fajardo coalition is an oversimplified explanation which not only 
ignores wider national developments and trends of legitimization of paramilitary control over 
the main geo-political and geo-economic areas of the country. It also fails to include more 
nuanced considerations about shifts in the distribution of power in Colombia’s and Medellín’s 
political settlement, which would inform a fuller understanding of these developments.  
Furthermore, we also find an increase in other violence-related variables. For example, the 
number of extortions of businesses has increased dramatically since 2004 (figure 7.22). This 
shows that businesses in Medellín have increasingly paid protection fees, so-called vacunas 
(‘vaccinations’). In a situation where private investment in Medellín increased (also as a result 
of the perceived higher security), paramilitary forces have more investment to protect. In 
certain parts of the city the paramilitary has established a monopoly on violence as well as 
significant ‘tax’-collection capacities, which are tolerated by the local authorities. In visits to 
the paramilitary-controlled north eastern and north western comunas the author observed a 
complete absence of any state enforcement of the rule of law. In conversations with local 
members of paramilitary organizations as well as with ex-members of urban militias it was 
furthermore stressed that the bandas exercise control over local businesses and the 
movement of people (Quijano, 2014). The authorities evaluate these ‘petty crimes’ as the 
lesser of two evils and thus tolerate paramilitarized control in comunas far away from the 
tourist activities (Román, 2014).  
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FIGURE 7.22: EXTORTIONS OF BUSINESSES IN MEDELLÍN  
 
SOURCE: MEDELLÍN COMO VAMOS (2015) 
 
The character of violence and tactics of war have also drastically changed since the turn of the 
millennium. Since then the paramilitary seem to have taken on board that a high homicide rate 
is harmful to the image of the city for attracting investment, particularly from abroad – after 
all, the national and international press are exclusively focused on the development of the 
city’s homicide rate (Quijano, 2014). In an interview a community leader denounced that 
instead of killing someone and leaving the body in the streets to display their strength, local 
gangs increasingly make people and bodies disappear (Pérez Zapata, 2014). These forced 
disappearances (seen in figure 7.23) do not affect the homicide rates.  
 
FIGURE 7.23: FORCED DISAPPEARANCES  
 
SOURCE: MEDELLÍN COMO VAMOS (2015) 
 
A related feature of violence worth discussing in this context is the changing nature of 
interurban forced displacement. As discussed in chapters two and six, Medellín’s policy agenda 
since 2004 places great emphasis on the construction of megaprojects as part of social 
urbanism and urban planning strategies. While the Fajardo administration claimed that since 
these projects are carried out in the least developed comunas they achieve “wealth 
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distribution without appealing to a discourse of anger or aggression” (Fajardo cited in Coupé et 
al., 2012, p. 54), the social impact of these projects is far from redistributive. These projects 
have in fact played an important role in interurban forced displacement. Alongside the tracks 
of the two main lines of the Metrocable, as well as in the residential zones in and around the 
library parks, the administration has forcibly displaced a large number of poor residents that 
are further pushed to the fringes of the urban borders (Pérez Zapata, 2014). Figure 7.24 shows 
these trends.  
 
FIGURE 7.24: INTERURBAN FORCED DISPLACEMENT: MEDELLÍN 
 
SOURCE: MEDELLÍN COMO VAMOS (2015) 
 
However, most analyses of Medellín’s transformation focus on the reduction of the city’s 
homicide rate. A political economy analysis of these trends can provide specific explanations, 
making claims regarding the occurrence of a “miracle” rather inappropriate. The first decrease 
in the city’s homicide rate in the 1990s can be explained by the elite bargain based on the 
agreement between the different elite factions over a paramilitarized control of the city. This 
filled the vacuum left by Pablo Escobar’s Medellín Cartel, and also prevented the further rise of 
insurgent urban militias. Unlike the drug lord Escobar, the paramilitary forces were not 
interested in political control, but solely concentrated on the extraction of rents through 
private security contracts with all elite factions as well as through illicit drug income and 
extortions (Franco Restrepo, 2005). Hence, the paramilitary did not challenge the economic 
and political power balance, which continued to be dominated by the GEA on the one hand 
and the political elites on the other (both of which directly and indirectly benefited through 
coalitions with the paramilitary).  
In the wake of what today is known as parapolitica the emergentes, led by Senator Álvaro 
Uribe Vélez pushed through Law 356 of 1994 that legalised paramilitary control through 
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establishing the private security forces Convivir26. With the creation of Convivir, the 
paramilitary had legal access to state-created rents and could operate as a legitimized force of 
social control. At the time, the legalization of private control through paramilitary forces was 
met with great enthusiasm, including by the GEA. As a leader of the grupo remarks: “The 
paramilitaries and Convivir are cooperatives that bind good people from the region to protect 
themselves, they are the result of institutions in difficulty and in decline... Fortunately, the 
Convivir have been given approval to continue operating... They are natural institutions in a 
society of this kind, and I think these institutions have to continue to exist” (cited in Betancur 
et al., 2001, p. 227). The Convivir thus became powerful organizations with considerable 
enforcement powers over a variety of different state functions, including the enforcement of 
property rights (Hylton, 2007). The paramilitarization of control can thus be seen as an 
institutional mechanism that stabilized the elite bargain between the emergentes and the GEA 
as both factions benefited, be it through a shared interest in extracting rent and income from 
the drug economy or through the enforcement of property right structures favourable for 
private capital accumulation.  
However, and coinciding with distributive conflicts over state-created rents and the role of 
EPM, in the late 1990s there was an increase in the homicide rate (see figure 2.8). Luis Pérez 
Gutiérrez’ opposition to the existing settlement between the political and economic elites at 
the time is one explanatory factor in this destabilization and increase in violence in Medellín. 
Subsequently the settlement came close to collapse. The rise in homicides can also be 
explained by the more politicized role of the paramilitary after the 1990s. However, and not 
least due to the election of Álvaro Uribe Vélez as President of Colombia in 2002, the conflict 
did not spiral out of control.  
For the analysis of the changing dynamics of violence after the turn of the millennium, we can 
thus conclude that several factors contributed to the stabilization of Medellín’s political 
settlement.  
Firstly, we see the presidency of Álvaro Uribe Vélez as important variable. Since the mid-1990s 
Uribe Vélez had played a core role in stabilizing the political settlement in Medellín. The 
emergente Uribe Vélez, with his close ties to the paramilitary as well as to the main paisa 
capitalists of the GEA, re-established the synergies between the different elite factions by 
pushing a national agenda of counter-insurgency for Medellín. Uribe Vélez’ ‘pacification’ 
                                                          
26 Convivir is the acronym for the neighbourhood watch groups Servicios Especiales de Vigilancia y 
Seguridad Privada (Special vigilance and private security services). Convivir (ironically) translates into 
“coexist” or “live together”.  
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strategy included a confrontational war against leftist urban guerrillas in Medellín that 
culminated with the Operación Orión in 2002. Operación Orión was a military operation led by 
President Uribe Vélez in which local and national public forces together with Medellín’s ever 
more powerful paramilitary and Convivir brutally cleansed the guerrilla stronghold sectors in 
the Eastern hillside comuna San Javier. Resistance by left-wing urban guerrillas was violently 
oppressed. Despite massive human rights violations, the Colombian government as well as 
some academic observers deem Uribe Vélez’ tactics, and particularly Orión, as main factors in 
the ‘pacification’ of Medellín. Certainly, increased access to formal and informal rents for the 
paramilitary calmed tensions and stabilized Medellín’s society. These developments preceded 
the ‘good governance’ reforms of the Fajardo coalition. Fajardo took office in a situation where 
the paramilitary in Medellín had near total control over most of the city’s marginalized 
comunas and of the drug economy that remains very much alive until today (Durán, 2014). As 
a political observer told the author: “Fajardo arrived to faits acomplis and all he needed to do 
is implement reforms” (Urán, 2014). 
Secondly, we find that the governance structures that evolved from the changed context of 
power and the distribution of rents through EPM also stabilized the bargaining between the 
different elite factions. Following Fajardo’s victory, the ruling coalition focused on public 
investments targeting the construction of several megaprojects. The social urbanism policies, 
combined with the Metrocable project generated large demand for cement and are largely 
responsible for subsequent growth of the construction sector. Incidentally, the increased 
dynamics of the construction sector also benefited the sectors of financial intermediation and 
real estate activities. As shown above, these sectors have a high participation of all elite 
factions: the GEA controls the cement production and finance industry, and the emergentes as 
well as the remaining drug elites/paramilitary have vested interests in the construction and 
real estate sectors.  
Thirdly, we identified shared interests between the different elite factions in maintaining the 
balance of power of Medellín’s political settlement. The promotion of the ‘good governance’ 
agenda and a particular pattern of sectoral growth through the institutional structures has 
served as a way of ensuring access to rents for all elite factions. We find evidence that the 
particular strategy of achieving economic development through inserting the city into global 
circuits of capital accumulation helped to stabilize the settlement. Analysing a communiqué of 
Medellín’s most influential paramilitary leader of the 2000s, Diego Murillo Bejarano alias Don 
Berna, we find that the overlapping of paramilitary interests with the dominant interest of the 
different elite factions in a neoliberal development strategy stabilized the elite bargain further. 
Don Berna explains that there is a need to create the “necessary climate so that investment 
216 
 
returns, particularly foreign investment, which is fundamental if we do not want to be left 
behind by the engine of globalization” (Amnesty International, 2005). Considering this 
statement, Hylton (2007, p. 88) concludes that Fajardo and Don Berna’s “major area of 
agreement… remains the necessity of adapting the city to the needs and security of foreign 
capital. Don Berna’s concern to create a favourable climate for overseas investors... Fajardo 
echoes the need to ‘project’ the image of a ‘vibrant city, once again taking its place as a 
business hub and tourist destination’”. While for the paramilitary an increase in investments 
means that there are more resources to protect, translating into more rents and income for 
the paramilitary (see Holmes et al., 2008, p. 131), the transnational capitalists benefit in 
several ways. As explained, FDI to Medellín are most likely to target sectors in which Medellín 
is perceived to have comparative advantages. As these advantages are largely in low 
productivity sectors with low wages and a low participation of high technological activities, this 
perpetuates Medellín’s position at the lower end of global value chains. Medellín’s neoliberal 
development agenda promotes and advances these global capitalist processes, which most 
powerful elite factions participate in and extract most of their incomes from.  
We can summarise that while the ‘good governance’ strategy might have established a 
relatively stable equilibrium in Medellín’s political settlement through a particular kind of rent 
distribution, this is by no means a miraculous development. Medellín’s particular form of 
neoliberal urban governance has served as an institutional mechanism to include a large 
amount of the political elite factions and the paramilitary actors in the transnationalized 
circuits of accumulation. The political settlement could thus be stabilized by gathering the 
different elite factions around the axis of transnational accumulation patterns through the 
endorsement of neoliberal development strategies. However, this market-enhancing growth 
strategy has had detrimental effects on productivity, sustainability, and inclusiveness, as it has 
resulted in low productivity growth. This has created a situation in which higher productivity 
investments from older incumbents as well as from industrial newcomers are not being 
incentivized. The developmental outcomes of this neoliberal strategy of inserting Medellín into 
the global capitalist market are evident in the low productivity character of Medellín’s 
economy, insufficient export capacities which failed to achieve backward linkages on 
productivity growth and technological transfers, high employment elasticities, and high 
inequality in income distribution.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS 
The main objective of this thesis was to theoretically investigate and explore institutional 
approaches that can help in achieving a more detailed understanding of recent institutional 
and policy evolution and associated outcomes in Medellín, Colombia. By challenging some of 
the underlying assumptions of the conventional theoretical understanding of the role of 
institutions for development, this thesis provided a detailed discussion of the ‘political 
settlements’ theory. This approach challenges conventional theories of institutions and 
development, in particular by adopting a historically well-informed and context-specific focus 
on how substantial interdependency between power structures, institutional frameworks and 
policy agendas influence developmental trajectories and economic performances. The thesis 
explored how recent politico-economic changes in Colombia and in the global economy have 
challenged dominant power structures and the institutional landscape of Medellín. It extended 
the political settlements framework to include local as well as transnational factors of the 
analysis, for the case of Medellín. 
The remainder of this concluding chapter is structured as follows: section 8.1 summarizes main 
arguments and key findings in relation to the research questions this study set out to answer. 
Section 8.2 highlights important policy implications. Section 8.3 reflects on future research 
opportunities in our field of study.  
 
8.1 KEY FINDINGS AND MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS 
While each chapter addressed specific research questions emerging from the discussion of the 
literature, the main findings and key contributions of this study evolve around several core 
themes analysed across the entire thesis.  
In a review of the literature on Medellín’s development in chapter two we found that 
conventional approaches analysing the city’s transformation use the context-detached and 
seemingly apolitical ‘good governance’ framework. The failure of this literature to convincingly 
explain recent institutional changes and developmental outcomes in Medellín prompted the 
need to frame an alternative theoretical approach. Furthermore, the largely ahistorical analysis 
of empirical evidence and the failure of the conventional literature to take into account any 
other than very aggregate and fairly rough quantitative and qualitative data, such as increases 
in GDP growth, lower unemployment and improved homicide rates motivated a more detailed 
and less aggregate empirical contribution to the debate on Medellín’s ‘urban miracle’. 
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In the theoretical analysis of institutional change, governance, and development we engaged 
with the broader question of how theories of institutions, governance and development can 
be framed in ways that contextualise institutional change in the historical, social and economic 
context of contemporary transition processes.  
Our starting point was the observation that conventional approaches to the study of the role 
of institutions in the economy generally adopt a mechanical view according to which harmful 
transaction costs, associated with specific types of institutions, reduce economic efficiency. In 
addition to the efficiency function of reducing transaction costs, institutional changes prompt 
resistance and contestation, to a greater or lesser degree, particularly in the context of 
structural transformation processes or economic development. Such processes, therefore, 
cannot be reduced to static-comparative analyses of which sets of regulations and institutional 
arrangements may maximise efficient resource allocation in existing market economies. 
Instead the costs of transition – of moving from substantially non-market based societies to 
largely market-based ones, have to be taken into account. While historically and contextually 
specific factors will be relevant also to the reform of regulatory apparatuses in advanced 
market economies, they loom much larger in transitional economies that undergo long-term 
structural and societal change. In particular, the viability of specific institutional reform agenda 
will be much more sensitive to often fragile compatibilities between the distribution of power 
in a society, the governance and rent-management capacities of state agencies and the 
technological capabilities of emerging classes of entrepreneurs. The theoretical point of 
departure of the framework of this thesis is thus one where such political and economic 
factors are included in the analysis of institutional change and economic development.  
Under circumstances of developmental transformation, when institutions manage to sustain a 
distribution of net economic benefits amongst different players, organizations and interest 
groups that is compatible with political stability as well as sustainable economic efficiency and 
growth, a political settlement emerges. In this sense, there are no ‘good’ or ‘bad’ institutions, 
only favourable and less favourable interdependent combinations of inherited and evolving 
power configurations, institutions and organizational as well as administrative capacities. This 
makes a blueprint approach to institutions, such as the ‘good governance’ agenda, unsuitable 
for a coherent understanding of the institutional impacts on development and growth.  
In most less developed economies or regions, and the case of Medellín is no exception, 
entrepreneurs with low technological and low productivity capabilities hold large 
organizational powers vis-à-vis the state. In such a settlement the emergence of an 
institutional structure that creates conditions for productivity growth is unlikely, as the state 
has limited governance capabilities to create incentives or compulsions for technology 
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acquisition that result in growth-enhancing outcomes. The (local and/or national) state, rather 
than being in a position to incentivize and discipline emerging entrepreneurs to learn and 
climb up the technology ladder, is hampered by weak bargaining power. Furthermore, 
informality is part and parcel of transformational processes and can go either way: It can help 
channel learning rents to receptive entrepreneurial groups, or it can reinforce low productivity 
tendencies. 
While these features of catching-up development and transformational processes are well 
established by now, this thesis has, in particular, taken note of the fact that the political 
settlements literature tends to underplay transnational factors and movements towards 
decentralization that increasingly shape the societies and economies of less developed 
countries. The main theoretical contribution of this thesis is therefore based on a further 
exploration of the political settlements framework beyond the narrow focus on national-level 
power structures, institutional frameworks, and economic policies. We found that processes of 
political decentralization and economic liberalization in Latin America have major implications 
for several aspects of the political settlements analysis. In particular, following Latin America’s 
neoliberal shift in the 1980s balances of power in many societies shifted and institutional 
mechanisms to create and distribute rents changed. Parallel processes of decentralization and 
economic liberalization have increased the power of local capitalist elites. At the same time, 
these changes effectively weakened the governance capacities of states to centrally create 
rents and allocate resources in ways that can achieve growth-enhancing developmental 
outcomes. The implications for the creation of traditional growth-enhancing institutions are 
particularly visible with the example of subsidies, which experienced a shift away from internal 
industrial agents towards transnational capital.  
Our theoretical analysis of Colombia’s experience showed that these processes have led to a 
shift of power away from the central state authorities towards local factions of the capitalist 
elite. Resulting changes in rent management and the integration of Colombia’s economy into 
globalized markets have facilitated the country’s return to static comparative advantages in 
low productivity sectors. We found that a decentralized regime of rent management in a 
context of economic liberalization can reinforce pressures to maintain low technological 
capabilities and static comparative advantages in low productivity and unskilled labour sectors. 
A range of political factors and constellations, such as those described for the case of Medellín 
in the context of wider decentralization policy in Colombia, meant that local governance 
capabilities to allocate resources to learning in medium or high productivity sectors were 
severely hampered. This was further reinforced by reliance on attracting FDI for technology 
transfers and the locational decision-making rationales of MNEs. Together, this largely 
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discouraged local incumbents with potential technological and productivity capabilities to 
invest in high-risk strategies, as returns on investments were not backed by a clear institutional 
structure or policy agenda. In sum, local governments in Colombia face growing pressures to 
accept the low productivity comparative advantages of their economies, while at the same 
time maintaining a large supply of unskilled and cheap labour to be able to compete with other 
similarly endowed cities for the attraction of FDI into sectors that are at the low productivity 
end of the global value chain. 
Using Robinson’s (2010) framework, we found that these processes have also led to an 
increase in the power of Latin America’s emerging “transnational capitalist class”. The rise of 
the transnational capitalist elite in Colombia has thus affected power structures and 
institutional mechanisms in ways that have implications for the implementation and 
enforcement of policies that can achieve sustainable levels of political and economic viability. 
We found that this elite faction, which holds most of its assets in low productivity services, 
low-wage industries, or extractive sectors has challenged and changed the political 
settlements that favoured ISI development, which were predominant in most countries in 
post-war Latin America. Thus, and unlike in nation-state capitalism, the transnational faction of 
the elite has little intention to develop productive domestic markets and internal effective 
demand, but rather has an interest in the advancement of the global capitalist system in which 
they participate and from which they extract most of their income.  
The transnational capitalist elites in Latin America have underpinned their economic power by 
achieving considerable organizational power and developing capacities as political actors. With 
the powerful position of this elite in local ruling coalitions, any change in institutional 
structures is likely to reinforce the low productivity development of Latin American markets in 
general and of Colombian urban economies in particular. Implemented and enforced policy 
agendas that are closely linked to ‘good governance’ reforms promote market-driven 
development and a further economic integration that helps in the promotion of global 
capitalism. The combination of a powerful transnational capitalist elite that has low 
entrepreneurial and low technological capabilities with a rolled-back decentralized state with 
limited discretionary power in a liberalized economy leads to a situation in which formal and 
informal institutions are unlikely to incentivize the development of growth-escalating sectors. 
Such a political settlement is unlikely to result in the creation of incentives and compulsions for 
investments in efforts for acquiring tacit knowledge in medium and high technology activities. 
Furthermore, the combination of power and institutions has limited governance capacities to 
discipline the powerful transnational capitalists. 
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The key empirical contributions of this thesis consists of the findings we made in the analysis of 
Medellín’s development experience. The findings were based on the originality of our 
historical, context-specific theoretical framework and on the application of a mixed methods 
case study approach using qualitative and quantitative data gathered during fieldwork for this 
research. This methodology helped in refining and supporting our theory, to test the 
consistencies between theoretical considerations and empirical evidence, and to identify 
specific policy responses.  
The first empirical contribution of this thesis consists of a historical analysis of political 
settlements in Medellín and Colombia. We analysed how historical and social processes 
shaped the development of the interdependency between power and institutions in Medellín 
in ways that led to the creation of favourable conditions for industrialization. We found that 
purely quantitative and economic analyses of Medellín’s industrialization need to be expanded 
by exploring how the historically developed combination of power and institutions became 
favourable for the implementation and enforcement of policies that incentivized growth in 
light manufacturing industries. For much of the twentieth century Medellín’s political 
settlement was marked by a power distribution that was compatible with institutional 
mechanisms that created incentives and compulsions for productivity growth and ISI 
development. The powerful position of entrepreneurs with interests and capabilities in 
developing labour-intensive industrial sectors facilitated the emergence of growth-enhancing 
rent management structures for successful easy industrialization. 
The second main empirical contribution of this thesis evolves around the analysis of how 
changes in the constellation of power, elite interests, governance capacities of the state, and 
entrepreneurial capabilities of the regional private sector can explain why the city’s economy 
deindustrialized. In analysing how the changing nature of the political settlement shaped 
developmental outcomes, we found that the distribution of power in Medellín’s and 
Colombia’S political settlements became largely incompatible with institutional mechanisms 
needed for the promotion of advanced industrial development. Various political economy 
changes during and after the Frente Nacional (i.e. the introduction of a mixed strategy of 
import-substitution and export-promotion, and an organizational fragmentation of elite 
interests) limited governance capacities to create and distribute growth-enhancing rents. This 
led to economic slowdown and political instability.  
We analysed how institutional responses to these changes in the form of decentralization 
reforms affected organizational power in Colombia more generally and in Medellín in 
particular. While these reforms were intended to pay-off outsiders of the dominant ruling 
coalition (also as a result from the rise of the new political elite – the clase emergente), they 
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also fragmented Colombia’s political settlement further. This made it even more difficult to 
implement and enforce growth-enhancing policies. 
Furthermore, we analysed the responses of the dominant industrial elite faction to these 
changes. We found that with the creation of the Grupo Empresarial Antioqueño (GEA), 
Medellín’s capitalists developed capacities in services, finance, and construction. The 
structures of the GEA protected the capitalists’ dominant economic position from the 
increasingly powerful emergentes. However, in the 1980s Medellín’s fragmented political 
settlement destabilized, as organizational power was increasingly contested from drug cartels 
and leftist urban militia movements. The levels of political and economic viability decreased 
rapidly and the city descended into chaos and violence.  
We found that a compromise over rent management, the paramilitarization of control and 
violent oppression of leftist insurgent movements temporarily stabilized the settlement in the 
1990s. However, a new conflict emerged between the political elite of emergentes and the 
capitalist elite over the use of locally state-created rents through the public utility company 
EPM. In combination with a general slowdown of economic growth in Colombia this conflict 
made the compromised bargaining of Medellín’s settlement increasingly fragile. At the turn of 
the millennium Medellín was yet again at the brink of becoming an urban society in crisis. We 
found that this was due to the fact that the distribution of power was no longer formally 
aligned to institutional mechanisms that could keep the political settlement politically stable 
and economically viable.  
The analysis of Medellín’s recent development through the lens of the political settlements 
approach helped in gaining a more nuanced understanding of how elite transnationalization 
and political decentralization affected the distribution of power and the institutional 
environment in Medellín in ways that had several implications for city’s development. We 
found that Colombia’s fairly radical shift to neoliberalism in the early 1990s strengthened 
particular capitalist business groups. At the same time, the further devolution of state powers 
to decentralized governments, increased fiscal pressure on city administrations, and the 
privatization of locally state-owned businesses decreased the discretionary power of the state.  
The Medellín-based GEA particularly benefited through the implemented economic and 
financial liberalization reforms. Besides securing access to rents created through privatization 
and deregulation of specific sectors, the GEA developed capacities as transnational actors in 
the now liberalized Colombian economy. The transnationalization of Medellín’s capitalist elite 
is marked by a restructuring of their business interests. The GEA thus focused on the 
development of capacities in low-wage services, finance, and construction, which has 
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reinforced the return of the city’s economy to static comparative advantages in low-skilled and 
low productivity activities.  
Besides impacting Medellín’s power structure, the economic liberalization and political 
decentralization reforms also had important implications for coordination and governance 
capabilities – particularly in the context of the transnationalization of the local capitalist elites. 
While Colombia’s protected and largely closed economy had guaranteed a relative stable elite 
bargain between dominant groups, the neoliberal shift challenged traditional forms of rent 
management and hence altered the rules of the game for possible creation and enforcement 
of growth-enhancing policies. The increased power of transnationalized local businesses and 
organized actors and the decreased power of the decentralized state can lead to the reduction 
of attempts in creating and enforce growth-enhancing institutional strategies. 
We further explored how Medellín’s faction of the transnational capitalist elite developed 
capacities as political actors to gain organizational powers over local rent management. We 
found that with the election of Mayor Sergio Fajardo in 2003 the transnational capitalist elite 
gained organizational power over local state-created rents through EPM’s profits and tax 
incomes. We argued that these changes have enduring implications. In a local political 
settlement where a transnational capitalist elite with low technological capabilities has 
considerable organizational capacities, the emergence of institutions that incentivize 
productivity growth is unlikely. The increasingly weakened local state has limited capacities 
that could create and enforce incentives and compulsions for investments into medium or high 
technology sectors. Through the strong position of this transnational capitalist elite, rent 
management in Medellín inherently targets sectors unlikely to be sustainable productivity 
growth escalators for the urban economy. The powerful position of the transnational capitalist 
elite in the ruling coalition furthermore hinders the enforcement of disciplining mechanisms in 
case of non-performance.  
We found that Medellín’s ‘good governance’ strategies are likely to result in the creation of 
governance capabilities required to create market-enhancing conditions in a broader context 
of neoliberal reforms. The GEA, which had reconfigured its businesses as well as its asset and 
investment structure following economic liberalization, uses its newly gained organizational 
control to establish an institutional structure that deepens its powers economically as well as 
politically. The GEA’s interest in implementing ‘good governance’ reforms that further push an 
economic transnationalization agenda is thus an opportunistic institutional mechanism 
adopted in the larger neoliberal context of Colombia’s polity. The governance model of 
Medellín thus promotes economic growth labour-intensive sectors marked by low productivity 
in which the GEA has vested interests. The incompatibility between the present power 
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structure with advanced and growth-enhancing institutions is reinforced through the balances 
of power in Medellín’s society. The composition of this political settlement makes entry for 
outsiders or newcomers into high-rent markets difficult through their disadvantageous 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the ruling coalition. Capitalists with higher entrepreneurial 
capabilities, who in contrast to older incumbents of the GEA do not have established ties with 
the Fajardo coalition, are deterred by such institutional strategies, as their interests are 
incompatible with the constellation of power. 
In a quantitative analysis of the theoretical and qualitative findings we discussed the 
implications of Medellín’s changed political settlements on public policies and private 
investment patterns. Using different quantitative methods we found that the particular 
combination of power and institutions in Medellín has largely facilitated public and private 
investments into sectors with low productivity growth, such as tourism, financial services, and 
construction. The volatility and speculative nature of these sectors further hindered 
productivity growth in Medellín’s economy. Hence, Medellín’s large GDP growth rates can be 
explained by a drastic increase in economic activities that in the long run will not serve the 
urban economy as sustainable growth escalators. The analysis also showed that most of the 
employment in Medellín’s non-agricultural sectors is concentrated in low productivity sectors. 
The analysis of labour market effects of this development revealed that there are large gross 
employment elasticities in Medellín’s very low productivity economy. The inability of 
additional GDP per capita growth to create productivity gains and to incentivize the acquisition 
of advanced technology shows that much of the economic growth is based on growth in low-
wage sectors, as Medellín’s cheap labour force makes labour supply highly elastic to GDP 
growth. This shows the underlying incapacity of Medellín’s governance model to create 
forward or backward linkages for productivity growth. This also becomes clear in the analysis 
of Medellín’s exports, which firstly have decreased over GDP growth and secondly have been 
dominated by low technology goods. These developments had a disastrous impact on wages 
and inequality. Real wages have been stagnating along with permanent employment. 
Unsurprisingly, Medellín remains the most unequal city in one of the most unequal countries 
worldwide.  
In analysing the developmental outcomes in terms of political stability and violence we found 
that the transformed power structures and institutional environment have helped in stabilizing 
the city’s political settlement by gathering different elite factions around the axis of 
transnational accumulation patterns. The dominant elite factions and the paramilitaries share 
similar interests in participating in globalized markets. We also found that the interests of all 
elite factions – including the paramilitary and informal organizations – in attracting (foreign) 
225 
 
investments had implications on the tactics of war and forms of violence. Hence, while 
homicide rates decreased, we could identify an increase in other forms of violence, such as 
forced disappearances, extortions and forced displacement.  
 
8.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
We have argued that the implementation and enforcement of policies that can create 
conditions for achieving successful developmental outcomes depend on a variety of different 
context-specific factors. The political settlements approach enables us to identify important 
variables that play important roles in bringing a society to inclusive and sustainable levels of 
political and economic viability. As these different variables are interdependent and are likely 
to have non-linear effects, the targeting of market failures through specific policy reforms is 
not always straightforward. Our analysis has found that this is particularly true in a context 
where state powers have been decentralized and transnational factors play an increasingly 
influential role. 
However, we can start by differentiating between variables that are relatively susceptible to be 
influenced by policy changes, and variables that would need longer term policy commitment in 
order to achieve significant changes. The variables that are usually the easiest target for policy 
change are capabilities of state agencies and governance actors. However, and different from 
the ‘good governance’ prescription, the policy change should prioritize a strengthening of 
governance capabilities to first identify potential growth-escalating sectors and secondly to 
implement financing instruments that can create and distribute rents to these sectors. 
Learning needs to be incentivized first and foremost through a governance agency that has the 
capabilities to create the conditions for a targeted sector to achieve growth-enhancing 
outcomes.  
The success of such a policy change also depends on the structure and capabilities of the 
targeted firm or sector. Changing the structure of firms and sectors might be more difficult 
than the change in the governance capacity of a state agency. But the targeted selection of a 
particular group of firms for support can help in developing their entrepreneurial capabilities in 
order to use rent benefits for investments into efforts in learning and acquiring higher 
technology activities. However, both the governance agency as well as the particular financing 
instrument need to target the specific appropriability problems different types of firms face in 
their processes of learning. This also includes a targeting of financing needs through FDI that 
can help domestic firms in improving learning processes for higher technology activities.  
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The discussion of the political settlements framework, however, suggests that these easier 
policy changes that can be achieved in the short to medium term are only feasible if we 
identify some constraints that are determined by other variables often exogenous to the policy 
change. This includes the interests and ideas of power elite faction that can influence the 
direction of policy change and thus development outcomes. The discussion of a political 
settlements framework for local-level analysis furthermore points to the importance of looking 
at changes and dynamics at the national level, which are often exogenous to the local level 
political settlement but nevertheless drive local developmental outcomes.  
The analysis of balances of power in a society are not to be neglected in this revisited political 
settlement framework. As the political settlement also defines the bargaining power between 
the state agency and the different types of firms, attempts at policy changes need to take 
these conditions as given. This can make short term changes difficult to achieve. A change of 
the political settlement itself can be achieved but this requires the political and organizational 
commitment of internally organized political movements in the medium to long term.  
The balances of power and the position of minimally capable entrepreneurs in the ruling 
coalition can affect the likelihood of implementing or enforcing a policy that intends to 
improve the governance capacities of a state agency, financing instruments that create and 
distribute rents, and the structure of firms or sectors that receive rent benefits. This also 
means that any policy that aims to achieve institutional change will fail to lead to positive 
outcomes if the different variables are treated as separate policy domains. It is impossible to 
achieve an ‘efficient governance agency’, an ‘effective financing instrument’, or a ‘good firm 
structure’ if they are taken out of context of a political economy analysis of how the different 
variables are interdependently connected in a political settlement with a particular distribution 
of power.  
The further theoretical exploration of the political settlements approach showed how 
movements towards decentralization and transnational factors affect the distribution of power 
in political settlements. However, the analysis of these processes through the political 
settlements lens also helps us in identifying further issues related to the implementation and 
enforcement of policies that can affect any of the discussed variables in a number of different 
ways. 
Political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization, for example have various implications for 
policy making. The downward transfer of state capacities might complicate policy 
coordination, which can slow down policy processes that have positive implications for 
governance agencies, financing instruments, and entrepreneurial capabilities of firms. The 
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increased complexity of the policy arena can thus add additional constraints for achieving 
growth-enhancing institutional changes. This is not to say that decentralization policies 
necessarily have negative consequences for developmental outcomes, but the effects of 
decentralization are not as straightforward and unambiguous as they are commonly presented 
by policy makers and academic scholars who take an unconditionally supportive stance 
towards decentralization. Even in a context where a ‘local developmental state’ has substantial 
governance capabilities, the national policy space remains an important sphere for rent 
management. 
For a comprehensive discussion of the implications of state restructuring on policy making we 
need to take the processes and impacts of transnationalization into further account. Besides 
that elite transnationalization substantially affect the power balances of a society, other 
transnational factors, such as the upward transfers of institutional capacities to supranational 
levels, complicate policy coordination further. The additional layer of the policy arena in 
general and influences of WTO, World Bank and the IMF in particular can hinder attempts to 
implement policies that would lead to growth-enhancing changes of governance agencies and 
financing instruments. The ever-increasing integration of the Colombian economy into global 
trade and investments regimes has reduced the scope of local and national governance 
agencies to implement financing instruments, such as tariffs and subsidies and has constrained 
the negotiating capacities of state agencies vis-à-vis foreign investors. Hence, while in pre-
transnationalized economies policy support to foreign investors was able to invoke a transfer 
of technological and organizational capabilities to domestic firms, these policy instruments 
have disappeared. Despite that the support of local firms remains important, transnationalized 
factors have complicated the design of policies that support local capability development. 
Local governance agencies need to develop capacities in order to create other financing 
measures and policy instruments to support local firms in learning and acquiring medium and 
high technological capabilities. However, in addition to these factors, the transnationalization 
of the capitalist interests of local capitalist elite factions might diminish possibilities of 
enforcing policies that would change the structure of firms or sectors in ways that could have 
positive effects on efforts of developing their technological capabilities. Economic integration 
and the participation of local capitalist elite factions in the global economy has not resulted in 
the development of medium and high technological capabilities. The persistence of 
comparative advantages in low productivity sectors hence hinders the development of 
capitalist interests in medium or high technology sectors. 
In sum, we find that the increased complexity of the policy arena through these additional 
layers have made effective implementation and enforcement of growth-enhancing policies 
228 
 
more complicated. Contrary to the ‘good governance’ reform prescriptions that generally 
imply market-led development, we find that more rather than less policy coordination is 
needed.  
Transposing these general findings into context-specific policy implications for Medellín proves 
difficult, particularly given the combinations of power constellation and institutions in the local 
political settlement. However, we find that there is a need to improve governance capabilities 
of state agencies to implement finance strategies that target domestic firms for support in 
developing technological capabilities. This is particularly true for rent created through the 
operations of EPM. Such policy measures of local capability development can also include the 
implementation of policies that support foreign investors. This could make MNEs commit to 
transferring more and more technologically advanced parts of the production value chain to 
targeted local sectors. The potential positive effects on productivity could increase demand for 
higher skilled labour, which would increase wages. Labour market reforms could furthermore 
target wage conditions that perpetuate conditions of high gross employment elasticities and 
high inequality.  
A globally integrated local economy also means that governance agencies in Medellín need to 
develop capacities to generate conditions that could facilitate the development of pre- and 
post-production services that are higher up on the value chain. As suggested by Baldwin 
(2013), for globally integrated local and regional economies to achieve high value added 
growth, industrialization becomes less significant. As such, for Medellín to achieve economic 
dynamism in sectors with high shares of value added, local entrepreneurs do not necessarily 
need to focus on developing capabilities in manufacturing of capital goods. Rather, and 
particularly in a context where the “vocation” of Medellín’s economy is seen in service sectors, 
local policy actors and governance agencies may want to focus on creating incentives for the 
development of high value added pre- and post-production services. These can include IT 
services, design of goods for production, marketing of goods, and the like. Policies that focus 
on wage convergence, rather than on specialization driven by low wages could help in boosting 
Medellín’s position as a player in the global supply chain trade. As Baldwin (2013, p. 50) 
suggests, “income convergence will boost supply chain trade in that the extra horizontal 
specialization will more than compensate any reduction in wage-driven, vertical 
specialization”.  
Examples for successful transition to horizontal specialization in high value added services can 
be found in Dubai, where pre-production activities (R&D, design, commercialization) and post-
production activities (marketing, advertising, specialized logistics) for global production and 
supply chains dominate the share of value added of GDP. Other plant-level examples include 
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Brazil’s flip-flop brand Havaianas. Started with the production of a basic model available in 
only four different colours, the relatively low-technology production process did not generate 
particularly high shares of value added. However, by focussing on product innovation and 
design, research and development of new materials, as well as on marketing, brand 
management and advertisement, the parent company Alpargatas could build Havaianas to 
become a global brand with net revenues going through the roof (see FT, 2013). While the 
company made a net revenue of R$1.9 billion in 2009, this increased to R$3.4 billion in 2013 
(49% of which came from the business branch of sandals) (see Alpargatas, 2013). Despite the 
seemingly low-technology production of a non-durable good, the flip-flop brand Havaianas 
provides a useful case showing how pre- and post-production services have become an 
important source for high value added growth in a globalized economy. Medellín’s local 
governance agencies as well as the local entrepreneurial elite could draw valuable lessons 
from these examples of successful horizontal diversification and specialization. Economic 
growth strategies and efforts for achieving high value added output could focus on developing 
governance capacities and entrepreneurial capabilities in high value added pre- and post-
production activities. 
 
8.3 AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
A general suggestion for future avenues of research stems from the insights offered by the use 
of the political settlements approach and in particular by the original application of the 
political settlements framework to a politically decentralized and economically 
transnationalized context. This allowed us to illuminate and overcome some limitations of 
studies that are embedded in conventional theories of institutional change and helped us to 
further explore the validity of our alternative political economy approach. 
Further research needs to critically test the political settlements approach discussed and 
explored in this thesis. This would entail a thorough study of how local and transnational 
factors impact power structures, institutional environments, governance capacities, and 
entrepreneurial capabilities in other decentralized and liberalized contexts. Any future 
research that aims to test the political settlements approach would also help in the process of 
theoretical refinement of the framework, making it a superior institutional theory for the 
analysis of developmental experience to the context-detached approaches that argue for one-
size-fits all solutions.  
Further comparative case study research is also needed. A comparative analysis of 
developmental experiences using our explored political settlements framework could help in 
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testing the approach across different geographical contexts. Such an empirical testing of the 
approach could not only help in theoretical refining, but also in achieving clearer 
understanding of policy challenges for the different layers of policy making (local, national, 
transnational). The exact impacts of possible opportunities and constraints in the transformed 
policy arena require careful study of how the different layers of policy making – including the 
national level – can achieve a successful policy coordination. 
For the particular issue of policy implications, further research is needed that analyses the 
actual processes and impacts of transnationalization in its great varieties. While this thesis 
provided a clear discussion of how the transnational capitalist elite in Latin America affects 
power constellation, governance structures, and technological capabilities, future research 
could focus on the implications of changes in trade relations. Of particular interest could be a 
discussion of particular production processes that are integrated into global chains of 
commodity production.  
In the Colombian context such an analysis would need to include the effects of a recent trade 
agreement between the country and the United States and a trade agreement between 
Colombia and the European Union, which came into effect in 2012 and 2013 respectively. Both 
agreements significantly change the policy space of local governments in Colombia, as they 
reduce the scope of tariffs and subsidies. These agreements furthermore weaken the 
bargaining power of local authorities in Colombia vis-à-vis foreign investors to transfer 
technology for domestic content requirements. Beyond the impacts on policy scope, the 
agreements also affect the participation of Colombian companies in the global production 
chain. Further research is needed on the actual impacts of these changes.  
We conclude by underlining the importance of the contributions of this thesis for a complete 
and rigorous understanding of institutional performance in achieving growth and 
development. The application of an alternative historical political economy framework to the 
locality of Medellín provided comprehensive analytical and empirical evidence demonstrating 
the wider validity of the political settlements approach. Our findings provided highly original 
insight on how broader political economy trends impact context-specific developments in a 
decentralized locality. 
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APPENDIX  
TABLE A1: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED  
Name Organization Position 
Arias, Desmond New York University Professor 
Álbanez Mesa, Adiella 
Maria 
Mesa de derrechos humanos, 
Comuna 7 
Community Leader 
Angel, Andrés Sofía Pérez Foundation, 
Foundation close to GEA 
Chairman 
Arboldea, Guillermo Confederacion de Cooperativas 
Antioquia (CONFECOOP 
Antioquia) 
President 
Arcila, Carlos  Mesa de derechos humanos de 
Medellín 
Community Leader 
Bateman, Milford Juraj Dobrila University Lecturer 
Berdugo López, Álvaro 
Iván 
Mayor's Office Deputy Mayor and 
Secretary of Territorial 
Development (2012-2016) 
Betancur, María 
Soledad  
Instituto Popular de 
Capacitación (IPC) 
Researcher/Economist 
Bojanini Garcia, David 
Emilio 
Grupo Sura CEO 
Brand, Peter National University Colombia Professor 
Canavire Bacarreza, 
Gustavo  
EAFIT University Lecturer 
Diez, Jorge Ivan Confederación General de 
Trabajo Antioquia (CGT 
Antioquia) 
President 
Duncan, Gustavo Northwestern and EAFIT 
University 
Lecturer 
Duran Ortiz, Juan 
Pablo 
International Bureau for Social 
and Economic Research (IBSER) 
Researcher/Economist 
Echeverri, Jaime Medellín Chamber of Commerce President 
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Escobar Arango, David Mayor's Office Private Secretary (2004-
2008) 
Fernández Correa, 
Patricia 
NGO Viva la Ciudadanía Director 
Garcia Molina, Mario National University Colombia Professor 
Gaviria Gutiérrez, Juan 
Felipe 
Empresas Publicas de Medellín 
(EPM), Mayor's office 
President of EPM (2004-
2008), Mayor (1983-1984) 
Giraldo Ramirez, Jorge 
Alberto 
EAFIT University Professor 
Guarin, Weimar Mesa Por La Vida Community Leader 
Gutierrez, Federico Mayor's Office Mayor (2016-2020) 
Gutierrez, Fransisco National University Colombia Professor 
Henao, Alberto Mayor's Office Economist at DAP 
Hoyos Vieira, Luis 
Felipe 
Mayor's Office Deputy Mayor and 
Secretary of Economic 
Development (2012-2016) 
Hylton, Forrest Northwestern University Professor 
Ibanez, Sergio Fuerzas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia (FARC) 
Member of Peace 
Delegation 
Jaramillo, Carlos 
Hernando 
Mayor's Office Director of Planning (2004-
2009) 
Loaiza García, Rodrigo Mayor's Office Deputy Secretary of 
Administration (2004-2008) 
and Deputy Secretary of 
Planning (2012-2016) 
Lopera Pérez, Juan 
Diego 
Mayor's Office; Governor's 
Office 
Co-director of Territorial 
Planning (2004-2008); 
MacLean, Kate   Birkbek Lecturer 
Martinez Roldan, Luis 
Esteban 
Mayor's Office Economist at DAP 
Maya, Guillermo National University Colombia Professor 
Mejía Martinez, Jorge Mayor's Office Secretary of Government 
(2012-2016) 
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Mejia Mejia, Juan 
Felipe 
EAFIT University Professor 
Munevar, Daniel National Finance Ministry Macroeconomic Advisor 
Niño, Eduard Convivamos Comuna 1 Community Leader 
Ojeda, Tomas Fuerzas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia (FARC) 
Member of Peace 
Delegation 
Ortíz Arciniegas, 
Catalina 
National University Colombia Professor 
Osorio, Sergio Grupo Argos Vice-President 
Paris, Andres Fuerzas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia (FARC) 
Member of Peace 
Delegation 
Patiño Marín, Juan 
Manuel 
Mayor's Office Co-Director of Planning 
Department (DAP) 
Pérez Jaramillo, Jorge Mayor's Office Director of Planning 
Department (DAP) (2012-
2016) 
Pérez Moreno, 
Santiago 
Bancolombia Vice-President 
Pérez Salazar, Iván 
Mauricio 
Mayor's Office; Instituto para el 
Desarrollo de Antioquia (IDEA) 
Secretary of Social 
Development (2004-2008); 
Finance Secretary (2008-
2012); President of IDEA 
(2012-2016) 
Pérez Zapata, Elkin de 
Jesus 
Corporación Con-Vivamos Community Leader 
Pérez, Oscar Dario Asociación Mutual La 1 Community Leader 
Piraquive, Gabriel National Planning Department, 
DNP 
Director of Economic 
Studies 
Quijano, Fernando Corporación para la Paz y el 
Desarrollo Social (Corpades) 
President 
Quintero, Juan Camilo Ruta N, Mayor's Office Director 
Quintero, Rafael Confederación General de 
Trabajo Antioquia (CGT 
Antioquia) 
President 
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Ramírez Brouchoud, 
María Fernanda 
EAFIT University Lecturer 
Ramírez, Ivan Dario NGO Paz y Democracia President 
Ramos Villa, María 
Eugenia 
Mayor's Office,; Governor's 
Office 
Secretary of Administrative 
Services (2004-2008), 
Empresa de Desarrollo 
Urbano (2008-2012); 
Director of Antioquia 
Planning Department 
(2012-2016) 
Rendón, Andrés Julian Governor's office Luis Alfredo 
Ramos (2008-2011) 
Secretary of Government 
(Governor, 2008-2012) 
Restrepo Posada, 
Federico 
Empresas Publicas de Medellín 
(EPM), Mayor's office, Now 
Instituto para el Desarrollo de 
Antioquia (IDEA) 
Director of Planning (2004-
2008), President of EPM 
(2008-2012), Vice-
President of IDEA (2012-
2016) 
Restrepo, Magdalena Fraternidad, Foundation of GEA Chairwoman 
Rios, Norberto Escuela Sindical Nacional (ESN) President 
Roman, Martin NGO Veeduria President 
Romero Vidal, 
Mauricio 
Javeriana University Professor 
Ruiz, Olmedo (aka. 
Ómar de Jesús 
Restrepo Correa) 
Fuerzas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia (FARC) 
Member of Peace 
Delegation 
Salazar, Alonso Mayor's Office Mayor (2008-2012) 
Sierra, Juan Carlos Mesa de derechos humanos de 
Medellín; Mesa metropolitana 
Community Leader 
Sierra, Ricardo Distrihogar CEO 
Tobón, Sergio Proantioquia Coordinator Social Thinking 
Torres Garcia, 
Alejandro 
EAFIT University Lecturer 
Uran, Omar Instituto Popular de 
Capacitación (IPC) 
Researcher 
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Valderrama, Juan 
David 
Agencia de Cooperacion e 
Inversion (ACI), Mayor's Office 
Director 
Velásquez, Karlos Mesa Interbarrial Comuna 8 Community Leader 
Vélez Cadavid, José 
Alberto 
Grupo Argos CEO 
 
